The (latest) “crisis in confidence” in social psychology has generated much heated discussion about the importance of replication, including how such replication should be carried out as well as interpreted by scholars in the field. What does it mean if a replication attempt “fails”—does it mean that the original results, or the theory that predicted them, have been falsified? And how should “failed” replications affect our belief in the validity of the original research? In this paper, we consider the “replication” debate from a historical and philosophical perspective, and provide a conceptual analysis of both replication and falsification as they pertain to this important discussion. Along the way, we introduce a Bayesian framework for assessing “failed” replications in terms of how they should affect our confidence in purported findings.

Historically, laws and policies to criminalize drug use or possession were rooted in explicit racism, and they continue to wreak havoc on certain racialized communities. We are a group of bioethicists, drug experts, legal scholars, criminal justice researchers, sociologists, psychologists, and other allied professionals who have come together in support of a policy proposal that is evidence-based and ethically recommended. We call for the immediate decriminalization of all so-called recreational drugs and, ultimately, for their timely and appropriate legal regulation. We also call for criminal convictions for nonviolent offenses pertaining to the use or possession of small quantities of such drugs to be expunged, and for those currently serving time for these offenses to be released. In effect, we call for an end to the “war on drugs.”

In this article, we explore the potential of enhancing academic prose and idea generation by fine-tuning a large language model (here, GPT-3) on one's own previously published writings: AUTOGEN ("AI Unique Tailored Output GENerator"). We develop, test, and describe three distinct AUTOGEN models trained on the prior scholarly output of three of the current authors (SBM, BDE, JS), with a fourth model trained on the combined works of all three. Our AUTOGEN models demonstrate greater variance in quality than the base GPT-3 model, with many outputs outperforming the base model in format, style, overall quality, and novel idea generation. As proof of principle, we present and discuss examples of AUTOGEN-written sections of existing and hypothetical research papers. We further discuss ethical opportunities, concerns, and open questions associated with personalized academic prose and idea generators. Ethical opportunities for personalized LLMs such as AUTOGEN include increased productivity, preservation of writing styles and cultural traditions, and aiding consensus building. However, ethical concerns arise due to the potential for personalized LLMs to reduce output diversity, violate privacy and intellectual property rights, and facilitate plagiarism or fraud. The use of coauthored or multiple-source trained models further complicates issues surrounding ownership and attribution. Open questions concern a potential credit-blame asymmetry for LLM outputs, the legitimacy of licensing agreements in authorship ascription, and the ethical implications of coauthorship attribution for data contributors. Ensuring the output is sufficiently distinct from the source material is crucial to maintaining ethical standards in academic writing. These opportunities, risks, and open issues highlight the intricate ethical landscape surrounding the use of personalized LLMs in academia. We also discuss open technical questions concerning the integration of AUTOGEN-style personalized LLMs with other LLMs, such as GPT-4, for iterative refinement and improvement of generated text. In conclusion, we argue that AUTOGEN-style personalized LLMs offer significant potential benefits in terms of both prose generation and, to a lesser extent, idea generation. If associated ethical issues are appropriately addressed, AUTOGEN alone or in combination with other LLMs can be seen as a potent form of academic enhancement.

When making substituted judgments for incapacitated patients, surrogates often struggle to guess what the patient would want if they had capacity. Surrogates may also agonize over having the (sole) responsibility of making such a determination. To address such concerns, a Patient Preference Predictor (PPP) has been proposed that would use an algorithm to infer the treatment preferences of individual patients from population-level data about the known preferences of people with similar demographic characteristics. However, critics have suggested that even if such a PPP were more accurate, on average, than human surrogates in identifying patient preferences, the proposed algorithm would nevertheless fail to respect the patient's (former) autonomy since it draws on the 'wrong' kind of data: namely, data that are not specific to the individual patient and which therefore may not reflect their actual values, or their reasons for having the preferences they do. Taking such criticisms on board, we here propose a new approach: the Personalized Patient Preference Predictor (P4). The P4 is based on recent advances in machine learning, which allow technologies including large language models to be more cheaply and efficiently 'fine-tuned' on person-specific data. The P4, unlike the PPP, would be able to infer an individual patient's preferences from material (e.g., prior treatment decisions) that is in fact specific to them. Thus, we argue, in addition to being potentially more accurate at the individual level than the previously proposed PPP, the predictions of a P4 would also more directly reflect each patient's own reasons and values. In this article, we review recent discoveries in artificial intelligence research that suggest a P4 is technically feasible, and argue that, if it is developed and appropriately deployed, it should assuage some of the main autonomy-based concerns of critics of the original PPP. We then consider various objections to our proposal and offer some tentative replies.