Penélope Hernández

Dr. Penélope Hernández


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

23Years (2004-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 November 2006 in Econometrica
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OGOlivier Gossner
Olivier Gossner
PHPenélope Hernández
Penélope Hernández
ANAbraham Neyman
Abraham Neyman

1 January 2016 in Journal of Dynamics and Games
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LELea Ellwardt
Lea Ellwardt
PHPenélope Hernández
Penélope Hernández
GMGuillem Martínez-Cánovas
Guillem Martínez-Cánovas
MMManuel Muñoz-Herrera
Manuel Muñoz-Herrera
We examine the interplay between a person's individual preference and the social influence others exert. We provide a model of network relationships with conflicting preferences, where individuals are better off coordinating with those around them, but where not all have a preference for the same action. We test our model in an experiment, varying the level of conflicting preferences between individuals. Our findings suggest that preferences are more salient than social influence, under conflicting preferences: subjects relate mainly with others who have the same preferences. This leads to two undesirable outcomes: network segregation and social inefficiency. The same force that helps people individually, hurts society.

1 December 2014 in Operations Research
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PHPenélope Hernández
Penélope Hernández
BSBernhard von Stengel
Bernhard von Stengel
This paper studies the stability of communication protocols that deal with transmission errors. We consider a coordination game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver, who communicate over a noisy channel. The sender’s strategy, called a code, maps states of nature to signals. The receiver’s best response is to decode the received channel output as the state with highest expected receiver payoff. Given this decoding, an equilibrium or “Nash code” results if the sender encodes every state as prescribed. We show two theorems that give sufficient conditions for Nash codes. First, a receiver-optimal code defines a Nash code. A second, more surprising observation holds for communication over a binary channel, which is used independently a number of times, a basic model of information transmission: under a minimal “monotonicity” requirement for breaking ties when decoding, which holds generically, every code is a Nash code.

7 August 2023 in Games and Economic Behavior
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GAGalit Ashkenazi-Golan
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan
PHPenélope Hernández
Penélope Hernández
ZNZvika Neeman
Zvika Neeman
ESEilon Solan
Eilon Solan

19 October 2019 in Entropy
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CBCarles Breto
Carles Breto
PAPriscila Espinosa Adamez
Priscila Espinosa Adamez
PHPenélope Hernández
Penélope Hernández
Jose PaviaJose Pavia
Jose Pavia
This paper applies a Machine Learning approach with the aim of providing a single aggregated prediction from a set of individual predictions. Departing from the well-known maximum-entropy inference methodology, a new factor capturing the distance between the true and the estimated aggregated predictions presents a new problem. Algorithms such as ridge, lasso or elastic net help in finding a new methodology to tackle this issue. We carry out a simulation study to evaluate the performance of such a procedure and apply it in order to forecast and measure predictive ability using a dataset of predictions on Spanish gross domestic product.

10 September 2020 in Experimental Economics
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SGSanjeev Goyal
Sanjeev Goyal
PHPenélope Hernández
Penélope Hernández
GMGuillem Martínez-Cánovas
Guillem Martínez-Cánovas
FMFrédéric Moisan
Frédéric Moisan
MMManuel Muñoz-Herrera
Manuel Muñoz-Herrera
ASAngel Sánchez
Angel Sánchez
We study a setting where individuals prefer to coordinate with others but they differ on their preferred action. Our interest is in understanding the role of link formation with others in shaping behavior. So we consider the situation in which interactions are exogenous and a situation where individuals choose links that determine the interactions. Theory is permissive in both settings: conformity (on either of the actions) and diversity (with different groups choosing their preferred actions) are both sustainable in equilibrium. We conduct an experiment to understand how link formation affects equilibrium selection. Our experiment reveals the powerful effect of linking on equilibrium selection: with an exogenous complete network, subjects choose to conform on the majority’s preferred action. By contrast, with endogenous linking—irrespective of the costs of linking—subjects always opt for diversity of actions.