Infrastructure planning for Urban Water Systems (UWSs) is challenged by, inter alia, increasing uncertainty in both demand and availability of water and aging infrastructure, and this is already impacting the climate-proofing of cities. In this context, the idea of resilience has been gradually embraced by the water sector, but the term itself is not yet universally defined, nor operationalised. Here, we propose a methodology to assess the resilience of a UWS, defining it as the degree to which the UWS continues to perform under increasing stress. A resilience assessment method is then proposed as a ‘stress-test’ of UWS configurations, under increasingly more stressful scenarios. We then demonstrate a toolbox assembled for the proposed analysis using, as a proof of concept, a semi-synthetic case study. Results are promising, suggesting that the approach could assist in the uptake and evolution of resilience thinking in strategic water infrastructure decision making, leading to water-wiser cities.

The water sector is facing emerging challenges, as cyber-physical threats target Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems of water utilities. A cyber-physical stress-testing platform is presented in this work, named RISKNOUGHT, which is able to model water distribution networks as cyber-physical systems, simulating the information flow of the cyber layer and the feedback interactions with the physical processes under control. RISKNOUGHT utilizes an EPANET-based solver for the physical process and a customizable network model for the SCADA system, capable of implementing complex control logic schemes within a simulation. The platform enables the development of composite cyber-physical attacks on various elements of the SCADA, including sensors, actuators, and PLCs, assessing the impact they have on the hydraulic response of the distribution network and the level of service. The platform is tested on a proof-of-concept benchmark network with promising results that demonstrate that the platform can form an innovative cyber-physical tool to support strategic planning and risk management.

The water sector is, currently and for the foreseeable future, challenged by rising levels of uncertainty in demand and availability of water, in a context of aging infrastructure and limited investment. In order to support strategic planning, water companies need a way to assess how their system behaves when faced with a range of changing conditions (climatic trends, asset deterioration, behavioral patterns, etc.) as well as accidents/incidents and/or extreme events (wildcards). In this study, a resilience assessment methodology was demonstrated, with ‘stress tests’ alternative water system configurations (including systems designed with decentralized or distributed philosophies) under a range of scenarios and extreme events. A ‘resilience profile graph’ was developed to quantify the performance of each configuration. The methodology was applied to the real-world urban water system of Oasen, which supplies the eastern part of the Province of South Holland, where the current system configuration and two potential future configurations were tested (one decentralized and one distributed). We show how the concept of resilience, operationalized through this methodology, can assist long term decision making and support strategic infrastructure planning.

Centralized urban water management currently faces multiple challenges, both at the supply side and the demand side. These challenges underpin the need to progress to the decentralization of urban water, where multiple distributed technologies (water-aware appliances, rainwater harvesting, greywater recycling, sustainable urban drainage) are applied in an integrated fashion and as a supplement to centralized systems to design more resilient neighborhoods. However, the methods and tools to assess the performance of these distributed solutions and provide management support for integrated projects are still few and mostly untested in real, combined cases. This study presents a simulation-based framework for the quantitative performance assessment of decentralized systems at a neighborhood scale, where different technologies can be linked together to provide beneficial effects across multiple urban water cycle domains. This framework links an urban water cycle model, which provides a scenario-based simulation testbed for the response of the whole system, with key performance indicators that evaluate the performance of integrated decentralized solutions at a neighborhood scale. The demonstrated framework is applied to provide an ex ante evaluation of SUPERLOCAL, a newly developed area in Limburg, the Netherlands, designed as a circular, water-wise neighborhood where multiple decentralized technologies are combined.

Water distribution networks (WDNs) are critical infrastructure for the welfare of society. Due to their spatial extent and difficulties in deployment of security measures, they are vulnerable to threat scenarios that include the rising concern of cyber-physical attacks. To protect WDNs against different kinds of water contamination, it is customary to deploy water quality (WQ) monitoring sensors. Cyber-attacks on the monitoring system that employs WQ sensors combined with deliberate contamination events via backflow attacks can lead to severe disruptions to water delivery or even potentially fatal consequences for consumers. As such, the water sector is in immediate need of tools and methodologies that can support cyber-physical quality attack simulation and vulnerability assessment of the WQ monitoring system under such attacks. In this study we demonstrate a novel methodology to assess the resilience of placement schemes generated with the Threat Ensemble Vulnerability Assessment and Sensor Placement Optimization Tool (TEVA-SPOT) and evaluated under cyber-physical attacks simulated using the stress-testing platform RISKNOUGHT, using multidimensional metrics and resilience profile graphs. The results of this study show that some sensor designs are inherently more resilient than others, and this trait can be exploited in risk management practices.

This work proposes a modeling framework to quantify the effects of deliberate organic contamination events on water distribution systems. A bacterial regrowth model and a first parallel chlorine decay model were combined to describe the biochemical water species kinetics during a deliberate contaminant injection consisting of organic (TOC) and bacterial loads. Several attacks were modeled using EPANET-MSX. The impact of each attack was quantified using vulnerability indexes measuring the number of consumers affected and other metrics. These vulnerability indexes were then used to depict the network’s response to a potential threat and identify the most critical areas of the network. A sensitivity analysis was also performed to determine the network’s sensitivity to three dynamic network variables (mass injection, injection duration, and organic carbon concertation in water). An increase on bacterial populations was observed during the contaminant spread to the network, which in turn signals additional health risk to consumers.