Johanna Sepúlveda

Johanna Sepúlveda


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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24 March 2020 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RFRamon Fernandes
Ramon Fernandes
César MarconCésar Marcon
César Marcon
RCRodrigo Cataldo
Rodrigo Cataldo
JSJohanna Sepúlveda
Johanna Sepúlveda
The Internet-of-Things (IoT) boosted the building of computational systems that share computation, communication and storage resources for uncountable types of applications. MultiProcessor System-on-Chip (MPSoC) is a fundamental component of such systems offering large parallelism degree in an ocean of processors and memories connected through one or more Network-on-Chips (NoCs). Therefore, a massive quantity of sensitive information of several applications can share computation and communication resources of the MPSoCs demanding security mechanisms and policies. Besides, the advances of CMOS technologies increases the quantity of static and dynamic faults, requiring a dependable and resilient target architecture, which can be partially fulfilled by an effective and efficient NoC design. This work addresses fault tolerance and security at NoC level with SDR, a routing algorithm that includes the concept of security zones in the MPSoC while providing support for dependable routing avoiding faulty links. The proposed routing algorithm prioritizes communication paths deemed secure in 2D mesh NoCs with deadlock freedom. Experimental results employing realistic workload scenarios based on the NASA Numeric Aerodynamic Simulation (NAS) Parallel Benchmark (NPB) and a fault model for 65nm and 22nm CMOS fabrication technologies demonstrates the scalability, security, and dependability of SDR.

13 January 2019
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
TFTim Fritzmann
Tim Fritzmann
TPThomas Pöppelmann
Thomas Pöppelmann
JSJohanna Sepúlveda
Johanna Sepúlveda

25 January 2019 in IEEE Embedded Systems Letters
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JSJohanna Sepúlveda
Johanna Sepúlveda
SLShiyang Liu
Shiyang Liu
JMJose M. Bermudo Mera
Jose M. Bermudo Mera

Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CCCesar G. Chaves
Cesar G. Chaves
SASiavoosh Payandeh Azad
Siavoosh Payandeh Azad
THThomas Hollstein
Thomas Hollstein
JSJohanna Sepúlveda
Johanna Sepúlveda
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are an increasing threat for Multiprocessor System-on-Chip (MPSoC) architectures. By exploiting the shared resources on the chip, an attacker is able to prevent completion or degrade the performance of a task. This is extremely dangerous for MPSoCs used in critical applications. The Network-on-Chip (NoC), as a central MPSoC infrastructure, is exposed to this attack. In order to maintain communication availability, NoCs should be enhanced with an effective and precise attack detection mechanism that allows the triggering of effective attack mitigation mechanisms. Previous research works demonstrate DoS attacks on NoCs and propose detection methods being implemented in NoC routers. These countermeasures typically led to a significantly increased router complexity and to a high degradation of the MPSoC’s performance. To this end, we present two contributions. First, we provide an analysis of information that helps to narrow down the location of the attacker in the MPSoC, achieving up to a 69% search space reduction for locating the attacker. Second, we propose a low cost mechanism for detecting the location and direction of the interference, by enhancing the communication packet structure and placing communication degradation monitors in the NoC routers. Our experiments show that our NoC router architecture detects single-source DoS attacks and determines, with high precision, the location and direction of the collision, while incurring a low area and power overhead.

1 September 2017
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
JSJohanna Sepúlveda
Johanna Sepúlveda
AZAndreas Zankl
Andreas Zankl
OMOliver Mischke
Oliver Mischke
Public-key cryptography (PKC), widely used to protect communication in the Internet of Things (IoT), is the basis for establishing secured communication channels between multiple parties. The foreseeable breakthrough of quantum computers represents a risk for many PKC ecosystems. Almost all approaches in use today rely on the hardness of factoring large integers or computing (elliptic-curve) discrete logarithms. It is known that cryptography based on these problems can be broken in polynomial time by Shors algorithm, once a large enough quantum computer is built. In order to prepare for such an event, the integration of quantum-resistant cryptography on devices operating in the IoT is mandatory to achieve long-term security. Due to their limited resources, tight performance requirements and long-term life-cycles, this is especially challenging for Multi-Processor System-on-Chips (MPSoCs) operating in this context. At the same time, it must be provided that well-known implementation attacks, such as those targeting a cipher's execution time or its use of the processor cache, are inhibited, as they've successfully been used to attack cryptosystems in the pre-quantum era. Hence, this work presents an analysis of the security-critical polynomial multiplication routine within the NTRU algorithm and its susceptibility to timing and cache attacks. We also propose two different countermeasures to harden systems with or without caches against said attacks, and include the evaluation of the respective overheads. We demonstrate that security against timing and cache attacks can be achieved with reasonable overheads depending on the chosen parameters of NTRU.

1 September 2021
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
DVDariia Verchyk
Dariia Verchyk
JSJohanna Sepúlveda
Johanna Sepúlveda
Identity-based encryption (IBE) is a type of public-key encryption (PKE) that employs an identifier as the basis for the encryption mechanism. Thus, the communication parties are able to encrypt messages (or verify signatures) without any prior setup between users or distribution of user certificates. This is especially relevant in many mission critical applications, usually characterized by constrained end-points. MIKEY-SAKKE uses this concept to build a highly scalable protocol able to secure cross-platform multimedia communications. However, MIKEY-SAKKE is based on cryptographic primitives that will be no longer secure when sufficiently powerful quantum computers are built. To this end, this paper presents three contributions. First, it evaluates the performance of MIKEY-SAKKE in constrained embedded devices. Second, it extracts the requirements that post-quantum cryptographic primitives should meet in order to allow a plug-and-play replacement of the threatened security primitives with quantum-secure primitives. Third, it benchmarks the different post-quantum primitives running in the NIST standardization process and analyses their impact on the quantum-secure MIKEY-SAKKE. The results show that none of the NIST finalists perfectly meet all the specified requirements to achieve a post-quantum plug-and-play approach. However, the different combinations of post-quantum KEMs and signature schemes have a range of trade-offs compared to SAKKE and ECCSI, either having slower computation or larger keys and ciphertexts/signatures, or both.