Many Americans remain financially underprepared for retirement. While automatic enrollment in employer‐sponsored retirement plans has helped, target‐date funds (TDFs) used as default investments have limitations. We propose target‐date registered index‐linked annuities (TD‐RILAs) as a transparent, cost‐effective alternative providing decreasing equity exposure over time. A theoretical analysis explores TD‐RILAs' optimal structure and compares them to TDFs. A lab experiment examines investors' preferences, product transparency, default choices, and the role of information. We find that TD‐RILAs are a suitable addition to retirement plans, potentially rivaling TDFs.
This paper examines the moral hazard effects of cost‐sharing subsidies on the Affordable Care Act's Health Insurance Exchanges. Exploiting a sharp discontinuity in subsidy generosity at 150% of the federal poverty level, we compare healthcare spending for individuals just above and below this threshold using a regression discontinuity design and data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. We find that individuals just below 150% federal poverty level who receive the most generous subsidies spend approximately $1860 more annually on healthcare compared to those just above the threshold receiving less generous subsidies, implying an elasticity of −0.52. Several analyses suggest this discontinuity reflects moral hazard rather than adverse selection or health differences across the income threshold. The results highlight the significant impact of moral hazard induced by generous cost‐sharing subsidies, with important implications for the design of means‐tested health insurance subsidies.
How do collateral requirements impact consumer borrowing behavior? Using administrative loan application and performance data from the U.S. Federal Disaster Loan Program, we exploit a loan amount threshold above which households must post their residence as collateral. One-third of all borrowers select the maximum uncollateralized loan amount, and our bunching estimates suggest that the median borrower is willing to give up 40% of their loan amount to avoid collateral. Exploiting time variation in the loan amount threshold, we find that collateral causally reduces default rates by 35%. Our results help to explain high perceived default costs in the mortgage market, and uniquely quantify the extent to which collateral reduces moral hazard in consumer credit markets.