Despite several beneficial applications, unfortunately, drones are also being used for illicit activities such as drug trafficking, firearm smuggling or to impose threats to security-sensitive places like airports and nuclear power plants. The existing drone localization and neutralization technologies work on the assumption that the drone has already been detected and classified. Although we have observed a tremendous advancement in the sensor industry in this decade, there is no robust drone detection and classification method proposed in the literature yet. This paper focuses on radio frequency (RF) based drone detection and classification using the frequency signature of the transmitted signal. We have created a novel drone RF dataset using commercial drones and presented a detailed comparison between a two-stage and combined detection and classification framework. The detection and classification performance of both frameworks are presented for a single-signal and simultaneous multi-signal scenario. With detailed analysis, we show that You Only Look Once (YOLO) framework provides better detection performance compared to the Goodness-of-Fit (GoF) spectrum sensing for a simultaneous multi-signal scenario and good classification performance comparable to Deep Residual Neural Network (DRNN) framework.
Video display units (VDUs) using differential signaling technology significantly increase the risk of compromising video information security through leakage emissions. This article shows that differential signaling cables act as substantial video leakage sources. A concept is proposed that explains the video leakage principles of VDUs using differential signal cables such as the high-definition multimedia interface (HDMI) cable, digital visual interface (DVI) cable, and the low-voltage differential signaling (LVDS) cable. The emanations of the LVDS cable are closely examined by measuring simultaneously the differential video signal on the LVDS lines and its near- and far-field leakage emissions. From these measurements, several conclusions are drawn that give new insights into the video eavesdropping risk of VDUs using differential signaling methods. Furthermore, a novel video image reconstruction method is proposed that exploits the compromising emanations of a VDU by using frequency demodulation techniques. This article shows that leaked video emanations of VDUs using differential signaling cables are not only amplitude modulated (AM) but also frequency modulated (FM). This strongly implies that the possible algorithmic toolset of malicious video eavesdroppers is much larger than currently assumed. This article investigates several VDU setups at a distance of 10 m, including an ultrahigh-definition video display, three different HDMI cables and two notebooks. Additionally, the AM-based and FM-based video image reconstruction results are discussed and compared.
In this paper a method is presented which successfully reconstructs the video image of a video display unit (VDU) by exploiting its leakage emissions at a distance of 80 meters. The video image reconstruction is realized without any prior knowledge of the leaking VDU and by using commercial off-the-shelf material. The tested VDUs comprise of an UHD (ultra-high-definition) video display and a full HD (high-definition) video display, both employing an HDMI (high-definition multimedia interface) cable as a video data signaling interface linked to a notebook. The tested setups are located in an urban environment with sporadic radio emissions and occupied frequency bands. Subsequently, the methods and results are thoroughly discussed which give new insights into this video eavesdropping risk for improving video data security.
We model the power allocation interaction between a cognitive radio and a jammer as a two-player zero-sum game. First, we determine the power allocation strategy for the cognitive radio using a modified version of the Q-learning algorithm against fixed jamming strategies. The learned anti-jamming strategy will be compared to the common waterfilling technique. Then, we consider the power allocation game using Q-learning for both the cognitive radio and the jammer. The learned strategies will be compared to the Nash equilibrium found under the assumption of perfect knowledge. Finally, we consider the real scenario of a jammer with imperfect information.
25 October 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking
Neutralizing a drone using a protocol-aware RF jammer requires precise knowledge of the occupied spectrum in the time and frequency domains. This paper aims to develop an automatic spectrum prediction framework utilizing the Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) and Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) models. We generate a synthetic dataset using the commonly used drone signal properties and parameters, and evaluate the prediction performance under several realistic scenarios. Our experiment shows that the CNN-LSTM model can accurately predict future time and frequency sequences by using the spectrogram matrix as the input. We obtained better prediction performance with lower computational costs with our framework compared to the existing frameworks. Furthermore, we show that the CNN-LSTM model can predict future timefrequency sequences of unseen hopping rates and patterns when using transfer learning. The performance validation is also performed using real drone RF signals. Furthermore, we present a two-stage spectrum prediction approach that achieves excellent performance by offering higher frequency resolutions while maintaining a lower computational cost.