Xin Zhai

Xin Zhai


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

20Years (2007-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2014 in International Journal of Production Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HZHonggeng Zhou
Honggeng Zhou
YSYongyi Shou
Yongyi Shou
XZXin Zhai
Xin Zhai
LLLing Li
Ling Li
CWCraig Wood
Craig Wood
XWXiaobo Wu
Xiaobo Wu

1 September 2021 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MHMing Hu
Ming Hu
JLJingchen Liu
Jingchen Liu
XZXin Zhai
Xin Zhai
Problem definition : We study a special form of group buying: the group buying succeeds only if the number of sign-ups reaches a preset threshold, with no duration constraint. Customers with heterogeneous valuations arrive sequentially and decide between signing up for the group buying or purchasing a regular product. To decide whether to join the group buying, customers need to estimate their expected waiting time, which varies depending on the cumulative sign-ups by the time of their arrival. The firm decides on the prices for the group-buying product and regular product, with the product quality levels and group-buying size exogenously determined. Academic/practical relevance : This type of group buying is often adopted for a special edition of the product and offered alongside a constantly available regular product. Methodology : We study the product line design with the group-buying sign-up behavior of customers characterized by the rational expectations equilibrium in a random pledging process. Results : We show that group buying with flexible duration can result in intertemporal customer segmentation, as different segments might be admitted at different times in the dynamic sign-up process. Such intertemporal segmentation is a natural discrimination scheme and has nontrivial implications. First, the efficiency loss due to waiting for enough sign-ups may decrease when a larger batch size is required for economic production. Second, as valuation heterogeneity in the market increases, the firm may not always benefit from offering group buying along with the regular product. Third, group buying can achieve a win-win-win situation for both high-end and low-end customers as well as the firm. Managerial implications : In addition to demonstrating the profitability of flexible-duration group buying, we show that the firm can strengthen its profitability by contingently setting prices or concealing sign-up information in group buying. We also confirm the robustness of our main insights by considering customers’ heterogeneous patience levels and horizontally differentiated products, among other factors.

2 April 2024 in Production and Operations Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SHShengya Hua
Shengya Hua
YLYing Lei
Ying Lei
XZXin Zhai
Xin Zhai
In choosing healthcare services, price and waiting time are two important factors that matter to patients. Price is set by healthcare providers, while waiting time is usually endogenously determined by patient choice and the healthcare provider's capacity investment. We study the pricing and capacity design for profit-driven hospitals offering two types of healthcare services—regular and premium—serving heterogeneous patients who choose from either of the two types of services. Patients make their choices based on both price and endogenously determined equilibrium waiting time. We then benchmark profit-driven hospitals to welfare-driven hospitals to reveal how the behaviors of for-profit hospitals deviate from the socially optimal outcomes in patients waiting, service capacity, and price. We find that fewer patients are treated by premium services in profit-driven hospitals, and thus profit-driven hospitals invest less in premium service capacity and charge a higher premium for premium services than welfare-driven hospitals. These inefficiency distortions exist in profit-driven hospitals primarily because they are incentivized to differentiate between the waiting times of the two types of service to induce patients to pay a higher premium for premium services. Our results also show that if the inefficiency in patient partition is corrected, profit-driven hospitals would choose the welfare-maximizing level of premium service capacity and thus achieve socially optimal results. However, we also find that regulations such as price ceiling and capacity regulation cannot fully correct the inefficiency in patient partition and capacity decisions of profit-driven hospitals. Lastly, the model is extended in several ways to ensure robustness.

1 March 2025 in Marketing Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YLYing Lei
Ying Lei
JSJi Shen
Ji Shen
EYEi Yang
Ei Yang
XZXin Zhai
Xin Zhai
This paper characterizes repeat-purchase loyalty in a dynamic competitive environment and discusses the profitability of different types of loyalty driven by switching costs and positive brand preferences.

30 November 2011 in International Journal of Production Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XZXin Zhai
Xin Zhai
JWJames E. Ward
James E. Ward
LSLeroy B. Schwarz
Leroy B. Schwarz

1 February 2012 in Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JWJianghua Wu
Jianghua Wu
AIAnanth Iyer
Ananth Iyer
PPPaul V. Preckel
Paul V. Preckel
XZXin Zhai
Xin Zhai