Phenomenology describes everything that appears to consciousness in the how of its experiential givenness, that is, as a phenomenon. But is it adequate to describe the presence of the transcendent God as a phenomenon? This is the guiding question of my exploration. It proceeds in three steps: First, Husserl's reasons for excluding divine transcendence from the field of phenomenological research and Heidegger's criticism of so-called “onto-theology” and “metaphysics of presence” come into focus as background for the debates on the (im)possible gift and the “theological turn” in French phenomenology. Second, Marion's description of God's presence as givenness of a self-giving “saturated” phenomenon is discussed in confrontation with the counterarguments by Lévinas, Derrida, Husserl and Heidegger. Third, as a conclusion of these discussions, a model of theology as semiotic “phenomenology of the Invisible” is outlined, taking into account that God's transcendence can become phenomenal either in or in contrast to the ambiguity of appearances.

This paper develops a theological phenomenology of listening by exploring the following questions: First, what is the relation, in prayer, between speech and silence? Second, may we legitimately determine prayer as a ‘dialogue’ with God? Third, what does it mean to speak of God’s ‘silence’ after Auschwitz—is God completely ‘absent’ or just ‘hidden’? Fourth, how can we identify what God wants us to say and do, and how can we know whether a prayer has been answered? Texts by Jewish, Christian, and Muslim authors (from Rûmî via Luther, Kierkegaard, and Chrétien to Buber, Fackenheim, Levinas, and Derrida) provide the basis for the discussion.

How can severely traumatized persons re-present the past and its impact on the present if (due to blackout, repression, or dissociation) they could not witness what they went through, or can hardly recall it? Drawing on Holocaust testimonies, this article explores the crisis of witnessing constituted by the Shoah and, more generally, problems of integrating and communicating traumatic experiences. Phenomenological, psychological, and ethical perspectives contribute to a systematic investigation of the relation between trauma, memory and testimony. I will argue that preserving personal continuity across the gap between past and present presupposes not only an ‘inner witness’ – which can, according to a long philosophical tradition, be identified with a person’s conscience – but also a social context in which one is addressed and can respond. An attentive listener can bear witness to the witness by accepting the assignation of responsibility implied in testimonial interaction, and thereby support the dialogic restitution of memory and identity.

SUMMARY It lies in the biblical line of thought that cultic sacrifices to God are made superfluous by human love of God and the neighbor. But is it possible to completely get rid of any sort of sacrifice in interhuman love relationships? With reference to texts by Kierkegaard and Levinas, this article discusses the paradigms of (I.) love as self-sacrifice, (II.) love as self-giving, and (III.) the double bind between the two. Part I clarifies that their affirmation of self-sacrificial love is to be read against the backdrop of their critique of selfish sacrificial love that has not the power to renounce itself, even if the relation will be the other's ruin. Part II explains why proclaiming one's love as self-sacrifice means misunderstanding oneself, the other, and the relation between self and other. The result is that unselfish love cannot adequately be captured in terms of sacrifice at all, since it turns its logic ‘A sacrifices B to C for the sake of D’ upside down. In contrast, the logic of gift leads into surplus despite loss. Yet, in Part III it turns out that we cannot ‘sacrifice’ the notion of sacrifice in the name of love. Not only is there a hidden gift in sacrifice (receiving in giving up and away), but also a sacrifice in the gift of love (limitless obligation without a right for reciprocity). This has interesting implications for the debate on gender, including a self-critical impetus reminding the feminist movement of the fact that it is wrong to conceive of women as purely passive victims of male manipulation. The highly ambiguous role that the ‘self’ is playing in its self-sacrifice is worth being reconsidered. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Bereits der innerbiblische Gedankengang legt nahe, dass kultische Opfer für Gott durch Liebe zu Gott und zum Nächsten ersetzt werden. Aber ist es möglich, in zwischenmenschlichen Liebesverhältnissen auf jegliche Art von Opfer zu verzichten? Mit Bezug auf Texte von Kierkegaard und Levinas diskutiert der vorliegende Artikel die Paradigmen von Liebe als Selbstaufopferung (I.), Liebe als Gabe (II.) und das Dilemma der unauflöslichen Verbindung beider (III.). Teil I stellt klar, dass die Bejahung aufopfernder Liebe bei Kierkegaard und Levinas vor dem Hintergrund ihrer Kritik an egoistischer Liebe zu lesen ist. Letztere opfert eher einen anderen als sich selbst und will sich auch dann nicht aufgeben, wenn das Verhältnis den Untergang des geliebten Menschen bedeutet. Teil II entfaltet, weshalb es ein Selbstmissverständnis sowie ein Missverständnis des Anderen und des Verhältnisses zwischen Selbst und Anderem ist, die eigene Liebe als Selbstaufopferung zu erklären – mit dem Ergebnis, dass selbstlose Liebe überhaupt nicht angemessen als Opfer verstehbar ist, da sie dessen Logik ›A opfert B für C um D willen‹ auf den Kopf stellt. Die Logik der Gabe führt in Überfluss dem Verlust zum Trotz. Es zeigt sich aber in Teil III, dass wir den Opferbegriff nicht einfach im Namen der Liebe ›opfern‹ können. Nicht nur birgt das Opfer eine verborgene Gabe in sich (Beschenktwerden im Auf- und Weggeben); das Geschenk der Liebe bringt auch ein verborgenes Opfer mit sich (grenzenlose Verpflichtung ohne einklagbares Recht auf Reziprozität). Dies hat interessante Implikationen für die Gender-Debatte. In selbstkritischem Impuls wird die feministische Bewegung daran erinnert, dass es verkehrt ist, Frauen nur als rein passive Opfer männlicher Manipulation zu betrachten. Vor allem die überaus zweideutige Rolle des ›Selbst‹ in seiner Selbst-Aufopferung ist dabei bedenkenswert.