Wensi Zhang

Dr. Wensi Zhang

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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23 December 2019 in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
WWWei Wang
Wei Wang
XLXiujuan Liu
Xiujuan Liu
WZWensi Zhang
Wensi Zhang
GGGe Gao
Ge Gao
HZHui Zhang
Hui Zhang
The main objective of this research is to examine the role of power relationship in a two-level green supply chain which is made up of one shared manufacturer and two competitive retailers. We develop six game theory-based models to explore the members’ operational decisions in a supply chain taking into account three vertical power structures (Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg, and Vertical Nash) as well as two retailers’ horizontal power structure (Bertrand or Stackelberg competition). Then, we design a two-part tariff contract which can encourage the supply chain members to promote cooperation and eventually coordinate the decentralized green supply chain under each power structure. Lastly, to further discuss the impact of the green awareness of consumers and the greening cost on supply chain players’ operational decisions and profits, we employ some numerical examples to conduct sensitivity analysis. The main conclusions are as follows. Firstly, the impact of power structure on the supply chain players’ operational decisions and profits mainly depends on the substitutability of the green products, the green awareness of consumers, and the greening cost for the manufacturer. Secondly, the more power the manufacturer has, the lower product greenness will be set. Thirdly, the consumer’s environmental awareness (the greening cost) positively (negatively) influences the manufacturer’s product greenness and wholesale price, the retailers’ sales prices, and the player’s profits under each power structure. Finally, the developed two-part tariff contract is practicable and beneficial for both the manufacturer and the two retailers.

15 October 2024 in Waste Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WZWensi Zhang
Wensi Zhang
XLXiuyu Liu
Xiuyu Liu
LZLi Zhu
Li Zhu
WWWei Wang
Wei Wang
HSHongfang Song
Hongfang Song

13 June 2025 in Journal of Cleaner Production
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HCHongrui Chu
Hongrui Chu
WZWensi Zhang
Wensi Zhang
LZLi Zhu
Li Zhu

4 December 2024 in Information Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WZWensi Zhang
Wensi Zhang
CHChengyao Huang
Chengyao Huang
JGJinwu Gao
Jinwu Gao
XHXiaoyu Hou
Xiaoyu Hou

23 April 2020 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
WZWensi Zhang
Wensi Zhang
JXJing Xiao
Jing Xiao
LCLingfei Cai
Lingfei Cai
Under the threat of global warming, joint emission reduction strategy has been widely adopted as an effective solution for the industry to guarantee environmental sustainability. In the practice of supply chain, environmental regulations and supply chain contracts are applied with the attempt to improve environmental performance. However, whether these measures are actually effective remains unanswered. In this paper, we study a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer adopting joint emission reduction strategy. We first investigate under what circumstance the environmental regulation can effectively result in higher emission reduction efforts. The result shows that when the cost coefficient satisfies certain conditions, the increase of penalty or subsidy can lead to more investment in emission reduction. In addition, if the environmental impact caused by the production process is extremely high, the enforcement of the regulation is ineffective. We also explore how the cost-revenue-sharing contract affects the emission reduction strategy and the coordination of the members in the supply chain. The results suggest that the incentive effect of environmental regulation is more effective when the supply chain coordination contract exists. Numerical experiments are also presented to verify our analytical conclusions.

2 March 2021 in RAIRO - Operations Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
WZWensi Zhang
Wensi Zhang
HChongrui chu
hongrui chu
This paper investigates how a random supply can influence management decisions under pull and push contracts in a decentralized supply chain with one supplier and one retailer. We suppose that the supplier faces yield uncertainty, and we adopt game models to analyse the supply chain members’ decisions (i.e., wholesale price and order quantity) under the two commonly used contracts. Specifically, we analyse the revenue sharing mechanism and buyback mechanism with pull and push contracts, respectively, and find that the buyback contract can efficiently coordinate the supply chain with push contract, while the revenue sharing contract cannot improve the performance with a pull contract. Then we design a modified revenue sharing contract that introduces a subsidy for excess inventory and shows that for the pull case, the proposed mechanism can coordinate the supply chain effectively. Finally, the analysis results are displayed intuitively by numerical cases.