James C. Cox

Prof. James C. Cox


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

32Years (1995-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2008 in Econometrica
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Journal Article
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JCJames C. Cox
James C. Cox
Dan FriedmanDan Friedman
Dan Friedman
VSVjollca Sadiraj
Vjollca Sadiraj

2 April 2007 in Economic Inquiry
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Journal Article
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JCJames C. Cox
James C. Cox
CDCary A. Deck
Cary A. Deck

1 June 2015 in Experimental Economics
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Journal Article
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JCJames C. Cox
James C. Cox
VSVjollca Sadiraj
Vjollca Sadiraj
USUlrich Schmidt
Ulrich Schmidt
Experiments on choice under risk typically involve multiple decisions by individual subjects. The choice of mechanism for selecting decision(s) for payoff is an essential design feature unless subjects isolate each one of the multiple decisions. We report treatments with different payoff mechanisms but the same decision tasks. The data show large differences across mechanisms in subjects’ revealed risk preferences, a clear violation of isolation. We illustrate the importance of these mechanism effects by identifying their implications for classical tests of theories of decision under risk. We discuss theoretical properties of commonly used mechanisms, and new mechanisms introduced herein, in order to clarify which mechanisms are theoretically incentive compatible for which theories. We identify behavioral properties of some mechanisms that can introduce bias in elicited risk preferences—from cross-task contamination—even when the mechanism used is theoretically incentive compatible. We explain that selection of a payoff mechanism is an important component of experimental design in many topic areas including social preferences, public goods, bargaining, and choice under uncertainty and ambiguity as well as experiments on decisions under risk.

1 January 2013 in Southern Economic Journal
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JCJames C. Cox
James C. Cox
EOElinor Ostrom
Elinor Ostrom
VSVjollca Sadiraj
Vjollca Sadiraj
JWJames M. Walker
James M. Walker

1 September 2006 in Experimental Economics
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JCJames C. Cox
James C. Cox
SHStephen C. Hayne
Stephen C. Hayne
Both mainstream economics and its critics have focused on models of individual rational agents even though most important decisions are made by small groups. Little systematic work has been done to study the behavior of small groups as decision-making agents in markets and other strategic games. This may limit the relevance of both economics and its critics to the objective of developing an understanding of how most important decisions are made. In order to gain some insight into this issue, this paper compares group and individual economic behavior. The objective of the research is to learn whether there are systematic differences between decisions made by groups and individual agents in market environments characterized by risky outcomes. A quantitative measure of deviation from minimally-rational decisions is used to compare group and individual behavior in common value auctions.

1 April 2009 in Southern Economic Journal
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Journal Article
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JCJames C. Cox
James C. Cox
EOElinor Ostrom
Elinor Ostrom
JWJames M. Walker
James M. Walker
ACAntonio Jamie Castillo
Antonio Jamie Castillo
ECEric Coleman
Eric Coleman
BSBrian Steed
Brian Steed