Yilei Wang

Yilei Wang


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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22 October 2021 in World Wide Web
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
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FWFan Wang
Fan Wang
LWLina Wang
Lina Wang
GLGuang-Shun Li
Guang-Shun Li
YWYilei Wang
Yilei Wang
CLChao Lv
Chao Lv
TSTingting Shao
Tingting Shao

1 September 2019 in Information Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LZLifeng Zhang
Lifeng Zhang
YWYilei Wang
Yilei Wang
FLFengyin Li
Fengyin Li
YHYuemei Hu
Yuemei Hu
MAMan Ho Au
Man Ho Au

1 March 2019 in Information Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YWYilei Wang
Yilei Wang
ABAndrea Bracciali
Andrea Bracciali
TLTao Li
Tao Li
Fengyin LiFengyin Li
Fengyin Li
XCXinchun Cui
Xinchun Cui
MZMinghao Zhao
Minghao Zhao

6 August 2020 in International Journal of Intelligent Systems
Verified
Journal Article
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GYGuoyu Yang
Guoyu Yang
YWYilei Wang
Yilei Wang
ZWZhaojie Wang
Zhaojie Wang
YTYouliang Tian
Youliang Tian
XYXiaomei Yu
Xiaomei Yu
SLShouzhe Li
Shouzhe Li
Blockchain is a “decentralized” system, where the security heavily depends on that of the consensus protocols. For instance, attackers gain illegal revenues by leveraging the vulnerabilities of the consensus protocols. Such attacks consist of selfish mining (SM1), optimal selfish mining ( ϵ ‐optimal), bribery selfish mining (BSM), and so forth. In existing works, the attacks only consider the circumstances, where part of miners are rational. However, miners are hardly nonrational in the blockchain system since they hope to maximize their revenues. Furthermore, attackers prefer intelligent tools to increase their power for more additional revenues. Therefore, new models are urgently needed to formulate the scenarios, where attackers are purely rational and intelligent. In this paper, we propose a new BSM model, where all miners are rational. Moreover, rational attackers are intelligent such that they optimize their strategies by utilizing reinforcement learning to boost their revenues. More specifically, we propose a new selfish mining algorithm: intelligent bribery selfish mining (IPBSM), where attackers choose optimal strategies resorting to reinforcement learning when they interact with the external environment. The external environment can be further modeled as a Markov decision process to facilitate the construction of reinforcement learning. The simulation results manifest that IPBSM, compared with SM1 and ϵ ‐optimal, has lower power thresholds and higher revenues. Therefore, IPBSM is a threat no to be neglected to the blockchain system.

1 September 2020 in International Journal of Intelligent Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
YWYilei Wang
Yilei Wang
GYGuoyu Yang
Guoyu Yang
TLTao Li
Tao Li
LZLifeng Zhang
Lifeng Zhang
YWYanli Wang
Yanli Wang
XYXiaomei Yu
Xiaomei Yu

19 December 2020 in Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
Fengyin LiFengyin Li
Fengyin Li
DWDongfeng Wang
Dongfeng Wang
YWYilei Wang
Yilei Wang
XYXiaomei Yu
Xiaomei Yu
NWNan Wu
Nan Wu
HZHuiyu Zhou
Huiyu Zhou
The development of Internet of Things (IoT) and Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) has led to close cooperation between electronic devices. It requires strong reliability and trustworthiness of the devices involved in the communication. However, current trust mechanisms have the following issues: (1) heavily relying on a trusted third party, which may incur severe security issues if it is corrupted, and (2) malicious evaluations on the involved devices which may bias the trustrank of the devices. By introducing the concepts of risk management and blockchain into the trust mechanism, we here propose a blockchain-based trust mechanism for distributed IoT devices in this paper. In the proposed trust mechanism, trustrank is quantified by normative trust and risk measures, and a new storage structure is designed for the domain administration manager to identify and delete the malicious evaluations of the devices. Evidence shows that the proposed trust mechanism can ensure data sharing and integrity, in addition to its resistance against malicious attacks to the IoT devices.