Machines powered by artificial intelligence increasingly mediate our social, cultural, economic and political interactions. Understanding the behaviour of artificial intelligence systems is essential to our ability to control their actions, reap their benefits and minimize their harms. Here we argue that this necessitates a broad scientific research agenda to study machine behaviour that incorporates and expands upon the discipline of computer science and includes insights from across the sciences. We first outline a set of questions that are fundamental to this emerging field and then explore the technical, legal and institutional constraints on the study of machine behaviour.

Advances in machine learning (ML) in recent years have enabled a dizzying array of applications such as data analytics, autonomous systems, and security diagnostics. ML is now pervasive-new systems and models are being deployed in every domain imaginable, leading to widespread deployment of software based inference and decision making. There is growing recognition that ML exposes new vulnerabilities in software systems, yet the technical community's understanding of the nature and extent of these vulnerabilities remains limited. We systematize findings on ML security and privacy, focusing on attacks identified on these systems and defenses crafted to date.We articulate a comprehensive threat model for ML, and categorize attacks and defenses within an adversarial framework. Key insights resulting from works both in the ML and security communities are identified and the effectiveness of approaches are related to structural elements of ML algorithms and the data used to train them. In particular, it is apparent that constructing a theoretical understanding of the sensitivity of modern ML algorithms to the data they analyze, à la PAC theory, will foster a science of security and privacy in ML.

The field of artificial intelligence (AI) strives to build rational agents capable of perceiving the world around them and taking actions to advance specified goals. Put another way, AI researchers aim to construct a synthetichomo economicus, the mythical perfectly rational agent of neoclassical economics. We review progress toward creating this new species of machine,machina economicus, and discuss some challenges in designing AIs that can reason effectively in economic contexts. Supposing that AI succeeds in this quest, or at least comes close enough that it is useful to think about AIs in rationalistic terms, we ask how to design the rules of interaction in multi-agent systems that come to represent an economy of AIs. Theories of normative design from economics may prove more relevant for artificial agents than human agents, with AIs that better respect idealized assumptions of rationality than people, interacting through novel rules and incentive systems quite distinct from those tailored for people.