Yaotang Li

Dr. Yaotang Li


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

21Years (2006-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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5 October 2012 in Numerical Linear Algebra with Applications
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CLChaoqian Li
Chaoqian Li
YLYaotang Li
Yaotang Li
XKXu Kong
Xu Kong

7 February 2006 in Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications
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YLYaotang Li
Yaotang Li
CYChang-Bo Yang
Chang-Bo Yang

16 June 2015 in Linear and Multilinear Algebra
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Journal Article
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CLChaoqian Li
Chaoqian Li
YLYaotang Li
Yaotang Li
A new eigenvalue localization set for tensors is given, and proved to be tighter than those in [Qi L. Eigenvalues of a real supersymmetric tensor. J. Symbolic Comput. 2005;40:1302–1324] and [Li CQ, Li YT, Kong X. New eigenvalue inclusion sets for tensors. Numer. Linear Algebra Appl. 2014;21:39–50]. Based on this set, we give two checkable sufficient conditions of the positive definiteness of tensors, and two checkable sufficient conditions of the positive semi-definiteness of tensors.

15 January 2012 in Numerical Algorithms
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PDPing-Fan Dai
Ping-Fan Dai
YLYaotang Li
Yaotang Li
CLChang-Jing Lu
Chang-Jing Lu

11 August 2014 in PLOS ONE
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JHJun-Zhou He
Jun-Zhou He
RWRui-Wu Wang
Rui-Wu Wang
YLYaotang Li
Yaotang Li
It is often assumed that in public goods games, contributors are either strong or weak players and each individual has an equal probability of exhibiting cooperation. It is difficult to explain why the public good is produced by strong individuals in some cooperation systems, and by weak individuals in others. Viewing the asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game as an evolutionary game, we find that whether the strong or the weak players produce the public good depends on the initial condition (i.e., phenotype or initial strategy of individuals). These different evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) associated with different initial conditions, can be interpreted as the production modes of public goods of different cooperation systems. A further analysis revealed that the strong player adopts a pure strategy but mixed strategies for the weak players to produce the public good, and that the probability of volunteering by weak players decreases with increasing group size or decreasing cost-benefit ratio. Our model shows that the defection probability of a “strong” player is greater than the “weak” players in the model of Diekmann (1993). This contradicts Selten's (1980) model that public goods can only be produced by a strong player, is not an evolutionarily stable strategy, and will therefore disappear over evolutionary time. Our public good model with ESS has thus extended previous interpretations that the public good can only be produced by strong players in an asymmetric game.

13 December 2015 in Linear and Multilinear Algebra
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Journal Article
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CLChaoqian Li
Chaoqian Li
JZJianjun Zhou
Jianjun Zhou
YLYaotang Li
Yaotang Li
A new Brauer-type eigenvalue localization set for tensors is given. We show that this set is tighter than those provided by Qi (J. Symbolic Comput. 2005 ), Li et al. (Numer. Linear Algebra App. 2014), and Li and Li (Linear and Multilinear Algebra, 2015). Based on this set, we give an upper bound for the spectral radius of nonnegative tensors, and prove that the new bound is sharper than those provided by Yang and Yang (SIAM J. Matrix Anal. App. 2010) and Li et al. (Numer. Linear Algebra App. 2014).