As a classical artificial intelligence algorithm, the convolutional neural network (CNN) algorithm plays an important role in image recognition and classification and is gradually being applied in the Internet of Things (IoT) system. A compact CNN accelerator for the IoT endpoint System-on-Chip (SoC) is proposed in this paper to meet the needs of CNN computations. Based on analysis of the CNN structure, basic functional modules of CNN such as convolution circuit and pooling circuit with a low data bandwidth and a smaller area are designed, and an accelerator is constructed in the form of four acceleration chains. After the acceleration unit design is completed, the Cortex-M3 is used to construct a verification SoC and the designed verification platform is implemented on the FPGA to evaluate the resource consumption and performance analysis of the CNN accelerator. The CNN accelerator achieved a throughput of 6.54 GOPS (giga operations per second) by consuming 4901 LUTs without using any hardware multipliers. The comparison shows that the compact accelerator proposed in this paper makes the CNN computational power of the SoC based on the Cortex-M3 kernel two times higher than the quad-core Cortex-A7 SoC and 67% of the computational power of eight-core Cortex-A53 SoC.
Differential power analysis (DPA) is an effective side channel attack method, which poses a critical threat to cryptographic algorithms, especially lightweight ciphers such as SIMON. In this paper, we propose an area-efficient countermeasure against DPA on SIMON based on the power randomization. Firstly, we review and analyze the architecture of SIMON algorithm. Secondly, we prove the threat of DPA attack to SIMON by launching actual DPA attack on SIMON 32/64 circuit. Thirdly, a low-cost power randomization scheme is proposed by combining fault injection with double rate technology, and the corresponding circuit design is implemented. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first scheme that applies the combination of fault injection and double rate technology to the DPA-resistance. Finally, the t-test is used to evaluate the security mechanism of the proposed designs with leakage quantification. Our experimental results show that the proposed design implements DPA-resistance of SIMON algorithm at certain overhead the cost of 47.7% LUTs utilization and 39.6% registers consumption. As compared to threshold implementation and bool mask, the proposed scheme has greater advantages in resource consumption.