Opinion leaders often play key roles in online knowledge-sharing communities, which has intrigued a lot of researchers and practitioners worldwide. However, it is not clear how various characteristics of opinion leaders may affect different online groups’ knowledge-sharing engagement. This paper aims to answer this question by building upon social capital theory to examine the differential influences of opinion leaders’ characteristics (interactivity, authority, and activity) on online groups. In-groups and out-groups were distinguished, and the study used the context of an investment-oriented online knowledge-sharing community. By leveraging a unique aggregated group-level secondhand dataset collected from Snowball.com, we conducted log-linear and Poisson regression models. The results revealed that the intensity of online group knowledge-sharing engagement was heavily contingent upon the types of characteristics of opinion leaders. We found that in-group knowledge-sharing engagement (generating new knowledge) was driven by an opinion leader’s interactivity and authority, whereas out-group knowledge-sharing engagement (developing new members) could not be facilitated by these types of characteristics. Instead, the opinion leader’s activity hindered out-group users from joining in-groups. The study also identified a “mutual promotion” issue, which was generated from the association between in-group and out-group knowledge-sharing engagement.
In the modern era, the minor coarse cereals (MCC) are particularly popular among consumers. Price fluctuations cause misperceptions for growers, but also bring about complications for processing enterprises and consumers. To solve this problem, a multi-grain product crowdfunding platform is proposed. To this end, an evolutionary game model is constructed to investigate the game equilibrium between growers and crowdfunders. The analysis determines that evolutionary game equilibrium is related to the relative price difference between the sowing period and the harvest period, and to the social/logistical cost. Under normal circumstances, the crowdfunder may default when the sowing-period price is greater than the harvest-period price. The grower may default if the sowing-period price is less than the harvest-period price. Therefore, in the design of a crowdfunding system for MCC products, a certain percentage of advance payment (30%) and certain default deposits should be collected from crowdfunders and growers, respectively.