This paper situates Elinor Ostrom's work on common-pool resource management in the tradition of ‘robust political economy’. Ostrom's analysis of bottom-up governance institutions is shown to recognise that such arrangements though imperfect are better placed to cope with bounded rationality and incentive compatibility problems in the management of smaller- and medium-scale common-pool resources. While Ostrom's work provides an analytical framework to explain the success of these arrangements, however, the paper argues that it lacks a robust account of when, if ever, top-down governance arrangements are to be preferred.
This paper draws on Hayek’s distinction between simple and complex phenomena to understand the nature of the challenge facing policymakers in responding to the new coronavirus pandemic. It shows that while government action is justifiable there may be few systemic mechanisms that enable policymakers to distinguish better from worse policy responses, or to make such distinctions in sufficient time. It then argues that this may be a more general characteristic of large-scale public policy making procedures and illustrates the importance of returning to a market-based political economy at the earliest convenience.
This paper draws on the work of Michel Foucault and Friedrich Hayek to understand threats to personal and enterprise freedom, arising from public health governance. Whereas public choice theory examines the incentives these institutions provide to agents, the analysis here understands those incentives as framed by discursive social constructions that affect the identity, power, and positionality of different actors. It shows how overlapping discourses of scientific rationalism may generate a ‘road to serfdom’ narrowing freedom of action and expression across an expanding terrain. As such, the paper contributes to the growing literature emphasising the importance of narratives, stories and metaphors as shaping political economic action in ways feeding through to outcomes and institutions.
Objectives To evaluate the relationships between neighbourhood cohesion and subjective well-being (SWB) in two different informal settlement types. Design Cross-sectional analysis of a community-based survey. Setting Communities in two districts, Sanjay Colony, Okhla Phase II and Bhalswa in Delhi, India. Participants 328 residents in Bhalswa and 311 from Sanjay Colony. Measurements Neighbourhood social cohesion scale measured on an 18-point scale and the SWB scale made up of four subjective measures—hedonic, eudaemonic, evaluative and freedom of choice. Sociodemographic characteristics and trust were used as covariates. Results In both neighbourhood types there was a statistically significant positive bivariate correlation between neighbourhood cohesion and SWB (Sanjay: r=0.145, p<0.05; Bhalswa: r=0.264, p<0.01). Trust and neighbourhood cohesion were strongly correlated (Sanjay: r=0.618, p<0.01; Bhalswa: r=0.533, p<0.01) and the longer the resident had lived in the community the greater the feeling of neighbourhood cohesion (Sanjay: r=0.157, p<0.01; Bhalswa: r=0.171, p<0.05). Only in the resettlement colony (Bhalswa) was SWB negatively correlated with length of residency (r=−0.117, p<0.05). Residents who chose their settlement type (Sanjay residents) were 22.5 percentage points (pp) more likely to have a feeling of belonging to their neighbourhood than residents that had been resettled (Bhalswa) (Cohen’s d effect size 0.45). Sanjay residents had a greater likelihood to feel more satisfied with life (4.8 pp, p<0.01) and having greater perceived freedom of choice (4.8 pp, p<0.01). Conclusions Our findings contribute to the general knowledge about neighbourhood cohesion and SWB within different informal settlement types in a mega-city such as New Delhi, India. Interventions that promote sense of belonging, satisfaction with life and freedom of choice have the potential to significantly improve people’s well-being.
This book is the first to comprehensively engage the ideas of the French social theorist and philosopher Michel Foucault from within the tradition of liberal political economy. The first part demonstrates important commonalities between Foucault’s ideas and those of a neglected ‘postmodern’ stream in liberal political thought. These ideas draw on a social theory emphasising a culturally situated individualism; a philosophy of science highly sceptical of socio-economic ‘scientism’ and ‘expert rule’; and an understanding of freedom as an open-ended process of ‘self-creation’ in the face of cultural power relations—a freedom threatened by alignments between state power and more decentred manifestations of power. Part II deploys the tools of Foucault’s critical social theory and those of a postmodern liberalism to problematise four separate though overlapping ‘bio-political’ or ‘pastoral’ dispositifs in contemporary societies focused on social justice, public health, ecological sustainability, and law and order. Where the Foucauldian and the postmodern liberal approaches point towards the value of a cultural and economic ‘creative destruction’ that destabilises existing modes of thought and ways of being, the pastoral dispositifs that seek to ‘monitor and correct’ multiple pattern anomalies are shown to stifle the space for that creative freedom. Though the book does not engage the question of whether Foucault himself moved towards endorsing liberal political economy, it throws considerable light on how key Foucauldian concerns may be addressed within the liberal tradition and why Foucauldians may have reason to embrace a reconstituted or postmodern liberalism.
Robust political economy is the attempt to theorize about political institutions in such a way as to guard against the knowledge and incentive problems that we can expect will threaten the public good in the real world. An implication of this attempt is the need to reason symmetrically about whether a proposed institution is liable to be as prone to failure due to knowledge and incentive problems as the situations it is designed to address. Another implication is that one should be wary of ad hoc institutional or policy proposals, that is, proposals that are not grounded in systematic tendencies to mitigate the knowledge and incentive problems. With these implications in mind, I am not convinced that the alternative institutions, conceptions of the state, and conceptions of social justice defended by my critics meet the test of robustness that, I maintain, can best be met through decentralization of power down to the level of the individual.