The two-echelon supply chain including single supplier and single retailer is set, and we study the compact of asymmetric information on the decisions in the supply chain when the both supplier’s private cost information and retailer’s private fairness-concern information are asymmetry between the supply chain members, so as to study the effect of misreporting behavior and fairness concern on the supply chain. By mathematical model derivation and numerical analysis, we prove that the misreporting behavior of supplier will intensify the unfair distribution of supply chain and thus make the supply chain operation further deviate from the optimal condition.

Under the wholesale price contract, we analyze the influence of the retailer’s fairness-concern information on the wholesale price, order quantity, the profit of each party and the supply chain in symmetry information (SI) condition and asymmetry information (AI) condition respectively. Then, we compute the value of retailer’s fairness-concern information to supplier, and we prove that the profit of all members and supply chain is decreasing with retailer’s fairness concern and the profit in SI condition is always higher than that in the AI condition. Then, we set the signaling game model to reveal the transmission mechanism of retailer’s fairness-concern information, and we analyze the potential separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium existing in signaling model under asymmetric fairness-concern information. We prove that only when the signal transmission cost is different between retailers with different fairness-concern degree, the signaling model can effectively reveal the role and type of retailers. Finally, we provide some suggestions improve fairness-concern information transmission and optimize supply chain operation by discussing the condition of each separating equilibrium results.

This paper sets supply chain buyback contract model with retailer's complete rationality and fairness concern respectively under stochastic demand, and uses Bayesian theorem to solve retailer's two-stage order decision under demand updating, so as to analyze the influence of retailer's fairness concern on the optimal order decision and the coordination of the buyback contract. The results show that the buyback contract can always coordinate the supply chain under the same condition; both the retailer's first order quantity and total order quantity decrease with wholesale price and increase with buyback price, but the retailer's fairness-concern behavior aggravates this trend.

This study investigates the effect of social preference on the recycling decision and coordination in an E-closed-loop supply chain (E-CLSC). Firstly, we set the dynamic E-CLSC game model including a manufacturer, an E-commerce platform (E-platform) and a recycler, where the manufacturer dominates the supply chain and both the E-platform and the recycler are followers. Secondly, we propose an E-CLSC information structure to depict four symmetry and asymmetry cases about the E-platform’s fairness concern and the manufacturer’s altruistic reciprocity, and the backward induction method is adopted to solve the equilibrium in each case. By comparative analysis, we propose a revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contract to optimize recycling decisions, coordinate the E-CLSC and Pareto-improve all parties’ profits. We show that whether information is symmetrical or not, only the wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the E-CLSC, whereas the revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contract can always achieve optimal recycling decisions, coordinate the supply chain and Pareto-improve all parties’ profits with a constant cost sharing ratio. In addition, the E-platform’s fairness concern can widen the range of the revenue sharing ratio and make it easier to coordinate the E-CLSC, but the manufacturer’s altruistic reciprocity may narrow the range of the revenue sharing ratio and make it harder to coordinate the E-CLSC.

The paper analyzes the modular structure of product family by decomposing the product family into generic modules. Then, the module model denoted by attribute variable is established for each generic module. Based on the classification of customer requirement and erection of product decision tree, the description and explanation type of customer requirement can be used to restrict the sub branch of decision tree in order to find out the certain product family satisfying customer. In approach of quality function deployment, the customer requirement is mapped to the module attribute, which can determinate the value and weight of module attribute variable. After retrieving the candidate set of modules which are nearest to the customer requirement on the module accordingly, the candidate modules are combined efficiently under the constraints relative to modules and attributes, In this way, many invalidate module combinations can be avoided and hence the efficiency of product configuration is promoted.

Postponement is an important strategy to achieve mass customization, and it has been adopted by many companies to improve production operation, inventory management, logistics management and supply chain operation, but the postponed activity will cause additional costs at the same time. The main work of this paper is to model the cost of partial postponed strategy and propose some management insights by numerical analysis.