Douglas Boyd

Dr. Douglas Boyd

College of Aeronautics, Embry Riddle Aeronautical University World Wide, 600 South Clyde Morris Blvd, Daytona Beach, FL 32114, USA
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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 November 2023 in Aerospace Medicine and Human Performance
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Journal Article
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Douglas BoydDouglas Boyd
Douglas Boyd
MSMark T. Scharf
Mark T. Scharf
INTRODUCTION: General aviation (GA), mainly comprised of light (≤12,500 lb) aircraft, maintains an inferior safety record compared with air carriers. To improve safety, aeronautical decision-making (ADM) practices have been advocated to GA pilots since 1991. Herein, we determined the extent to which GA pilots disregard such practices.METHODS: Fatal accidents (1991–2019) involving private pilots (PPLs) in single-engine airplanes were identified (N = 1481) from the National Transportation Safety Board AccessR database. Of these, deficient go/no-go and in-flight ADM-related mishaps were scored using the PAVE (pilot, aircraft, environment, external pressure)/IMSAFE (illness, medicine, stress, alcohol, fatigue, eating) and PPP (perceive, process, perform) models, respectively. Statistical testing used Poisson distributions, Fisher exact tests, and Mann-Whitney U-tests.RESULTS: Of the 1481 accidents, 846 were identified as deficient ADM-related. Electing to depart into a hazardous environment (PAVE), disregarding wellness (IMSAFE), and poor aircraft familiarity (PAVE) represented the most common categories (54%, 21%, and 20%, respectively) of errant go/no-go ADM. A 64% decline in fatal accidents related to errant go/no-go decisions for the environment category was evident over the 30-yr period, with little decrements in the other domains. Within the errant environment-related category accidents, the decision to depart into forecasted adverse weather (e.g., degraded visibility, icing, thunderstorms) constituted the most prevalent subcategory (56%, N = 195). Surprisingly, of this subcategory, accidents were overrepresented by over nine- and threefold for instrument-rated PPLs disregarding icing and thunderstorm forecasts, respectively.CONCLUSION: With little decrement in ADM-related accidents in the pilot, aircraft, and external pressure domains, new strategies to address such deficiencies for PPLs are warranted.Boyd DD, Scharf MT. Deficient aeronautical decision-making contributions to fatal general aviation accidents. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2023; 94(11):807–814.

1 May 2021 in Aerospace Medicine and Human Performance
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Journal Article
Closed access
DBDon Budde
Don Budde
Jochen HinkelbeinJochen Hinkelbein
Jochen Hinkelbein
Douglas BoydDouglas Boyd
Douglas Boyd
INTRODUCTION: Air taxis conduct nonscheduled transport and employ aircraft in various performance categories hereafter referred to as low, medium, and high performance, respectively. No study has yet addressed fixed-wing air taxi safety by performance category. Herein, we compared accident rates/occupant injury across air taxi airplane fleets grouped by performance category and identified human factors contributing to fatal accidents for airplanes in that category with the highest mishap rate.METHODS: Accidents (20042018) in the United States were identified from the National Transportation Safety Board database. General Aviation/Part 135 Activity Surveys provided annual fleet times. Fatal accident contributing factors were per the Human Factors Classification System (HFACS). Statistics utilized Poisson distributions, Chi-Square/Fisher, and Mann-Whitney tests.RESULTS: There were 269 air taxi mishaps (53 fatal) identified. Over the 15 yr, the accident rate (1.10/million flight hours-all categories) declined 50%, largely due to a reduction in medium/high performance category airplane crashes. However, little temporal change was observed for low performance airplanes (1.5/million flight hours) and injury severity trended higher. At the aircrew/physical environment levels, HFACS revealed decision (improper choices), skill-based (stick and rudder) and perceptual (night, instrument conditions) errors contributing to > 60% of fatal accidents involving low performance airplanes. At the organizational level, failing to correct problems, time pressures, and incentive systems contributed to 16% of fatal mishaps.CONCLUSION: Safety deficits remain for the low performance category air taxi fleet warranting increased pilot instrument flight training/utilization of the mandatory 3-axis autopilot in degraded visibility. Safety culture improvements to address issues of personnel/equipment/training deficiencies, failing to correct problems, and time pressures/a safety-compromising incentive system all need to be addressed.Budde D, Hinkelbein J, Boyd DD. Analysis of air taxi accidents (20042018) and associated human factors by aircraft performance class. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2021; 92(5):294302.

8 March 2019 in Atmosphere
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Journal Article
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Douglas BoydDouglas Boyd
Douglas Boyd
Thomas GuinnThomas Guinn
Thomas Guinn
(1) Background: Flying in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) carries an elevated risk of fatal outcome for general aviation (GA) pilots. For the typical GA flight, aerodrome-specific forecasts (Terminal Aerodrome Forecast (TAF), Localized Aviation Model Output Statistics Program (LAMP)) assist the airman in pre-determining whether a flight can be safely undertaken. While LAMP forecasts are more prevalent at GA-frequented aerodromes, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) recommends that this tool be used as supplementary to the TAF only. Herein, the predictive accuracy of LAMP for ceiling flight categories of visual flight rules (VFR) and instrument flight rules (IFR) was determined. (2) Methods: LAMP accuracy was evaluated for the period of July–December 2018 using aviation-specific probability of detection (PODA), false alarm ratio (FARA) and critical success scores (CSSA). Statistical differences were determined using Chi-Square tests. (3) Results: LAMP forecasts (n = 823) across 39 states were accrued. LAMP PODA for VFR (0.67) and IFR (0.78) exceeded (p < 0.031) the corresponding TAF scores (0.57 and 0.56). For VFR, the LAMP showed a non-significant (p = 0.243) higher FARA (0.25) than the TAF (0.19). For IFR forecasts, the LAMP FARA was lower (p < 0.001) (0.48 and 0.81, respectively). LAMP CSSA scores exceeded the TAF for VFR (p = 0.012) and IFR forecasts (p < 0.001). (4) Conclusion: These findings support the greater integration of LAMP into pre-flight weather briefings.

15 April 2024 in Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering
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Journal Article
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Douglas BoydDouglas Boyd
Douglas Boyd
TGThomas Guinn
Thomas Guinn
Introduction: Flights of general aviation aircraft in icing conditions pose safety hazards especially since few airplanes are equipped with ice protection systems (FIKI). Herein, we sought to answer the following questions not previously addressed: (i) Has the general aviation icing-related accident rate declined over time? (ii) Which phase(s) of flight lead(s) to the highest fraction of fatal accidents? (iii) Do general aviation pilots adhere to safe practices when operating in forecasted icing? Methods: Retrospectively, icing-related accidents were per the National Transportation Safety Board database. Prospectively, non-FIKI single-engine airplanes, operating in forecasted icing, were tracked (January–March 2023) using FlightAwareR. Presumptive icing was determined with METARs/modelled Skew-T data. Statistical tests employed Poisson distributions/Pearson chi-square analyses. Results: In a retrospective analysis, despite a nonstatistical (p=0.621) downward trend in icing-related accidents (2000–2019), over half of mishaps were fatal, a fraction unchanged (p=0.842) over the two decades. Loss-of-control represented the terminating event with the highest proportion of fatal outcomes (85%). Accidents involving takeoff-climb ice accretion were overrepresented for fatal outcomes (66%). In a prospective study arm, of 300 non-FIKI flights operating in forecasted icing and tracked in real time, 65% departed or descended/landed (44%) in presumptive icing.Conclusions: A modest downward trend in icing-related accident rate and an undiminished high fraction of fatal mishaps rationalize focused training of pilots operating non-FIKI aircraft in areas prone to icing. Specifically, two novel observations warrant emphasis: (i) an approximately threefold higher icing-related fatal accident fraction compared with all general aviation accidents and (ii) the high proportion of lethal mishaps due to takeoff-climb ice accretion.

5 August 2024 in Safety
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Journal Article
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Douglas BoydDouglas Boyd
Douglas Boyd
ASAlan J. Stolzer
Alan J. Stolzer
Background. Civil aviation comprises airlines/charters and general aviation (GA). Currently, airlines are experiencing a pilot shortage, partly reflecting scheduled retirements mandatory for airline (but not GA) pilots aged 65 years, fueling a debate as to whether the retirement age should be increased. Herein, using 16–40 years-of-age aviators as a reference, we determined whether GA pilots aged 60+ years (i) incurred an elevated accident rate, employing, for the first time, age-tiered flight time as a measure of risk exposure and (ii) carried an excess risk for cognitive deficiency-related fatal accidents. Methods. Airplane accidents (2002–2016) involving Class 3 medical certificated pilots were per the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) databases. Age-tiered pilot risk exposure represented a summation of flight hours per Class 3 medical applications. Cognitive decline measures were per NTSB field codes. Statistical analyses employed Chi-Square, Mann–Whitney, logistic regression, and binomial tests. Results. Using flight hours as the denominator, the fatal accident rate for older pilots (41–80 years) was unchanged compared with aviators aged 16–40 years. In the logistic regression, no cognitive deficiency measure was predictive (p = 0.11, p = 0.15) for pilots aged 61+ years who were involved in fatal accidents. Conclusion. These findings question the necessity of an automatic disqualification of air transport pilots at 65 years of age.