Significance: Since SARS-CoV-2 emerged in China, it has spread rapidly around the world. Effective vaccines and therapeutics for SARS-CoV-2−induced disease (coronavirus disease 2019;COVID-19) are urgently needed. We found that SARS-CoV-2 isolates replicate efficiently in the lungs of Syrian hamsters and cause severe pathological lesions in the lungs of these animals similar to commonly reported imaging features of COVID-19 patients with pneumonia. SARS-CoV-2−infected hamsters mounted neutralizing antibody responses and were protected against rechallenge with SARS-CoV-2. Moreover, passive transfer of convalescent serum to naïve hamsters inhibited virus replication in their lungs. Syrian hamsters are a useful small animal model for the evaluation of vaccines, immunotherapies, and antiviral drugs.

The recent emergence of B.1.1.529, the Omicron variant^1,2, has raised concerns of escape from protection by vaccines and therapeutic antibodies. A key test for potential countermeasures against B.1.1.529 is their activity in preclinical rodent models of respiratory tract disease. Here, using the collaborative network of the SARS-CoV-2 Assessment of Viral Evolution (SAVE) programme of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), we evaluated the ability of several B.1.1.529 isolates to cause infection and disease in immunocompetent and human ACE2 (hACE2)-expressing mice and hamsters. Despite modelling data indicating that B.1.1.529 spike can bind more avidly to mouse ACE2 (refs. ^3,4), we observed less infection by B.1.1.529 in 129, C57BL/6, BALB/c and K18-hACE2 transgenic mice than by previous SARS-CoV-2 variants, with limited weight loss and lower viral burden in the upper and lower respiratory tracts. In wild-type and hACE2 transgenic hamsters, lung infection, clinical disease and pathology with B.1.1.529 were also milder than with historical isolates or other SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern. Overall, experiments from the SAVE/NIAID network with several B.1.1.529 isolates demonstrate attenuated lung disease in rodents, which parallels preliminary human clinical data.

During the current coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, a variety of mutations have accumulated in the viral genome of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and, at the time of writing, four variants of concern are considered to be potentially hazardous to human society¹. The recently emerged B.1.617.2/Delta variant of concern is closely associated with the COVID-19 surge that occurred in India in the spring of 2021 (ref. ²). However, the virological properties of B.1.617.2/Delta remain unclear. Here we show that the B.1.617.2/Delta variant is highly fusogenic and notably more pathogenic than prototypic SARS-CoV-2 in infected hamsters. The P681R mutation in the spike protein, which is highly conserved in this lineage, facilitates cleavage of the spike protein and enhances viral fusogenicity. Moreover, we demonstrate that the P681R-bearing virus exhibits higher pathogenicity compared with its parental virus. Our data suggest that the P681R mutation is a hallmark of the virological phenotype of the B.1.617.2/Delta variant and is associated with enhanced pathogenicity.

Here, biological attributes of two early human isolates of the newly emerged H7N9 influenza viruses are characterized: the potential of these viruses to infect and/or transmit within various animal models is discussed, as is their relative sensitivity to neuraminidase inhibitors and experimental polymerase inhibitors compared to an H1N1 pandemic strain. By 20 July 2013, there had been 134 laboratory-confirmed human cases of infection with avian influenza A H7N9 virus infection, including 43 deaths. Yoshihiro Kawaoka and colleagues characterize the biology of two recent isolates of the virus. They provide a wealth of data from infections in mice, pigs, macaques and ferrets. H7N9 virus is shown to be less sensitive to neuraminidase inhibitors than pandemic H1N1 virus, but equally susceptible to an experimental polymerase inhibitor. Terrence Tumpey and colleagues determine the capacity of two clinical H7N9 isolates to cause disease and transmit between mammals. They show that the virus can replicate in human airway cells and in the respiratory tract of ferrets to a higher level than can seasonal H3N2 virus, and show higher lethality in mice than genetically related H7N9 and H9N2 viruses. In transmission studies, the H7N9 virus showed limited transmission in ferrets by respiratory droplets. Ron Fouchier and colleagues investigate the transmissibility of H7N9 virus between ferrets. They show that airborne transmission can occur, but inefficiently. They also show that on passage in ferrets, virus variants that have higher avian receptor binding, higher pH of fusion and lower thermostability are selected, and they suggest that these characteristics may result in reduced transmissibility. Avian influenza A viruses rarely infect humans; however, when human infection and subsequent human-to-human transmission occurs, worldwide outbreaks (pandemics) can result. The recent sporadic infections of humans in China with a previously unrecognized avian influenza A virus of the H7N9 subtype (A(H7N9)) have caused concern owing to the appreciable case fatality rate associated with these infections (more than 25%), potential instances of human-to-human transmission1, and the lack of pre-existing immunity among humans to viruses of this subtype. Here we characterize two early human A(H7N9) isolates, A/Anhui/1/2013 (H7N9) and A/Shanghai/1/2013 (H7N9); hereafter referred to as Anhui/1 and Shanghai/1, respectively. In mice, Anhui/1 and Shanghai/1 were more pathogenic than a control avian H7N9 virus (A/duck/Gunma/466/2011 (H7N9); Dk/GM466) and a representative pandemic 2009 H1N1 virus (A/California/4/2009 (H1N1pdm09); CA04). Anhui/1, Shanghai/1 and Dk/GM466 replicated well in the nasal turbinates of ferrets. In nonhuman primates, Anhui/1 and Dk/GM466 replicated efficiently in the upper and lower respiratory tracts, whereas the replicative ability of conventional human influenza viruses is typically restricted to the upper respiratory tract of infected primates. By contrast, Anhui/1 did not replicate well in miniature pigs after intranasal inoculation. Critically, Anhui/1 transmitted through respiratory droplets in one of three pairs of ferrets. Glycan arrays showed that Anhui/1, Shanghai/1 and A/Hangzhou/1/2013 (H7N9) (a third human A(H7N9) virus tested in this assay) bind to human virus-type receptors, a property that may be critical for virus transmissibility in ferrets. Anhui/1 was found to be less sensitive in mice to neuraminidase inhibitors than a pandemic H1N1 2009 virus, although both viruses were equally susceptible to an experimental antiviral polymerase inhibitor. The robust replicative ability in mice, ferrets and nonhuman primates and the limited transmissibility in ferrets of Anhui/1 suggest that A(H7N9) viruses have pandemic potential.

In November 2021, the B.1.1.529 (omicron) variant of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) was detected in South Africa.¹ Since then, omicron has rapidly spread around the world. On November 26, 2021, the World Health Organization designated omicron as a variant of concern. The omicron variant was found to have at least 33 mutations (29 amino acid substitutions, 1 insertion of three amino acids, and 3 small deletions) in its spike (S) protein, as compared with early SARS-CoV-2 strains identified in Wuhan, China.² Notably, 15 of the 29 substitutions were in the receptor-binding domain of the S protein, which is the primary target for monoclonal antibody–based therapy. This finding suggests that the monoclonal antibodies that have been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) may be less effective against the omicron variant.