Significance: Here we provide what is, to our knowledge, the first gene map of the type I IFN region of any bat species with the sequence of the type I IFN locus of the Australian black flying fox,Pteropus alecto.The bat IFN locus contains fewer IFN genes compared with any other mammal sequenced to date, including only threeIFN-αgenes. We also demonstrate that batIFN-αgenes are constitutively expressed in unstimulated bat tissues and cells and that their expression is unaffected by viral infection. This unusual pattern ofIFN-αexpression has not been described in any other species to our knowledge and has important implications for the role of innate immunity in the ability of bats to coexist with viruses in the absence of disease.
To date, limited genetic changes in the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) genome have been described. Here, we report a 382-nucleotide (nt) deletion in SARS-CoV-2 that truncates open reading frame 7b (ORF7b) and ORF8, removing the ORF8 transcription regulatory sequence (TRS) and eliminating ORF8 transcription. The earliest 382-nt deletion variant was detected in Singapore on 29 January 2020, with the deletion viruses circulating in the country and accounting for 23.6% (45/191) of SARS-CoV-2 samples screened in this study. SARS-CoV-2 with the same deletion has since been detected in Taiwan, and other ORF7b/8 deletions of various lengths, ranging from 62 nt to 345 nt, have been observed in other geographic locations, including Australia, Bangladesh, and Spain. Mutations or deletions in ORF8 of SARS-CoV have been associated with reduced replicative fitness and virus attenuation. In contrast, the SARS-CoV-2 382-nt deletion viruses showed significantly higher replicative fitness in vitro than the wild type, while no difference was observed in patient viral load, indicating that the deletion variant viruses retained their replicative fitness. A robust antibody response to ORF8 has been observed in SARS-CoV-2 infection, suggesting that the emergence of ORF8 deletions may be due to immune-driven selection and that further deletion variants may emerge during the sustained transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in humans. IMPORTANCE During the SARS epidemic in 2003/2004, a number of deletions were observed in ORF8 of SARS-CoV, and eventually deletion variants became predominant, leading to the hypothesis that ORF8 was an evolutionary hot spot for adaptation of SARS-CoV to humans. However, due to the successful control of the SARS epidemic, the importance of these deletions for the epidemiological fitness of SARS-CoV in humans could not be established. The emergence of multiple SARS-CoV-2 strains with ORF8 deletions, combined with evidence of a robust immune response to ORF8, suggests that the lack of ORF8 may assist with host immune evasion. In addition to providing a key insight into the evolutionary behavior of SARS-CoV-2 as the virus adapts to its new human hosts, the emergence of ORF8 deletion variants may also impact vaccination strategies.
The COVID-19 pandemic highlights the substantial public health, economic, and societal consequences of virus spillover from a wildlife reservoir. Widespread human transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) also presents a new set of challenges when considering viral spillover from people to naïve wildlife and other animal populations. The establishment of new wildlife reservoirs for SARS-CoV-2 would further complicate public health control measures and could lead to wildlife health and conservation impacts. Given the likely bat origin of SARS-CoV-2 and related beta-coronaviruses (β-CoVs), free-ranging bats are a key group of concern for spillover from humans back to wildlife. Here, we review the diversity and natural host range of β-CoVs in bats and examine the risk of humans inadvertently infecting free-ranging bats with SARS-CoV-2. Our review of the global distribution and host range of β-CoV evolutionary lineages suggests that 40+ species of temperate-zone North American bats could be immunologically naïve and susceptible to infection by SARS-CoV-2. We highlight an urgent need to proactively connect the wellbeing of human and wildlife health during the current pandemic and to implement new tools to continue wildlife research while avoiding potentially severe health and conservation impacts of SARS-CoV-2 "spilling back" into free-ranging bat populations.
Background: Human infections with avian influenza viruses (AIV) represent a persistent public health threat. The principal risk factor governing human infection with AIV is from direct contact with infected poultry and is primarily observed in Asia and Egypt where live-bird markets are common.Areas of agreement: Changing patterns of virus transmission and a lack of obvious disease manifestations in avian species hampers early detection and efficient control of potentially zoonotic AIV.Areas of controversy: Despite extensive studies on biological and environmental risk factors, the exact conditions required for cross-species transmission from avian species to humans remain largely unknown.Growing points: The development of a universal (‘across-subtype’) influenza vaccine and effective antiviral therapeutics are a priority.Areas timely for developing research: Sustained virus surveillance and collection of ecological and physiological parameters from birds in different environments is required to better understand influenza virus ecology and identify risk factors for human infection.
16 December 2019 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Influenza B viruses have circulated in humans for over 80 y, causing a significant disease burden. Two antigenically distinct lineages (“B/Victoria/2/87-like” and “B/Yamagata/16/88-like,” termed Victoria and Yamagata) emerged in the 1970s and have cocirculated since 2001. Since 2015 both lineages have shown unusually high levels of epidemic activity, the reasons for which are unclear. By analyzing over 12,000 influenza B virus genomes, we describe the processes enabling the long-term success and recent resurgence of epidemics due to influenza B virus. We show that following prolonged diversification, both lineages underwent selective sweeps across the genome and have subsequently taken alternate evolutionary trajectories to exhibit epidemic dominance, with no reassortment between lineages. Hemagglutinin deletion variants emerged concomitantly in multiple Victoria virus clades and persisted through epistatic mutations and interclade reassortment—a phenomenon previously only observed in the 1970s when Victoria and Yamagata lineages emerged. For Yamagata viruses, antigenic drift of neuraminidase was a major driver of epidemic activity, indicating that neuraminidase-based vaccines and cross-reactivity assays should be employed to monitor and develop robust protection against influenza B morbidity and mortality. Overall, we show that long-term diversification and infrequent selective sweeps, coupled with the reemergence of hemagglutinin deletion variants and antigenic drift of neuraminidase, are factors that contributed to successful circulation of diverse influenza B clades. Further divergence of hemagglutinin variants with poor cross-reactivity could potentially lead to circulation of 3 or more distinct influenza B viruses, further complicating influenza vaccine formulation and highlighting the urgent need for universal influenza vaccines.
Wild birds have been implicated in the emergence of human and livestock influenza. The successful prediction of viral spread and disease emergence, as well as formulation of preparedness plans have been hampered by a critical lack of knowledge of viral movements between different host populations. The patterns of viral spread and subsequent risk posed by wild bird viruses therefore remain unpredictable. Here we analyze genomic data, including 287 newly sequenced avian influenza A virus (AIV) samples isolated over a 34-year period of continuous systematic surveillance of North American migratory birds. We use a Bayesian statistical framework to test hypotheses of viral migration, population structure and patterns of genetic reassortment. Our results reveal that despite the high prevalence of Charadriiformes infected in Delaware Bay this host population does not appear to significantly contribute to the North American AIV diversity sampled in Anseriformes. In contrast, influenza viruses sampled from Anseriformes in Alberta are representative of the AIV diversity circulating in North American Anseriformes. While AIV may be restricted to specific migratory flyways over short time frames, our large-scale analysis showed that the long-term persistence of AIV was independent of bird flyways with migration between populations throughout North America. Analysis of long-term surveillance data provides vital insights to develop appropriately informed predictive models critical for pandemic preparedness and livestock protection. Despite continuous virological surveillance (1976–2009) in wild waterfowl (Anseriformes) and shorebirds (Charadriiformes), the ecological and evolutionary dynamics of avian influenza A virus (AIV) in these hosts is poorly understood. Comparative genomic analysis of AIV data revealed that the high prevalence of Charadriiformes infected in Delaware Bay is a reservoir of AIV that is phylogenetically distinct from AIV sampled from most North American Anseriformes. In contrast, influenza viruses sampled from Anseriformes in Alberta are representative of the remaining AIV diversity sampled across North America. While AIV may be restricted to specific migratory flyways over short time frames, our large-scale analysis showed that this population genetic structure was transient and the long-term persistence of AIV was independent of bird flyways. These results suggest an introduced virus lineage may initially be restricted to one flyway, but migration to a major congregation site such as Alberta could occur followed by subsequent spread across flyways. These generalized predictions for virus movement will be critical to assess the associated risk for widespread diffusion and inform surveillance for pandemic preparedness.