The pandemic of COVID-19 has brought great challenges to the development of the world economy and has an unprecedented and inevitable impact on the logistics industry connecting various economic activities. In the context of the gradual alleviation of the COVID-19 outbreak in China, we observed five impacts on China's logistics industry, which are sharp drop in logistics demand, shortage of transportation capacity, disruption of logistics network, change of service mode, and increase in operating costs and number of loss-making enterprises. When this invited paper was written, the outbreak in China has been effectively under controlled. In the post-COVID-19 era, under the three driving forces (i.e. the market, technology and policy), China's logistics industry will develop rapidly, leading to significant changes in five aspects: logistics demand, logistics supply, logistics infrastructure, logistics informatisation, and logistics industry development. The authors of this invited paper have been actively involved in the development of China's logistics industry in various capacities, governmental and non-governmental as well as in academia, and participated in a range of studies on the development trends, plans and policies of China's logistics industry. The authors have a profound understanding of the latest situation in the China's logistics industry and government initiatives.

In recent years, the interdisciplinary research of supply chains and sustainability has received extensive, yet gradual, attention; when compared to the rapid economic growth of the service industry, however, sustainable supply chain management has not been systematically explored yet. It has not only great theoretical significance, but also positive practical significance to provide a framework for the operation of a sustainable service supply chain from a sustainable development point of view. Based on the triple bottom line (TBL), we have analyzed related sustainable supply chain management research between 2006 and 2015, reviewed papers involving two or three bottom lines as well, and then introduced some classical frameworks for manufacturing supply chain management and service supply chain management. Afterward, by analyzing the differences between the manufacturing and service industries, we propose a framework of sustainable service supply chain management (SSSCM). Based on the impacts of sustainable development TBL on service supply chain participants, we have finally made a framework for sustainable operation facing triads service supply chain and proposed a future research agenda.

With the application of advanced technology, smart logistics ecological cooperation is in development, characterised by data sharing and platform empowerment. In order to explore the trend of ecological cooperation between the logistics platform and the supplier from the perspective of business ecosystem, this study uses evolutionary game theory to describe the multi-period game between the two parties, and obtains the equilibrium where the two parties both choose ecological cooperation and its preconditions. Through sensitivity analysis, we obtain the specific paths to convert other evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) into the ideal ESS by adjusting certain parameters, and provide suggestions for the platform to induce its supplier to choose ecological cooperation. The platform should charge a reasonable agency fee to reach the ecological cooperation. The relationship between the agency fee, empowerment cost, and service price elasticity coefficient determines the platform's ultimate evolutionary stable strategy. This study finds the butterfly effect of ecological cooperation. There are different combinations of the initial probabilities between the two parties making them both choose ecological cooperation or both not choose under the same condition.

In the logistics service supply chain (LSSC), quality supervision and coordination is an important approach that can ensure the effective operation of LSSC and obtain more customers. This paper aims to study the quality decisions of the functional logistics service provider (FLSP) and the logistics service integrator (LSI) when a service quality defect guarantee is promised by the FLSP. Assuming that customer demand is a function of the quality defect guarantee of the FLSP, the optimal quality decisions of the LSI and FLSP are presented under three typical game modes: Nash game, Stackelberg game, and centralised decision. Numerical analysis is conducted to show how the quality parameters of the customer affect the optimal quality decision-making behaviour of the LSI and FLSP. The research results indicate that, under all three game modes, the optimal quality defect guarantee of the FLSP increases as the customer punishment increases, and decreases as the elasticity of the customer demand for the quality defect guarantee increases. In addition, under all three game modes, the optimal quality supervision effort of the LSI is an increasing function of both customer punishment and elasticity of the customer demand for the quality defect guarantee.