In the research reported here, we examined whether processing speed mediates the development of general intelligence (g) in adolescence. Using the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, a battery of 12 diverse cognitive tests, we assessed processing speed and g in a large sample of 13- to 17-year-olds obtained from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (N = 6,969). The direct effect of age on g was small compared with the total effect of age on g, which was almost fully mediated through speed. The results suggest that increases in g in adolescence can be attributed to increases in mental speed.
In a prior issue of the Journal of Intelligence, I argued that the most important scientific issue in intelligence research was to identify specific abilities with validity beyond g (i.e., variance common to mental tests) (Coyle, T.R. Predictive validity of non-g residuals of tests: More than g. Journal of Intelligence 2014, 2, 21–25.). In this Special Issue, I review my research on specific abilities related to non-g factors. The non-g factors include specific math and verbal abilities based on standardized tests (SAT, ACT, PSAT, Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery). I focus on two non-g factors: (a) non-g residuals, obtained after removing g from tests, and (b) ability tilt, defined as within-subject differences between math and verbal scores, yielding math tilt (math > verbal) and verbal tilt (verbal > math). In general, math residuals and tilt positively predict STEM criteria (college majors, jobs, GPAs) and negatively predict humanities criteria, whereas verbal residuals and tilt show the opposite pattern. The paper concludes with suggestions for future research, with a focus on theories of non-g factors (e.g., investment theories, Spearman’s Law of Diminishing Returns, Cognitive Differentiation-Integration Effort Model) and a magnification model of non-g factors.
1 April 2011 in Personality and Individual Differences
Cognitive ability stimulates economic productivity. However, the effects of cognitive ability may be stronger in free and open economies, where competition rewards merit and achievement. To test this hypothesis, ability levels of intellectual classes (top 5%) and average classes (country averages) were estimated using international student assessments (Programme for International Student Assessment; Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study; and Progress in International Reading Literacy Study) (N = 99 countries). The ability levels were correlated with indicators of economic freedom (Fraser Institute), scientific achievement (patent rates), innovation (Global Innovation Index), competitiveness (Global Competitiveness Index), and wealth (gross domestic product). Ability levels of intellectual and average classes strongly predicted all economic criteria. In addition, economic freedom moderated the effects of cognitive ability (for both classes), with stronger effects at higher levels of freedom. Effects were particularly robust for scientific achievements when the full range of freedom was analyzed. The results support cognitive capitalism theory: cognitive ability stimulates economic productivity, and its effects are enhanced by economic freedom.
This comment argues that an important issue in intelligence research is to identify constructs with validity beyond g, and that non-g residuals of tests represent a promising target.