Mathias Staudigl

Dr. Mathias Staudigl


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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28 July 2020 in Advances in Nonlinear Analysis
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RBRadu Ioan Boţ
Radu Ioan Boţ
Sorin-Mihai GradSorin-Mihai Grad
Sorin-Mihai Grad
DMDennis Meier
Dennis Meier
MSMathias Staudigl
Mathias Staudigl
In this work we investigate dynamical systems designed to approach the solution sets of inclusion problems involving the sum of two maximally monotone operators. Our aim is to design methods which guarantee strong convergence of trajectories towards the minimum norm solution of the underlying monotone inclusion problem. To that end, we investigate in detail the asymptotic behavior of dynamical systems perturbed by a Tikhonov regularization where either the maximally monotone operators themselves, or the vector field of the dynamical system is regularized. In both cases we prove strong convergence of the trajectories towards minimum norm solutions to an underlying monotone inclusion problem, and we illustrate numerically qualitative differences between these two complementary regularization strategies. The so-constructed dynamical systems are either of Krasnoselskiĭ-Mann, of forward-backward type or of forward-backward-forward type, and with the help of injected regularization we demonstrate seminal results on the strong convergence of Hilbert space valued evolutions designed to solve monotone inclusion and equilibrium problems.

1 January 2021 in EURO Journal on Computational Optimization
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PDPavel Dvurechensky
Pavel Dvurechensky
SSShimrit Shtern
Shimrit Shtern
MSMathias Staudigl
Mathias Staudigl

1 June 2021 in Stochastic Systems
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RBRadu Ioan Boţ
Radu Ioan Boţ
PMPanayotis Mertikopoulos
Panayotis Mertikopoulos
MSMathias Staudigl
Mathias Staudigl
PVPhan Tu Vuong
Phan Tu Vuong
We develop a new stochastic algorithm for solving pseudomonotone stochastic variational inequalities. Our method builds on Tseng’s forward-backward-forward algorithm, which is known in the deterministic literature to be a valuable alternative to Korpelevich’s extragradient method when solving variational inequalities over a convex and closed set governed by pseudomonotone Lipschitz continuous operators. The main computational advantage of Tseng’s algorithm is that it relies only on a single projection step and two independent queries of a stochastic oracle. Our algorithm incorporates a minibatch sampling mechanism and leads to almost sure convergence to an optimal solution. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first stochastic look-ahead algorithm achieving this by using only a single projection at each iteration.

1 January 2016 in Theoretical Economics
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WSWilliam H. Sandholm
William H. Sandholm
MSMathias Staudigl
Mathias Staudigl
We consider a model of stochastic evolution under general noisy best-response protocols, allowing the probabilities of suboptimal choices to depend on their payoff consequences. Our analysis focuses on behavior in the small noise double limit: we first take the noise level in agents' decisions to zero, and then take the population size to infinity. We show that in this double limit, escape from and transitions between equilibria can be described in terms of solutions to continuous optimal control problems. These are used in turn to characterize the asymptotics of the stationary distribution, and so to determine the stochastically stable states. We use these results to perform a complete analysis of evolution in three-strategy coordination games that satisfy the marginal bandwagon property and that have an interior equilibrium, with agents following the logit choice rule

1 May 2023 in Mathematics of Operations Research
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BDBenoit Duvocelle
Benoit Duvocelle
PMPanayotis Mertikopoulos
Panayotis Mertikopoulos
MSMathias Staudigl
Mathias Staudigl
DVDries Vermeulen
Dries Vermeulen
We examine the long-run behavior of multiagent online learning in games that evolve over time. Specifically, we focus on a wide class of policies based on mirror descent, and we show that the induced sequence of play (a) converges to a Nash equilibrium in time-varying games that stabilize in the long run to a strictly monotone limit, and (b) it stays asymptotically close to the evolving equilibrium of the sequence of stage games (assuming they are strongly monotone). Our results apply to both gradient- and payoff-based feedback—that is, when players only get to observe the payoffs of their chosen actions. Funding: This research was partially supported by the European Cooperation in Science and Technology COST Action [Grant CA16228] “European Network for Game Theory” (GAMENET). P. Mertikopoulos is grateful for financial support by the French National Research Agency (ANR) in the framework of the “Investissements d’avenir” program [Grant ANR-15-IDEX-02], the LabEx PERSYVAL [Grant ANR-11-LABX-0025-01], MIAI@Grenoble Alpes [Grant ANR-19-P3IA-0003], and the ALIAS [Grant ANR-19-CE48-0018-01].

18 July 2018 in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
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PMPanayotis Mertikopoulos
Panayotis Mertikopoulos
MSMathias Staudigl
Mathias Staudigl
We examine a class of stochastic mirror descent dynamics in the context of monotone variational inequalities (including Nash equilibrium and saddle-point problems). The dynamics under study are formulated as a stochastic differential equation, driven by a (single-valued) monotone operator and perturbed by a Brownian motion. The system’s controllable parameters are two variable weight sequences, that, respectively, pre- and post-multiply the driver of the process. By carefully tuning these parameters, we obtain global convergence in the ergodic sense, and we estimate the average rate of convergence of the process. We also establish a large deviations principle, showing that individual trajectories exhibit exponential concentration around this average.