This work proposes a model starting from the Three-Circle Model, based on the reality of the small and medium-sized family business sector in the Mexico City Metropolitan Area. The present paper proposes a new model that was built based on the Three Circle Model, but it is based on the reality of the Small and Medium Mexican family business sector. The model does not include the Ownership Subsystem, but it includes the Environment Subsystem, a subsystem that has a vital influence on the life and performance of an organization of that size. These three subsystems intersect in common elements such as culture, economy or company vision, triggering the success or failure of the company itself. The methodology used was a mixed methodology, with both qualitative and quantitative elements. First, the Delphi method was used on a scale that was applied to 25 owners of Small and Medium Enterprises and then, to make an additional confirmation, hypothesis testing, factorial analysis and the technique of structural equations were used. It was seen that the ownership subsystem has a lower weight than the business, environment and family subsystems, is the least relevant.
El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar las diferentes estrategias competitivas empleadas por los Operadores de Telecomunicaciones (OTs) europeos y estadounidenses dependiendo del papel de las instituciones, la dinámica particular del mercado doméstico y regional de Estados Unidos y Europa, y el perfil particular de cada operador, a partir de la Crisis Financiera Global (CFG) de 2008. Partiendo de un modelo conceptual basado en Barney, Porter y Peng, como trípode estratégico para definir una estrategia competitiva, se analizan las entrevistas realizadas a cincuenta profesionales que han estado directa o indirectamente involucrados en aspectos relacionados con la gestión estratégica de los siete OTs analizados. La investigación permite obtener un resultado importante: la mayor duración y profundidad de la CFG en Europa y las significativas diferencias coyunturales y estructurales existentes entre ambas regiones propiciaron un entorno y dinámica competitiva menos favorable para los OTs de Europa. Además, las diferencias en el perfil de los mercados locales y en el grado de desarrollo del negocio móvil impactó negativamente en los resultados financieros de los operadores europeos por unas menores sinergias y economías de escala, contribuyendo a su peor desempeño en capitalización. Como consecuencia, la estrategia competitiva y gestión del modelo de negocio de los OTs de Estados Unidos fue más eficaz que la de los OTs europeos.
This paper analyses the voting behavior of the parliamentary groups in the Regional Assembly of Madrid to appoint the Bureau, its representative body, in all the legislatures since its inception (1983–2021). To this end, the actual result of the voting is compared with the mock result attained by following a Nash equilibrium (NE) and a d’Hondt (d’H) allocation in each vote. But the result of a d’Hondt allocation varies based on the number of stages in which the voting is performed (President, Vice-President, and Secretaries), so a bias towards disproportionality could exist as measured by the absolute index of disproportionality which calculates the number of seats non-proportionally allocated. The results show that, in view of the hypothesis on the importance of the number of seats, the NE was only followed in four of the 12 Legislatures for Vice-Presidents (it was always followed for Secretaries). Thus, parliamentary groups could gain more seats by modifying their strategies. Additionally, the absolute rate of disproportionality and the number of seats non-proportionally allocated indicate that, in general, parliamentary groups obtain voting results that are less disproportionate than they could be (due to the number of voting stages).