The time is ripe to integrate burgeoning evidence of the important role of sensory and motor functioning in mental health within the National Institute of Mental Health’s [NIMH] Research Domain Criteria [RDoC] framework (National Institute of Mental Health, n.d.a), a multi-dimensional method of characterizing mental functioning in health and disease across all neurobiological levels of analysis ranging from genetic to behavioral. As the importance of motor processing in psychopathology has been recognized (Bernard and Mittal, 2015; Garvey and Cuthbert, 2017; National Institute of Mental Health, 2019), here we focus on sensory processing. First, we review the current design of the RDoC matrix, noting sensory features missing despite their prevalence in multiple mental illnesses. We identify two missing classes of sensory symptoms that we widely define as (1) sensory processing, including sensory sensitivity and active sensing, and (2) domains of perceptual signaling, including interoception and proprioception, which are currently absent or underdeveloped in the perception construct of the cognitive systems domain. Then, we describe the neurobiological basis of these psychological constructs and examine why these sensory features are important for understanding psychopathology. Where appropriate, we examine links between sensory processing and the domains currently included in the RDoC matrix. Throughout, we emphasize how the addition of these sensory features to the RDoC matrix is important for understanding a range of mental health disorders. We conclude with the suggestion that a separate sensation and perception domain can enhance the current RDoC framework, while discussing what we see as important principles and promising directions for the future development and use of the RDoC.

Prosody, the melody and intonation of speech, involves the rhythm, rate, pitch and voice quality to relay linguistic and emotional information from one individual to another. A significant component of human social communication depends upon interpreting and responding to another person's prosodic tone as well as one's own ability to produce prosodic speech. However there has been little work on whether the perception and production of prosody share common neural processes, and if so, how these might correlate with individual differences in social ability. The aim of the present study was to determine the degree to which perception and production of prosody rely on shared neural systems. Using fMRI, neural activity during perception and production of a meaningless phrase in different prosodic intonations was measured. Regions of overlap for production and perception of prosody were found in premotor regions, in particular the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). Activity in these regions was further found to correlate with how high an individual scored on two different measures of affective empathy as well as a measure on prosodic production ability. These data indicate, for the first time, that areas that are important for prosody production may also be utilized for prosody perception, as well as other aspects of social communication and social understanding, such as aspects of empathy and prosodic ability.

Abnormal sensory-based behaviors are a defining feature of autism spectrum disorders (ASD). Dr. A. Jean Ayres was the first occupational therapist to conceptualize Sensory Integration (SI) theories and therapies to address these deficits. Her work was based on neurological knowledge of the 1970’s. Since then, advancements in neuroimaging techniques make it possible to better understand the brain areas that may underlie sensory processing deficits in ASD. In this article, we explore the postulates proposed by Ayres (i.e., registration, modulation, motivation) through current neuroimaging literature. To this end, we review the neural underpinnings of sensory processing and integration in ASD by examining the literature on neurophysiological responses to sensory stimuli in individuals with ASD as well as structural and network organization using a variety of neuroimaging techniques. Many aspects of Ayres’ hypotheses about the nature of the disorder were found to be highly consistent with current literature on sensory processing in children with ASD but there are some discrepancies across various methodological techniques and ASD development. With additional characterization, neurophysiological profiles of sensory processing in ASD may serve as valuable biomarkers for diagnosis and monitoring of therapeutic interventions, such as SI therapy.

Gastrointestinal dysfunction is one of the most prevalent physiological symptoms of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). A growing body of largely preclinical research suggests that dysbiotic gut microbiota may modulate brain function and social behavior, yet little is known about the mechanisms that underlie these relationships and how they may influence the pathogenesis or severity of ASD. While various genetic and environmental risk factors have been implicated in ASD, this review aims to provide an overview of studies elucidating the mechanisms by which gut microbiota, associated metabolites, and the brain interact to influence behavior and ASD development, in at least a subgroup of individuals with gastrointestinal problems. Specifically, we review the brain-gut-microbiome system and discuss findings from current animal and human studies as they relate to social-behavioral and neurological impairments in ASD, microbiota-targeted therapies (i.e., probiotics, fecal microbiota transplantation) in ASD, and how microbiota may influence the brain at molecular, structural, and functional levels, with a particular interest in social and emotion-related brain networks. A deeper understanding of microbiome-brain-behavior interactions has the potential to inform new therapies aimed at modulating this system and alleviating both behavioral and physiological symptomatology in individuals with ASD.

While it has been suggested that alterations in the composition of gut microbial metabolites may play a causative role in the pathophysiology of autism spectrum disorder (ASD), it is not known how gut microbial metabolites are associated with ASD-specific brain alterations. In this cross-sectional, case-control observational study, (i) fecal metabolomics, (ii) task-based functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and (iii) behavioral assessments were obtained from 43 ASD and 41 neurotypical (NT) children, aged 8–17. The fMRI tasks used socio-emotional and sensory paradigms that commonly reveal strong evoked brain differences in ASD participants. Our results show that fecal levels of specific tryptophan-related metabolites, including kynurenate, were significantly lower in ASD compared to NT, and were associated with: 1) alterations in insular and cingulate cortical activity previously implicated in ASD; and 2) ASD severity and symptoms (e.g., ADOS scores, disgust propensity, and sensory sensitivities). Moreover, activity in the mid-insula and mid-cingulate significantly mediated relationships between the microbial tryptophan metabolites (indolelactate and tryptophan betaine) and ASD severity and disgust sensitivity. Thus, we identify associations between gut microbial tryptophan metabolites, ASD symptoms, and brain activity in humans, particularly in brain regions associated with interoceptive processing.

How do we understand and empathize with individuals whose bodies are drastically different from our own? We investigated the neural processes by which an individual with a radically different body, a congenital amputee who is born without limbs, engages her own sensory-motor representations as a means to understand other people’s body actions or emotional states. Our results support the prediction that when the goal of the action is possible for the observer, one’s own motor regions are involved in processing action observation, just as when individuals viewed those similar to themselves. However, when the observed actions are not possible, mentalizing mechanisms, relying on a different set of neural structures, are additionally recruited to process the actions. Furthermore, our results indicate that when individuals view others experiencing pain in body parts that they have, the insula and somatosensory cortices are activated, consistent with previous reports. However, when an individual views others experiencing pain in body parts that she does not have, the insula and secondary somatosensory cortices are still active, but the primary somatosensory cortices are not. These results provide a novel understanding for how we understand and empathize with individuals who drastically differ from the self.