Laurie Santos

Dr. Laurie Santos


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

28Years (1999-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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3 January 2015 in Annual Review of Psychology
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Journal Article
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LSLaurie Santos
Laurie Santos
ARAlexandra G. Rosati
Alexandra G. Rosati
Humans exhibit a suite of biases when making economic decisions. We review recent research on the origins of human decision making by examining whether similar choice biases are seen in nonhuman primates, our closest phylogenetic relatives. We propose that comparative studies can provide insight into four major questions about the nature of human choice biases that cannot be addressed by studies of our species alone. First, research with other primates can address the evolution of human choice biases and identify shared versus human-unique tendencies in decision making. Second, primate studies can constrain hypotheses about the psychological mechanisms underlying such biases. Third, comparisons of closely related species can identify when distinct mechanisms underlie related biases by examining evolutionary dissociations in choice strategies. Finally, comparative work can provide insight into the biological rationality of economically irrational preferences.

8 September 2020 in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
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Journal Article
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JPJonathan Phillips
Jonathan Phillips
WBWesley Buckwalter
Wesley Buckwalter
FCFiery Cushman
Fiery Cushman
OFOri Friedman
Ori Friedman
AMAlia Martin
Alia Martin
JKJoshua Knobe
Joshua Knobe
Research on the capacity to understand others' minds has tended to focus on representations ofbeliefs,which are widely taken to be among the most central and basic theory of mind representations. Representations ofknowledge, by contrast, have received comparatively little attention and have often been understood as depending on prior representations of belief. After all, how could one represent someone as knowing something if one does not even represent them as believing it? Drawing on a wide range of methods across cognitive science, we ask whether belief or knowledge is the more basic kind of representation. The evidence indicates that nonhuman primates attribute knowledge but not belief, that knowledge representations arise earlier in human development than belief representations, that the capacity to represent knowledge may remain intact in patient populations even when belief representation is disrupted, that knowledge (but not belief) attributions are likely automatic, and that explicit knowledge attributions are made more quickly than equivalent belief attributions. Critically, the theory of mind representations uncovered by these various methods exhibits a set of signature features clearly indicative of knowledge: they are not modality-specific, they are factive, they are not just true belief, and they allow for representations of egocentric ignorance. We argue that these signature features elucidate the primary function of knowledge representation: facilitating learning from others about the external world. This suggests a new way of understanding theory of mind – one that is focused on understanding others' minds in relation to the actual world, rather than independent from it.

6 October 2008 in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
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Journal Article
Open access
VLVenkat Lakshminaryanan
Venkat Lakshminaryanan
MCM Keith Chen
M Keith Chen
LSLaurie Santos
Laurie Santos
In humans, the capacity for economically rational choice is constrained by a variety of preference biases: humans evaluate gambles relative to arbitrary reference points; weigh losses heavier than equally sized gains; and demand a higher price for owned goods than for equally preferred goods that are not yet owned. To date, however, fewer studies have examined the origins of these biases. Here, we review previous work demonstrating that human economic biases such as loss aversion and reference dependence are shared with an ancestrally related New World primate, the capuchin monkey ( Cebus apella ). We then examine whether capuchins display an endowment effect in a token-trading task. We identified pairs of treats (fruit discs versus cereal chunks) that were equally preferred by each monkey. When given a chance to trade away their owned fruit discs to obtain the equally valued cereal chunks (or vice versa), however, monkeys required a far greater compensation than the equally preferred treat. We show that these effects are not due to transaction costs or timing issues. These data suggest that biased preferences rely on cognitive systems that are more evolutionarily ancient than previously thought—and that common evolutionary ancestry shared by humans and capuchins may account for the occurrence of the endowment effect in both species.

30 August 2011 in Developmental Science
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Journal Article
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DMDrew C.W. Marticorena
Drew C.W. Marticorena
ARApril M. Ruiz
April M. Ruiz
CMCora Mukerji
Cora Mukerji
AGAnna Goddu
Anna Goddu
LSLaurie Santos
Laurie Santos

8 December 2005 in Animal Cognition
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Journal Article
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LSLaurie Santos
Laurie Santos
HPHeather M. Pearson
Heather M. Pearson
GSGeertrui M. Spaepen
Geertrui M. Spaepen
FTFritz Tsao
Fritz Tsao
MHMarc D. Hauser
Marc D. Hauser

1 December 2003 in Animal Cognition
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Journal Article
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LSLaurie Santos
Laurie Santos
CMCory T. Miller
Cory T. Miller
MHMarc D. Hauser
Marc D. Hauser