State of the art deep learning techniques are known to be vulnerable to evasion attacks where an adversarial sample is generated from a malign sample and misclassified as benign. Detection of encrypted malware command and control traffic based on TCP/IP flow features can be framed as a learning task and is thus vulnerable to evasion attacks. However, unlike e.g. in image processing where generated adversarial samples can be directly mapped to images, going from flow features to actual TCP/IP packets requires crafting the sequence of packets, with no established approach for such crafting and a limitation on the set of modifiable features that such crafting allows.In this paper we discuss learning and evasion consequences of the gap between generated and crafted adversarial samples. We exemplify with a deep neural network detector trained on a public C2 traffic dataset, white-box adversarial learning, and a proxy-based approach for crafting longer flows. Our results show 1) the high evasion rate obtained by using generated adversarial samples on the detector can be significantly reduced when using crafted adversarial samples; 2) robustness against adversarial samples by model hardening varies according to the crafting approach and corresponding set of modifiable features that the attack allows for; 3) incrementally training hardened models with adversarial samples can produce a level playing field where no detector is best against all attacks and no attack is best against all detectors, in a given set of attacks and detectors. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time that level playing field feature set- and iteration-hardening are analyzed in encrypted C2 malware traffic detection.
Knowing domain names associated with traffic allows eavesdroppers to profile users without accessing packet payloads. Encrypting domain names transiting the network is, therefore, a key step to increase network confidentiality. Latest efforts include encrypting the TLS Server Name Indication (eSNI extension) and encrypting DNS traffic, with DNS over HTTPS (DoH) representing a prominent proposal. In this paper, we show that an attacker able to observe users' traffic relying on plain-text DNS can uncover the domain names of users relying on eSNI or DoH. By relying on large-scale network traces, we show that simplistic features and off-the-shelf machine learning models are sufficient to achieve surprisingly high precision and recall when recovering encrypted domain names. The triviality of the attack calls for further actions to protect privacy, in particular considering transient scenarios in which only a fraction of users will adopt these new privacy-enhancing technologies.