This page has only limited features, please log in for full access.
This study is the first to empirically investigate whether farmers’ assessment of their cooperatives’ environmental efforts is related to their satisfaction with the cooperatives, in addition to their assessment of the cooperatives in economic and social terms. A survey was conducted among a randomly selected sample of 211 members of 63 farmer cooperatives in Fujian Province, China. Binary logit analyses were conducted to test three theoretically derived hypotheses. There was a positive relationship between member satisfaction with the cooperatives and farmers’ assessment of the cooperatives’ environmental actions, although the cooperatives’ economic and social contributions were even more appreciated. Consequently, at least under the prevailing circumstances, member satisfaction with their cooperatives is positively associated with the farmers’ view of the environmental ambitions of their cooperatives.
Liyan Yu; Jerker Nilsson. Farmers’ Assessments of Their Cooperatives in Economic, Social, and Environmental Terms: An Investigation in Fujian, China. Frontiers in Environmental Science 2021, 9, 1 .
AMA StyleLiyan Yu, Jerker Nilsson. Farmers’ Assessments of Their Cooperatives in Economic, Social, and Environmental Terms: An Investigation in Fujian, China. Frontiers in Environmental Science. 2021; 9 ():1.
Chicago/Turabian StyleLiyan Yu; Jerker Nilsson. 2021. "Farmers’ Assessments of Their Cooperatives in Economic, Social, and Environmental Terms: An Investigation in Fujian, China." Frontiers in Environmental Science 9, no. : 1.
This study comprises a qualitative analysis of the governance structures within the two largest agricultural cooperatives in Sweden, both of which have large and heterogeneous memberships, as well as sizeable and complex business operations. Interviews were conducted with district council members and representatives from the boards of directors. The data from both case cooperatives indicate a genuinely traditional democratic member governance structure. There is a great deal of social capital in the governance system. A tentative explanation of the member involvement is that the cooperatives’ equity capital is owned by the individual members, and the members are free to sell and buy their shares at a market rate. The members are satisfied with the return on the capital they have invested in the cooperatives. They receive bonus shares and dividends above what most members would get in other investments. A conclusion is that very large cooperatives may succeed well with a member-democratic governance system of the traditional cooperative type, which in this case is probably due to the members’ satisfaction with the individualized ownership of the cooperatives.
Karin Hakelius; Jerker Nilsson. The Logic behind the Internal Governance of Sweden’s Largest Agricultural Cooperatives. Sustainability 2020, 12, 9073 .
AMA StyleKarin Hakelius, Jerker Nilsson. The Logic behind the Internal Governance of Sweden’s Largest Agricultural Cooperatives. Sustainability. 2020; 12 (21):9073.
Chicago/Turabian StyleKarin Hakelius; Jerker Nilsson. 2020. "The Logic behind the Internal Governance of Sweden’s Largest Agricultural Cooperatives." Sustainability 12, no. 21: 9073.
This study explored the relations between the farmer‐members' social networks and their interest in cooperative governance, specifically their willingness to be elected representatives. Several researchers assert that member interest in cooperative governance is related to social factors. The empirical basis consists of surveys of random samples of Swedish farmers conducted in 1993, 2003, and 2013. The results indicate a strong relationship between the social networks and the farmers' propensity to participate in cooperative governance. This relationship has persisted even though the investigated 20‐year period was very turbulent for Swedish agriculture. Over time, members have become more willing to be elected when they receive backing from their social networks, with personal networks being more important than professional networks. The professional networks are related only to the level of aspiration and not actual participation in governance. [EconLit Citations: D73, P13, Q13].
Chrysoula Morfi; Jerker Nilsson; Karin Hakelius; Kostas Karantininis. Social networks and member participation in cooperative governance. Agribusiness 2020, 37, 264 -285.
AMA StyleChrysoula Morfi, Jerker Nilsson, Karin Hakelius, Kostas Karantininis. Social networks and member participation in cooperative governance. Agribusiness. 2020; 37 (2):264-285.
Chicago/Turabian StyleChrysoula Morfi; Jerker Nilsson; Karin Hakelius; Kostas Karantininis. 2020. "Social networks and member participation in cooperative governance." Agribusiness 37, no. 2: 264-285.
This study investigates why members support their forestry cooperative's provision of awareness-raising campaigns. The members pay for the cooperative's dissemination of information to the government, non-governmental organizations, and the public to achieve a more favorable opinion about forestry. The possible gains of the campaign are non-rivalry goods and apply to members and non-members alike, which makes the campaign a public good. A sample of 782 members of a Swedish forestry cooperative completed a questionnaire based on four theoretically motivated hypotheses. The findings indicate that members are unconcerned about non-member benefits from campaigns. Members particularly appreciate raising awareness of production-related issues. Social influences among the population of forest owners have no major impact. Trust in the cooperative is essential for member support of the provision of public goods. Members support the cooperative's campaigns even if the outcomes are uncertain or occur in a distant future.
Jerker Nilsson; Matilda Helgesson; Jens Rommel; Ellinor Svensson. Forest-owner support for their cooperative's provision of public goods. Forest Policy and Economics 2020, 115, 102156 .
AMA StyleJerker Nilsson, Matilda Helgesson, Jens Rommel, Ellinor Svensson. Forest-owner support for their cooperative's provision of public goods. Forest Policy and Economics. 2020; 115 ():102156.
Chicago/Turabian StyleJerker Nilsson; Matilda Helgesson; Jens Rommel; Ellinor Svensson. 2020. "Forest-owner support for their cooperative's provision of public goods." Forest Policy and Economics 115, no. : 102156.
For the rural districts of China to get an economically and socially sustainable development, the strengthening of agricultural cooperatives is essential. This study aims at presenting a model about how social capital within the cooperatives can be converted into financial capital to the benefit of both the cooperative and the members. Case studies of four cooperatives serve as illustrations. There is a large amount of social capital in these cooperatives, with their operations simple enough to allow members to be involved. The supplying members (common members) are few and well acquainted with one another. They have close relationships with those individuals (core members) who have the dominating ownership and who run the cooperatives. These case cooperatives were chosen because they have innovative financial solutions. For example, members let their private assets and those of the cooperative constitute joint collateral when money is borrowed from financial institutions. In another case, the members trust each other sufficiently for there to be a mutual fund that lends money both to members and their cooperative. Yet another model involves members having low demands concerning capital returns when lending to their cooperative.
Liyan Yu; Jerker Nilsson. Social Capital and Financial Capital in Chinese Cooperatives. Sustainability 2019, 11, 2415 .
AMA StyleLiyan Yu, Jerker Nilsson. Social Capital and Financial Capital in Chinese Cooperatives. Sustainability. 2019; 11 (8):2415.
Chicago/Turabian StyleLiyan Yu; Jerker Nilsson. 2019. "Social Capital and Financial Capital in Chinese Cooperatives." Sustainability 11, no. 8: 2415.
In most post-socialist economies, private farming has re-emerged after regime change, although even today this sector most often accounts for only a minor proportion of national production. Russian private farmers are reported to dislike formal cooperatives, so this study investigated whether their informal collaborative arrangements may affect their business results. A survey involving personal interviews with 158 randomly chosen private farmers in the Kurgan Region examined whether collaborating farmers are economically more successful and consider their financial situation to be better than that of neighbouring farmers. Ordinary least square and ordered probit regression analysis indicated that farmers with stronger networks are more successful in terms of farm wealth, and also relative to the financial situation of their immediate neighbours. This suggests that success among private farmers in a post-socialist setting is related to their networks.
Svetlana Golovina; Sebastian Hess; Jerker Nilsson; Axel Wolz. Networking among Russian farmers and their prospects for success. Post-Communist Economies 2018, 31, 484 -499.
AMA StyleSvetlana Golovina, Sebastian Hess, Jerker Nilsson, Axel Wolz. Networking among Russian farmers and their prospects for success. Post-Communist Economies. 2018; 31 (4):484-499.
Chicago/Turabian StyleSvetlana Golovina; Sebastian Hess; Jerker Nilsson; Axel Wolz. 2018. "Networking among Russian farmers and their prospects for success." Post-Communist Economies 31, no. 4: 484-499.
This study finds that selective incentives induce district council members and chairpersons to work for the collective best of a co‐operative membership. Being the lowest echelon of a co‐operative's internal governance hierarchy, district councils constitute a link between the membership and the board of directors. Previous research indicates that district council members are often driven by a co‐operative conviction and social concerns. The present study challenges this view. On the basis of a survey of all 191 district council members and council chairpersons of a large Swedish agricultural co‐operative, it is found that the elected representatives rank low in terms of co‐operative conviction and social concerns. They involve themselves mainly in order to get personal benefits; they want to gain access to information, mature personally and obtain inputs to develop their farm enterprises. The financial compensation is of limited importance.
Chrysoula Morfi; Jerker Nilsson; Hanna Österberg. WHY FARMERS INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN CO-OPERATIVE DISTRICT COUNCILS. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 2018, 89, 581 -598.
AMA StyleChrysoula Morfi, Jerker Nilsson, Hanna Österberg. WHY FARMERS INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN CO-OPERATIVE DISTRICT COUNCILS. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics. 2018; 89 (4):581-598.
Chicago/Turabian StyleChrysoula Morfi; Jerker Nilsson; Hanna Österberg. 2018. "WHY FARMERS INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN CO-OPERATIVE DISTRICT COUNCILS." Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 89, no. 4: 581-598.
During recent decades, there have been many failures among large and complex agricultural co-operatives with a traditional organizational structure, that is, with mainly collective governance and collective ownership. Many co-operatives have been converted into the so-called hybrid co-operatives, owned together with external financiers. This article applies governance cost theory to explain this development. The results show that members are not able to govern a collectively owned firm that is large and complex; members are thus reluctant to invest in co-operatives; and members do not perceive that co-operatives benefit them economically. Thus, strong leaders take control and non-member investors gain ownership and influence.
Jerker Nilsson. Governance costs and the problems of large traditional co-operatives. Outlook on Agriculture 2018, 47, 87 -92.
AMA StyleJerker Nilsson. Governance costs and the problems of large traditional co-operatives. Outlook on Agriculture. 2018; 47 (2):87-92.
Chicago/Turabian StyleJerker Nilsson. 2018. "Governance costs and the problems of large traditional co-operatives." Outlook on Agriculture 47, no. 2: 87-92.
Jerker Nilsson; Svetlana Golovina; Sebastian Hess; Axel Wolz. GOVERNANCE OF PRODUCTION CO-OPERATIVES IN RUSSIAN AGRICULTURE. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 2016, 87, 541 -562.
AMA StyleJerker Nilsson, Svetlana Golovina, Sebastian Hess, Axel Wolz. GOVERNANCE OF PRODUCTION CO-OPERATIVES IN RUSSIAN AGRICULTURE. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics. 2016; 87 (4):541-562.
Chicago/Turabian StyleJerker Nilsson; Svetlana Golovina; Sebastian Hess; Axel Wolz. 2016. "GOVERNANCE OF PRODUCTION CO-OPERATIVES IN RUSSIAN AGRICULTURE." Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 87, no. 4: 541-562.
When the Soviet kolkhozy and sovkhozy were converted, a large number of agricultural production co-operatives was created. Most of these co-operatives still exist in Russia and some of them have a strong market position, accounting for almost one-third of the aggregate volume produced by large farms. This study explores whether social capital might be the explanation for this relative success, i.e. that members support their co-operative because they trust their fellow members as well as the leadership. Interviews with co-operative members resulted in 1401 usable answers. The results from an ordered logit model indicate that social capital plays a partial role. Members who consider co-operatives to be an efficient business form value social ties to other members, even though the leadership does not enjoy much social capital.
Svetlana Golovina; Sebastian Hess; Jerker Nilsson; Axel Wolz. Social capital in Russian agricultural production co-operatives. Post-Communist Economies 2014, 26, 522 -536.
AMA StyleSvetlana Golovina, Sebastian Hess, Jerker Nilsson, Axel Wolz. Social capital in Russian agricultural production co-operatives. Post-Communist Economies. 2014; 26 (4):522-536.
Chicago/Turabian StyleSvetlana Golovina; Sebastian Hess; Jerker Nilsson; Axel Wolz. 2014. "Social capital in Russian agricultural production co-operatives." Post-Communist Economies 26, no. 4: 522-536.