This paper examines the impact of the U.S. bankruptcy procedures on the valuation of corporate securities and capital structure decisions. We provide closed-form solutions for the values of corporate debt and equity when defaulting firms can either liquidate their assets or renegotiate outstanding debt under the Court protection. The paper shows that the possibility to renegotiate the debt contract (i) has an ambiguous impact on leverage choices and (ii) unambiguously increases credit spreads on corporate debt. The analysis also reveals that the sharing rule of cash flows during bankruptcy has a large impact on optimal leverage. By contrast, credit spreads on corporate debt show little sensitivity to this very parameter.
Standard contingent claims models of the levered firm examine capital structure choices with the assumption that full offsets of corporate losses are allowed. However, restrictions on tax loss carry-forwards (TLCF) are the rule rather than the exception. The EBIT model of Goldstein et al. ( 2001 Goldstein, R , Ju, N and Leland, H . 2001. An EBIT-based model of dynamic capital structure. Journal of Business, 74: 483–512. [Crossref] [Google Scholar] ) is extended to measure how optimal leverage is affected by restrictions on TLCF. The restricted TLCF case reconciles the static trade-off model with the evidence that (i) optimal leverage is decreasing with firm growth and (ii) firms benefiting from TLCF may issue debt less aggressively.