In the era of the sharing economy, the rise of production capacity sharing has changed traditional manufacturing modes and broken the balance of original production systems. In addition to that environmental-friendly manufacturing enterprises are of great significance with regard to production capacity sharing and sustainable development of the ecology environment. To investigate the decision-making behaviors of the participants involved in low-carbon production capacity sharing, an evolutionary game model taking into account the platforms, manufacturing enterprises with idle production capacity, and those with demanding production capacity is constructed. Then, both evolutionary game theory and Lyapunov stability theorem are used to analyze the asymptotic stability of the equilibrium and evolutionary stability strategies of the system. Besides, the economic and managerial significance of the evolutionary stability strategy is given. Finally, the influence of low-carbon production capacity of enterprises on the stability of the dynamic system is discussed, such as the cost effect of low-carbon production capacity, the effect of transaction cost, and so on. Results indicate that they can provide theoretical reference for decision-making with respect to the platforms, manufacturing enterprises, and sustainable development of the dynamic system.

Exemplified by EcoStruxure from Schneider and CASICloud, production-capacity-sharing platforms typically operate as two-sided platforms. These platforms contribute to carbon emission reductions while generating revenue through uniform membership fees, fixed service charges, or commission fees applied to one or both sides of the platform. As B2B platforms, however, they must determine whether to offer online payment options to participants on both sides of the market. We employ the theory of two-sided markets and the method of comparative analysis, developing a two-sided market model to investigate: (1) the platform’s optimal payment method selection strategies and (2) how same-side network externalities and user online search costs affect platform performance. We examine two payment modes: M mode (offline payments only) and F mode (combined offline/online payments). The F mode comprises two sub-modes—FF (two-sided users choose to pay offline) and FN (two-sided users choose to pay online)—determined by users’ payment preferences on each side. We conduct pairwise comparisons of the platform’s membership fee, fixed service fee, and online service level between: (i) FF and M modes and (ii) FN and M modes. Our results indicate that the optimal payment method selection varies across market conditions, with each mode demonstrating superior performance under specific market characteristics. The FF mode consistently yields higher profits compared to the M mode. When suppliers’ expected revenues fall below a certain threshold, the FN mode outperforms the M mode in terms of profit generation. Conversely, the M mode becomes preferable above this threshold. Furthermore, the effects of same-side network externalities and search costs vary significantly across different payment modes. Under the M mode and the FF₁ mode, the effects of the same-side network externality on the platform’s membership fee are associated with two-sided users’ online search costs, which are more monotonous. Under the FN₁ and FN₂ modes, both the same-side network externality and two-sided users’ online search costs impact the platform’s optimal strategies monotonously, but they are not always the same in these two modes.