Model inversion attacks (MIAs) aim to recover private data from inaccessible training sets of deep learning models, posing a privacy threat. MIAs primarily focus on the white-box scenario where attackers have full access to the model’s structure and parameters. However, practical applications are usually in black-box scenarios or label-only scenarios, i.e., the attackers can only obtain the output confidence vectors or labels by accessing the model. Therefore, the attack models in existing MIAs are difficult to effectively train with the knowledge of the target model, resulting in sub-optimal attacks. To the best of our knowledge, we pioneer the research of a powerful and practical attack model in the label-only scenario. In this paper, we develop a novel MIA method, leveraging a conditional diffusion model (CDM) to recover representative samples under the target label from the training set. Two techniques are introduced: selecting an auxiliary dataset relevant to the target model task and using predicted labels as conditions to guide training CDM; and inputting target label, pre-defined guidance strength, and random noise into the trained attack model to generate and correct multiple results for final selection. This method is evaluated using Learned Perceptual Image Patch Similarity as a new metric and as a judgment basis for deciding the values of hyper-parameters. Experimental results show that this method can generate similar and accurate samples to the target label, outperforming generators of previous approaches.

After any distribution of secret sharing shadows in a threshold changeable secret sharing scheme, the threshold may need to be adjusted to deal with changes in the security policy and adversary structure. For example, when employees leave the organization, it is not realistic to expect departing employees to ensure the security of their secret shadows. Therefore, in 2012, Zhang et al. proposed (t → t′, n) and ({t₁, t₂,⋯, t_N}, n) threshold changeable secret sharing schemes. However, their schemes suffer from a number of limitations such as strict limit on the threshold values, large storage space requirement for secret shadows, and significant computation for constructing and recovering polynomials. To address these limitations, we propose two improved dealer-free threshold changeable secret sharing schemes. In our schemes, we construct polynomials to update secret shadows, and use two-variable one-way function to resist collusion attacks and secure the information stored by the combiner. We then demonstrate our schemes can adjust the threshold safely.

Encouraging cooperation among selfish individuals is crucial in many real-world systems, where individuals’ collective behaviors can be analyzed using evolutionary public goods game. Along this line, extensive studies have shown that reputation is an effective mechanism to investigate the evolution of cooperation. In most existing studies, participating individuals in a public goods game are assumed to contribute unconditionally into the public pool, or they can choose partners based on a common reputation standard (e.g., preferences or characters). However, to assign one reputation standard for all individuals is impractical in many real-world deployment. In this paper, we introduce a reputation tolerance mechanism that allows an individual to select its potential partners and decide whether or not to contribute an investment to the public pool based on its tolerance to other individuals’ reputation. Specifically, an individual takes part in a public goods game only if the number of participants with higher reputation exceeds the value of its tolerance. Moreover, in this paper, an individual’s reputation can increase or decrease in a bounded interval based on its historical behaviors. We explore the principle that how the reputation tolerance and conditional investment mechanisms can affect the evolution of cooperation in spatial lattice networks. Our simulation results demonstrate that a larger tolerance value can achieve an environment that promote the cooperation of participants.