An understanding of the types of shocks that disrupt and negatively impact urban household food security is of critical importance to develop relevant and targeted food security emergency preparedness policies and responses, a fact magnified by the current COVID-19 pandemic. This gap is addressed by the current study which draws from the Hungry Cities Partnership (HCP) city-wide household food insecurity survey of Nairobi city in Kenya. It uses both descriptive statistics and multilevel modelling using General Linear Mixed Models (GLMM) to examine the relationship between household food security and 16 different shocks experienced in the six months prior to the administration of the survey. The findings showed that only 29% of surveyed households were completely food secure. Of those experiencing some level of food insecurity, more experienced economic (55%) than sociopolitical (16%) and biophysical (10%) shocks. Economic shocks such as food price increases, loss of employment, and reduced income were all associated with increased food insecurity. Coupled with the lack of functioning social safety nets in Nairobi, households experiencing shocks and emergencies experience serious food insecurity and related health effects. In this context, the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to have a major negative economic impact on many vulnerable urban households. As such, there is need for new policies on urban food emergencies with a clear emergency preparedness plan for responding to major economic and other shocks that target the most vulnerable.

Recent conceptualizations of ‘food deserts’ have expanded from a sole focus on access to supermarkets, to food retail outlets, to all household food sources. Each iteration of the urban food desert concept has associated this kind of food sourcing behavior to poverty, food insecurity, and dietary diversity characteristics. While the term continues to evolve, there has been little empirical evidence to test whether these assumed associations hold in cities of the Global South. This paper empirically tests the premises of three iterations of the urban food desert concept using household survey data collected in Nairobi, Kenya, and Mexico City, Mexico. While these associations are statistically significant and show the expected correlation direction between household food sourcing behavior and food security, the strength of these relationships tends to be weak. These findings indicate that the urban food desert concept developed in North American and UK cities may have limited relevance to measuring urban food insecurity in the Global South.

This introduction highlights the paradox of the uses and regulation of public spaces by street trading reflected in two interwoven contradictions. The first contradiction is about the massive presence of street trade and the persistent ambiguous regulatory framework. The second contradiction deals with the misconception of street vending as an “unorganized” and “temporary” activity. It illustrates that vague legal and institutional frameworks as well as a hostile operating environment are drivers of conflictual uses of public space, such as streets that are partially fragmented and privatized by traders.

Due to its availability and affordability for poorer populations, wood-based biomass energy remains vital in meeting local energy demands – especially for cooking fuel – in many regions of the developing world. However, increasing feedstock scarcity (e.g. due to deforestation) coupled with the negative socio-economic and environmental outcomes of inefficient production and consumption technologies make it imperative to identify alternative energy solutions that benefit people without harming the environment. Indeed, tackling energy poverty is crucial to efforts aimed at meeting sustainable development goals at the household level. However, interventions aimed at reducing energy poverty must simultaneously seek solutions that might reduce people’s carbon footprint. Carbon footprints, or the amounts of greenhouse gas emissions linked to particular activities, are associated with climate change and its impacts. Globally, calls have intensified to reduce the carbon footprint of energy use, including use of biomass fuels. Locally, climate change issues are increasingly seen as posing particular threats to already vulnerable communities. The present paper evaluates the carbon footprints of alternative biomass energy solutions for cooking, as one key aspect of their environmental performance. It compares the carbon footprints of firewood, charcoal, biogas, jatropha oil, and crop residue briquettes. The research focuses on selected technologies for biomass energy production and consumption in two case study sites in rural and urban contexts of Kenya and Tanzania. Carbon footprinting is applied as a methodological approach to evaluating technological options for sustainable development in developing economies undergoing rapid population growth, urbanization, and industrial development. Results indicate that the unimproved charcoal value chain has a big carbon footprint. The value chain for jatropha oil appears to hold the greatest potential for carbon footprint reductions, as long as the feedstock is grown in the form of hedges around plots. However, the limited yield potential of hedges calls into question the economic viability of this solution. Results further show that carbon footprinting can help to raise awareness and inform stakeholders and decision-makers about alternative, environmentally more suitable biomass energy value chains. However, any assessment of the overall sustainability of these value chains should also integrate socio-economic aspects and factors influencing adoption

A number of political commentators, the media and observers have portrayed the 2007 election violence in Kenya as an ethnic conflict between two of the largest tribal opposing factions: the Kikuyu and the Luo. However, the situation in a multi-ethnic country like Kenya could prove to be much more complicated than one may think. According to Mueller (2008, 186) the violence was a result of weak institutions, mostly overridden by a highly personalised and centralised presidency that does not exercise the autonomy or checks and balances normally associated with democracies and political parties that are not programmatic, driven by ethnic clientism, and have a winner-take-all view of political and its associated economic by-products. Africa Policy Institute (2008) described it as a crisis of democratic transformation typically experienced by countries facing a closely contested election or election dispute. During an interview at the Wilson Centre on 10 January 2008, Maina Kiai said that ‘this is not an ethnic conflict; this is a political conflict with ethnic overtones’ caused by the lack of transparency in the elections. Githinji and Holmquist (2008, 344) argue that the crisis is best understood not simply as ethnic rivalry for power but rather as a product of rising expectations due to the increase in democratic space in the last five years combined with the frustration of exclusion on the economic and political front. Finally, others are of the opinion that the violence was a spontaneous reaction targeted against Kenya's stolen election. If the historical perspective outlined below is anything to go by, there is more to the violence than solely the perceived ethnic conflict. Kenya's crisis, including the 2007 election violence, has deep historical roots.