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Ying Peng
College of Architecture and Environment, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China

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Journal article
Published: 17 June 2020 in International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health
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To solve information asymmetry, we adopted the principal-agent framework to design the incentive mechanisms between the remanufacturer and the collector in the construction and demolition (C&D) waste-recycling industry. By using the model of reciprocity, we analyzed how the entities’ behavioral motives affect their decisions in terms of the incentive mechanisms. The findings showed that the collector responds to their perception of the remanufacturer’s intentions. If the perception is positive, they will make more effort in the collection work. If not, less effort will be put forth. Most importantly, we found that reciprocity helps to save the remanufacturer cost in the incentive mechanisms and makes the collector choose a higher effort level in the collection work. This finding showed that reciprocity serves to solve information asymmetry. By conducting a numerical simulation, we found that although a high subsidy policy can achieve rapid improvement of recycling-supply-chain performance, it is inefficient in maintaining friendly cooperation between the remanufacturer and the collector.

ACS Style

Peiyang Su; Ying Peng; Qidan Hu; Ruwen Tan. Incentive Mechanism and Subsidy Design for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling under Information Asymmetry with Reciprocal Behaviors. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 2020, 17, 4346 .

AMA Style

Peiyang Su, Ying Peng, Qidan Hu, Ruwen Tan. Incentive Mechanism and Subsidy Design for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling under Information Asymmetry with Reciprocal Behaviors. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2020; 17 (12):4346.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Peiyang Su; Ying Peng; Qidan Hu; Ruwen Tan. 2020. "Incentive Mechanism and Subsidy Design for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling under Information Asymmetry with Reciprocal Behaviors." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 17, no. 12: 4346.

Journal article
Published: 01 January 2020 in Journal of Industrial & Management Optimization
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ACS Style

Jun Huang; Ying Peng; Ruwen Tan; Chunxiang Guo. Alliance strategy of construction and demolition waste recycling based on the modified shapley value under government regulation. Journal of Industrial & Management Optimization 2020, 1 .

AMA Style

Jun Huang, Ying Peng, Ruwen Tan, Chunxiang Guo. Alliance strategy of construction and demolition waste recycling based on the modified shapley value under government regulation. Journal of Industrial & Management Optimization. 2020; ():1.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Jun Huang; Ying Peng; Ruwen Tan; Chunxiang Guo. 2020. "Alliance strategy of construction and demolition waste recycling based on the modified shapley value under government regulation." Journal of Industrial & Management Optimization , no. : 1.

Journal article
Published: 14 October 2019 in International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health
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In order to investigate the issues of the recycling and remanufacturing of construction and demolition waste (C&D waste), this paper develops a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a recycler, considering both the retailer’s fairness concern psychology and governmental regulations. Four mathematical models are developed for the calculations, and the models are solved through game theory. In both the decentralized and centralized scenarios, the members’ strategies are discussed and the optimal values of decision variables are determined. A numerical study is carried out for sensitivity analyses to verify the accuracy of the theoretical conclusions. The results reveal that retailer fairness concerns lead to a decrease in the wholesale price of building materials and negatively affect manufacturers’ profits. Additionally, governmental regulations can effectively increase the recycling amount and improve the utilization rate of C&D waste, and promote a virtuous cycle of the recycling and remanufacturing of C&D waste.

ACS Style

Deng Li; Ying Peng; Chunxiang Guo; Ruwen Tan. Pricing Strategy of Construction and Demolition Waste Considering Retailer Fairness Concerns under a Governmental Regulation Environment. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 2019, 16, 3896 .

AMA Style

Deng Li, Ying Peng, Chunxiang Guo, Ruwen Tan. Pricing Strategy of Construction and Demolition Waste Considering Retailer Fairness Concerns under a Governmental Regulation Environment. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2019; 16 (20):3896.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Deng Li; Ying Peng; Chunxiang Guo; Ruwen Tan. 2019. "Pricing Strategy of Construction and Demolition Waste Considering Retailer Fairness Concerns under a Governmental Regulation Environment." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 16, no. 20: 3896.

Journal article
Published: 23 May 2019 in Sustainability
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The generation of construction and demolition waste (CDW) is a problem for societies aspiring to sustainability. In this regard, governments have the responsibility to support the CDW recycling through subsidies. However, the information asymmetry, as well as the “dynamic nature” of the CDW recycling market, results in a number of barriers for the government to promote CDW recycling. In this paper, we establish a mathematical model that includes the government and the recycling enterprise in the presence of dual information asymmetry including the unknown recycling technology level and unobservable recycling efforts in one-stage and two-stage cooperation. Using the incentive theory, the static and dynamic optimal recycling incentive contracts of the government were designed, and the optimal decisions of the recycler were identified. A numerical simulation revealed that by designing reasonable contracts, the government can encourage the recycler to report the true technical level and achieve information screening. Furthermore, the subsidy of the high-tech recycler remained unchanged under different circumstances. However, the subsidy of the low-tech recycler was closely related to the probability of misreporting and the proportion of technology types. This finding suggests that the government and recycler are inclined towards long-term dynamic cooperation.

ACS Style

Qidan Hu; Ying Peng; Chunxiang Guo; Dong Cai; Peiyang Su. Dynamic Incentive Mechanism Design for Recycling Construction and Demolition Waste under Dual Information Asymmetry. Sustainability 2019, 11, 2943 .

AMA Style

Qidan Hu, Ying Peng, Chunxiang Guo, Dong Cai, Peiyang Su. Dynamic Incentive Mechanism Design for Recycling Construction and Demolition Waste under Dual Information Asymmetry. Sustainability. 2019; 11 (10):2943.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Qidan Hu; Ying Peng; Chunxiang Guo; Dong Cai; Peiyang Su. 2019. "Dynamic Incentive Mechanism Design for Recycling Construction and Demolition Waste under Dual Information Asymmetry." Sustainability 11, no. 10: 2943.

Journal article
Published: 18 July 2018 in International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health
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With the development of the construction industry, increasing concern over construction and demolition waste (CDW) has initiated a wave of environmental regulation by the government in order to reduce the environmental impact and ensure sustainable development. Research on behavioral decision-making can offer a theoretical basis for the government and individuals. This paper aims to study the behavioral decision-making of stakeholders in CDW recycling under environmental regulation. Considering the limited rationality of stakeholders and the difference in reference points, an evolutionary game model including contractors and manufacturers of construction materials is proposed based on the prospect theory of behavioral economics. The results indicate that, only when the perceived benefits of one or both stakeholders for participation under the environmental regulation exceed those for non-participation, can the CDW recycling system eventually evolve to a stable state in which both stakeholders choose to participate. In addition, factors such as the initial strategy, production cost, technology, subsidies, recycling benefits, and the degree of perception of the stakeholders, exert certain influences on the stable state. To attain the required stable state, the government should increase the subsidies for the stakeholders and strengthen the publicity regarding recycling effects to improve the perceived benefits.

ACS Style

Hong Shen; Ying Peng; Chunxiang Guo. Analysis of the Evolution Game of Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Behavior Based on Prospect Theory under Environmental Regulation. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 2018, 15, 1518 .

AMA Style

Hong Shen, Ying Peng, Chunxiang Guo. Analysis of the Evolution Game of Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Behavior Based on Prospect Theory under Environmental Regulation. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2018; 15 (7):1518.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Hong Shen; Ying Peng; Chunxiang Guo. 2018. "Analysis of the Evolution Game of Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Behavior Based on Prospect Theory under Environmental Regulation." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 15, no. 7: 1518.