In Tae Hwang

In Tae Hwang


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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5 June 2019 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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MLMijoo Lee
Mijoo Lee
IHIn Tae Hwang
In Tae Hwang
Since the global financial crisis, management incentive compensation, which is sensitive to financial firms’ short-term performance, has been noted to threaten financial systems’ sustainability by incentivizing managers to pursue excessive risks. Subsequently, international standards have been established regarding compensation for financial institutions’ senior executives and employees. However, this compensation may impact not only banks’ risk-taking behaviors, but also their earnings management, as the latter affects financial performance while compensation is decided as a reflection of such performance. Therefore, this study analyses executive compensation’s impact on banks’ earnings management using compensation data on South Korean banks. The analysis revealed higher earnings management using a loan loss provision with more variable compensation. On the one hand, if the proportion of equity-linked compensation to incentive compensation increased, then earnings management increased. On the other hand, more deferred compensation led to increased earnings smoothing. This study evaluates regulatory impacts across multiple dimensions by analyzing the effects of incentive compensation standards—intended to increase financial systems’ sustainability—on individual financial institutions and further contributes to studies on managerial decision making.

17 December 2018 in Sustainability
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Journal Article
Open access
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IHIn Tae Hwang
In Tae Hwang
KHKangsung Hur
Kangsung Hur
SKSun Min Kang
Sun Min Kang
Previous research showed that in the early years after adoption, the change to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) impacted accounting quality. The purpose of this study is to analyze whether those effects have changed over time in companies within countries that have different legal regimes, enforcement, and degrees of external investor protection. We measure accounting quality using discretionary accruals, real activities manipulation, and the stock price value relevance of earnings per share and book value per share. The findings show that the early effects of IFRS adoption continue with the passage of time in companies listed in countries with common law systems, such as the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia, which provide powerful outside investor protection in capital markets. Yet, the early effects of IFRS adoption do not continue after the passage of time in companies listed in Asian countries with statutory law systems, such as Korea and China, which have low levels of outside investor protection. Moreover, it is difficult to obtain evidence that value relevance has improved after the accounting measurement of corporate value shifted to IFRS. The results show that there are differences in the sustained effects on accounting quality, even after the application of IFRS due to the different social, economic, and cultural characteristics of countries.

8 January 2018 in Sustainability
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Journal Article
Open access
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SJShun-Ji Jin
Shun-Ji Jin
IHIn Tae Hwang
In Tae Hwang
SKSun Min Kang
Sun Min Kang
As a consequence of a large-scale accounting fraud, China implemented a dual audit system for listed companies issuing foreign stocks (B shares and H shares) from 2001 to 2006, before adopting Chinese-IFRS in 2007. At the end of 2010, the EU proposed that listed corporations over a certain size should be required to implement a joint audit system. However, only a few countries have implemented this system, and thus, data and references are extremely limited. The dual audit system is called the “twin” of the joint audit system. We analyze whether the dual system improves a company’s earnings quality. Earnings quality is studied by means of real earnings management, and the variable of loss aversion. We find that real earnings management of dual audited enterprises is lower than that of single audited (A-share) enterprises, and the inclination toward loss aversion of enterprises in the foreign share market has not increased significantly relative to the A-share enterprises after the abolition of the dual audit system. The results indicate that a dual audit system improves earnings quality. We expect that the conclusions of this research will resolve the issues and concerns about the joint audit system.

20 February 2021 in Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics
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Journal Article
Closed access
KHKangsung Hur
Kangsung Hur
IHIn Tae Hwang
In Tae Hwang
This study analyzes the effect of bank CEO appointment structure and tenure on borrowers’ accounting practices and earnings management. Drawing on agency theory, we posit that agency costs are high for banks that frequently change CEOs and those that appoint CEOs from external sources. The results indicate firms that borrow from banks with high agency costs adopt less conservative accounting practices and employ real activities earnings management when deteriorating management conditions lead to negative cash flow. This study provides a strong empirical foundation for future research by verifying that appointment structure and tenure of bank CEOs affect borrowers’ accounting choices.

30 April 2017 in Korean Accounting Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SKSun Min Kang
Sun Min Kang
IHIn Tae Hwang
In Tae Hwang
KHKangsung Hur
Kangsung Hur