Environmental regulations of different intensities may have different impacts on polluting enterprises. The purpose of this article is to analyze how different environmental regulations affect the pollution discharge strategies of papermaking enterprises. By establishing an evolutionary game model between the government environmental regulation intensities and the pollutant emissions from papermaking enterprises, this thesis further solves the model and performs stability analysis and finally uses MATLAB to conduct simulation studies. And the researching results show that papermaking enterprises will take risks to choose the illegal pollutant discharge strategies when the illegal profits are large. Further analysis shows that the increase in the successful probability of the strong environmental regulations does not necessarily force papermaking enterprises to choose to comply with pollution discharge regulations. However, papermaking enterprises may choose to comply with discharge pollution regulations not only by increasing the successful probability of strong environmental regulations but also by increasing the rewards and punishments for papermaking enterprises as well as by increasing the probability of reporting violations of pollutants. Based on the above results, the author proposes several countermeasures, such as establishing a specialized pollution monitoring agency, encouraging third-party supervision, reporting pollution behaviors, and increasing penalties for polluting companies for violations. China is in a critical period of transition from rapid development to high-quality development. It will provide some reliable references for the construction of a green economy and an ecological economy that the characteristics and relationships between the intensity of government environmental regulations and corporate pollution emissions revealed in this article.

Environmental pollution has become an important obstacle on the path of ecological civilization construction, and it is urgent to control environmental pollution. By establishing an evolutionary game model, this thesis focuses on analyzing how paper-making enterprises choose their own emission reduction strategies under the reward and punishment mechanism. It further analyzes how social welfare changes under the reward and punishment mechanism, and finally through simulation research, this thesis analyzes the evolutionary paths of paper-making enterprises’ pollution emission strategies under the reward and punishment mechanism. The results of the reward and punishment mechanism are as follows: under the static reward and punishment mechanism, the game system will repeatedly oscillate around a point. There is no stable equilibrium point at this time. However, under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, the game system will tend to a stable equilibrium point. The results of social welfare analysis show that high-intensity rewards will reduce the amount of pollution discharged by paper-making enterprises, thereby maximizing social welfare. On the contrary, when paper-making enterprises discharge a large amount of pollution, they will be subject to high-intensity penalties. When facing high-intensity punishments, paper-making enterprises will tend to not to discharge. So social welfare is also maximized. The simulation research results show that reasonable punishment strategies are more effective than reward ones. Based on this, the author proposes countermeasures, such as establishing a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism, reasonably determining the reward and punishment intensity for polluting enterprises. The emission reduction strategies of paper-making enterprises will be affected by the government’s reward and punishment mechanism. A deep study of its internal mechanism is not only of great significance for pollution control but also of great significance for the development of a green economy.

Wang, Y.; Cheng, B., and Qin, G., 2019. Analysis on industrial linkages and driving effects of Chinese fishery industry based on input-output model. In: Li, L.; Wan, X.; and Huang, X. (eds.), Recent Developments in Practices and Research on Coastal Regions: Transportation, Environment and Economy. Journal of Coastal Research, Special Issue No. 98, pp. 363–366. Coconut Creek (Florida), ISSN 0749-0208.Based on the national input-output (IO) tables from 2002, 2007, and 2012, this paper summarized the development of China's fishery industry and studied the industrial linkage and driving effects between the fishery industry and other sectors of the national economy. The results show that the output scale, gross domestic product, wages, and social welfare of China's fishery industry have all increased significantly, but the tax revenue and profits have decreased rapidly. The direct driving capacity, induced driving capacity, and total driving capacity of China's fishery industry all show a continuous downward trend, dropping from 1.1107, 4.8108, and 6.9478 to 1.0609, 3.4635, and 5.5293, respectively. The indirect driving capacity rises first and then declines, rising from 1.0263 to 1.1155 and then falling to 1.0049. The driving effect of China's fishery industry on other sectors is limited and shows a weakening trend.

The world economy, since the outbreak of the coronavirus epidemic, has undergone profound changes. Especially since the coronavirus became the norm, how to achieve rapid economic revitalization has become a problem that countries have to face. In order to analyze how the government should promote the enterprises’ economic revitalization and effectively control pollution under the normalized epidemic situation, this paper analyzes the economic revitalization and pollution control problems faced by enterprises under the normalized epidemic situation by using the evolutionary game method. Through the analysis of the evolutionary game model, we draw the following conclusions: (1) Discovered by comparing two different incentives mechanism and penalties mechanism, the dynamic incentives mechanism, and penalties mechanism has a better effect on the process of enterprises’ economic revitalization, and it also can reduce the discharge of enterprises’ pollutants. (2) In terms of discharge reduction effect, penalties have a better effect than incentives. Compared with incentives, in the process of the economic revitalization of enterprises, in order to reduce pollution discharge, the government can adopt dynamic penalties strategies. This paper analyzes what the government should do when enterprises face the problems of economic revitalization and pollution control. This study can not only provide suggestions for the government in the process of governance but also provide countermeasures for the economic revitalization of enterprises.