The study proposes a supply chain contractual coordination model based on the product lifecycle information sharing effort and consumers' price sensitivity to a product with the Blockchain system. This paper examined the following five scenarios: (1) centralized supply chain with Blockchain system-based product lifecycle information sharing investment; (2) Stackelberg leader retailer processed and invested Blockchain system scenario; (3) retailer processed the Blockchain system cost-sharing scenario; (4) retailer processed Blockchain system investment through bargaining the revenue-sharing model; (5) Blockchain system investment under the cost and revenue-sharing contract. The study used the game theory reverse induction method to compare the Nash equilibrium solutions under different decision-making scenarios and discussed the chain member’s constraint condition of Blockchain system investment. We simulated and analysed the products’ lifecycle information sharing effort cost factor, the influence of price sensitivity coefficient, and expected profits of the supplier and retailer. The study results show that the product lifecycle information sharing effort under the Blockchain system increases the profit of the whole chain and decreases with the increase of customer’s price sensitivity coefficient.

In this paper, we propose a supply chain contract model aimed to coordinate a three‐echelon supply chain, which is based on the revenue‐sharing allocation with loss‐aversion preference. We consider a three‐echelon supply chain consisting of a risk‐neutral manufacturer, a risk‐neutral distributor, and loss‐averse multiple retailers. To address this model, we consider a shortage product produced and sold within a single period in the stochastic market. The model allows the system efficiency to be achieved as well as it will improve the profits of all supply chain members by tuning the contract parameters. We used the expected utility function to describe the loss‐aversion member’s influence coefficient. The decisions of chain members under different conditions are studied by simulation analyses. The paper also analysed the relationship between different revenue‐sharing coefficient combinations with multiple retailers in the supply chain system. Furthermore, the study has addressed the supply chain coordination decision bias in the centralized and decentralized systems.

Due to poor performance of supply chain members the paper has been studied supply chain contracts based on newsboy model without option and centralized decision-making model. This research paper presents how to coordinate the supply chain in two-level of supply chain. All the numerical part analysis of a maximization of both members expected profit using Matlab software are carried out so as to present normal distribution and cumulative density function and summarized the paper with conclusion part. A total profit of supply chain is illustrated as well.

Suppliers do not always choose the buy-back contract to achieve coordination facing with different return logistics costs. In this paper we discuss the impact of return logistics cost on supply chain coordination and effectiveness of supply chain members based on the classic newsboy model. When the retailer and the supplier have the same return logistics cost, three kinds of buy-back contract models with return logistics cost burdened by the retailer, the supplier and both parties are respectively discussed, and these three cases achieve the supply chain coordination with the same optimal quantity. When the retailer and the supplier have the different return logistics cost, we propose the member of supply chain who has lower return logistics cost undertakes the return delivery to achieve the supply chain coordination.