Fabrizio Finocchiaro

Mr. Fabrizio Finocchiaro


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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8 June 2017 in IEEE Design & Test
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GCGianpiero Cabodi
Gianpiero Cabodi
PCPaolo Camurati
Paolo Camurati
FFFabrizio Finocchiaro
Fabrizio Finocchiaro
FSFrancesco Savarese
Francesco Savarese
DVDanilo Vendraminetto
Danilo Vendraminetto
The article presents a case study comparing two types of properties for formal verification of security requirements in embedded systems. —Wen Chen, NXP

19 September 2019 in Electronics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
GCGianpiero Cabodi
Gianpiero Cabodi
PCPaolo Enrico Camurati
Paolo Enrico Camurati
FFFabrizio Finocchiaro
Fabrizio Finocchiaro
DVDanilo Vendraminetto
Danilo Vendraminetto
Spectre and Meltdown attacks in modern microprocessors represent a new class of attacks that have been difficult to deal with. They underline vulnerabilities in hardware design that have been going unnoticed for years. This shows the weakness of the state-of-the-art verification process and design practices. These attacks are OS-independent, and they do not exploit any software vulnerabilities. Moreover, they violate all security assumptions ensured by standard security procedures, (e.g., address space isolation), and, as a result, every security mechanism built upon these guarantees. These vulnerabilities allow the attacker to retrieve leaked data without accessing the secret directly. Indeed, they make use of covert channels, which are mechanisms of hidden communication that convey sensitive information without any visible information flow between the malicious party and the victim. The root cause of this type of side-channel attacks lies within the speculative and out-of-order execution of modern high-performance microarchitectures. Since modern processors are hard to verify with standard formal verification techniques, we present a methodology that shows how to transform a realistic model of a speculative and out-of-order processor into an abstract one. Following related formal verification approaches, we simplify the model under consideration by abstraction and refinement steps. We also present an approach to formally verify the abstract model using a standard model checker. The theoretical flow, reliant on established formal verification results, is introduced and a sketch of proof is provided for soundness and correctness. Finally, we demonstrate the feasibility of our approach, by applying it on a pipelined DLX RISC-inspired processor architecture. We show preliminary experimental results to support our claim, performing Bounded Model-Checking with a state-of-the-art model checker.