Sixth-generation (6G) communication is emerging as seamless and massive connecting of almost everything. Therefore, vehicles, being extensively linked with human mobility, require a technological pace for compatibility with the 6G era. 6G will also potentially revolutionize the Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication. However, this modernization will surface several security challenges in the complex heterogeneous architecture of V2X communication in 6G. Similarly, the expansion of V2X also introduces unconventional security risks and vulnerabilities. This paper aims to provide an overview of the security challenges and solutions for V2X communication in the upcoming 6G era to visualize the future of this research domain. This paper discusses the architecture and standards utilized in 6G enabled V2X communications and provisions a comprehensive analysis of V2X security in Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Authentication and Access Control (CIA ³ ) domains. Thereby, we analyze the impact of the emerging technological concepts of Blockchain and Federated Learning (FL) in 6G enabled V2X communication. Thereby, we suggest a Blockchain-enabled FL based generic security architecture for V2X communication in 6G networks. At the conclusive end, the review highlights key lessons learned and the future research directions in the domain of security of V2X communications in the 6G including; Privacy in 3D Fog Computing, Privacy in Augmented Reality, C. Secure Software Defined Networking (SDN), Physical Layer Security In THz Spectrum, SUMO (Simulation of Urban MObility) and Intrusion Detection using AI.

In connected cars with various electronic control unit (ECU) modules, Ethernet is used to communicate data received by the sensor in real time, but it is partially used alongside a controller area network (CAN) due to the cost. There are security threats in the CAN, such as replay attacks and denial-of-service attacks, which can disrupt the driver or cause serious damage, such as a car accident through malicious manipulation. Although several secure protocols for protecting CAN messages have been proposed, they carry limitations, such as combining additional elements for security or modifying CAN messages with a limited length. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a method for encrypting the data frame, including real data in the CAN message structure, using format-preserving encryption (FPE), which ensures that the plaintext and ciphertext have the same format and length. In this way, block ciphers such as AES-128 must be divided into two or three blocks, but FPE can be processed simultaneously by encrypting them according to the CAN message format, thus providing better security against denial-of-service attacks. Based on the 150 ms CAN message, a normal message was received from a malicious message injection of 180 ms or more for AES-128 and a malicious message injection of 100 ms or more for FPE. Finally, based on the proposed scheme, a CAN transmission environment is constructed for analyzing the encryption/decryption rate and the process of transmitting and processing the encrypted message for connected cars in multi-access edge computing (MEC). This scheme is compared with other algorithms to verify that it can be used in a real environment.