Chen Kehong

Dr. Chen Kehong

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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17 April 2019 in International Journal of Production Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CKChen Kehong
Chen Kehong
YZYong Zha
Yong Zha
LALayth Alwan
Layth Alwan
LZLu Zhang
Lu Zhang
This paper presents a model for designing two-stage dynamic pricing strategies when the seller faces strategic consumers in the presence of a reference price effect. The consumers form the utilities of two sequential periods based on anticipated future retail price in the second period and current retail price in the first period as the reference price, and then choose the purchasing timing, representing strategic behaviour. We first consider a centralised system where the seller chooses between two pricing policies: markdown pricing and markup pricing under a centralised system, and find that the seller will not adopt a markup pricing policy. We derive equilibrium prices and optimal pricing strategies for the seller under markdown pricing policy using equilibrium theory and backward induction method. We find that the seller’s profit decreases with the consumer strategic behaviour, and increases (decreases) with the reference price effect when consumer strategic behaviour is low (high), indicating a non-monotonity with respect to the coexistence of consumer strategic behaviour and reference price effect. We then extend our study from a centralised system to a decentralised system and find that double marginalisation is effectively weakened by the two effects. Interestingly, the centralised structure may not always be optimal relative to a decentralised structure, indicating a non-monotone relationship between the wholesale price and the profit in decentralised structure.

1 January 2022 in Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
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DWDawei Wang
Dawei Wang
LZLinlin Zhao
Linlin Zhao
YFYang Feng
Yang Feng
CKChen Kehong
Chen Kehong
The operational process of high-tech industry can be separated into a research and development stage (RDS) and a commercialization stage (CS). Within this, the research employees are shared by both stages, and part of the economic output of the CS becomes a feedback factor and continuously flows back to the RDS. Using this framework, this study establishes cooperative and non-cooperative two-stage data envelopment analysis (DEA) models to explore the efficiencies of regional high-tech industries in China. The proposed approach can calculate the overall efficiency and stage efficiencies simultaneously. Based on empirical data of high-tech industries in 29 regions of China from 2012 to 2016, it is concluded that (1) a harmony exists between the RDS and the CS in the cooperative case, while a disharmony happens between the RDS and CS in the non-cooperative case; (2) there exist distinct geographic characteristics regarding the stage inefficiencies of these regional high-tech industries.

10 April 2019 in Naval Research Logistics (NRL)
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
YZYong Zha
Yong Zha
CKChen Kehong
Chen Kehong
XYXiaohang Yue
Xiaohang Yue
YYYugang Yu
Yugang Yu
SMSamar Mukhopadhyay
Samar Mukhopadhyay

19 January 2025 in Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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YGYingxi Ge
Yingxi Ge
CKChen Kehong
Chen Kehong
The aim of this study was to analyze the strategic choices and profit variations of a monopolistic automobile manufacturer capable of producing both traditional fuel vehicles and new energy vehicles, with a particular focus on government interventions. Using a theoretical model, the research examined firm-level production decisions by incorporating consumer preferences and market competition under three policy scenarios: no government intervention, government subsidies, and tax policies. The key findings are as follows: (1) In the absence of government intervention, the firm’s production strategy is influenced by consumer preferences for new energy vehicles. Specifically, the firm prioritizes the production of new energy vehicles when consumer preference is high, fuel vehicles when preference is low, and both types when preference is moderate. (2) Government subsidies substantially reduce the production of fuel vehicles while promoting the production of new energy vehicles. However, excessively high subsidies may lead the firm to revert to fuel vehicle production. (3) Tax policies influence production strategies in a manner similar to subsidy policies. (4) When government intervention is weak and competition between fuel vehicles and new energy vehicles is intense, subsidy policies are more effective; however, when competition is less intense, tax policies may be more beneficial. Under strong government intervention, subsidy policies are found to be more effective. This research contributes to the literature by providing a theoretical foundation for government policymaking in the new energy vehicle sector, offering insights into firm-level production decisions under various policy environments. The originality of this study lies in its comparison of the effectiveness of subsidy and tax policies in promoting new energy vehicle production, which helps guide policymakers in designing optimal policy interventions.

5 June 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XWXiangxiang Wu
Xiangxiang Wu
SQShuling Qin
Shuling Qin
YZYong Zha
Yong Zha
CKChen Kehong
Chen Kehong
In this paper, we examine the selection of the optimal licensing mode and the decision to enter an app market for a platform owner confronting app price competition from an app developer in various power structure imbalances. Specifically, the platform grants the app developer permission to offer apps for sale to users within its platform ecosystem via two licensing modes, i.e., an app sharing mode and a licensing fee mode. In addition, the platform may directly provide its own apps to users and compete with the app developer. By developing a game theory model, we analyze the strategic choices and pricing decisions of the two parties in various game structures. We find that when the app developer holds greater market power, only app sharing can be a win-win mode under a moderate level of sales costs. The platform always chooses to enter the market under the licensing fee mode, but it will strategically opt for whether to enter under the app sharing mode, contingent upon the magnitude of sales costs. Interestingly, a win-win outcome triggered by entry exists only under the licensing fee mode when the sales cost difference is large. In contrast, under the app sharing mode, entry always results in one member being disadvantaged, without achieving a win-win outcome. Under the licensing fee mode, it is intuitive that both parties benefit the most only when they act as leaders in the game and suffer the most when their competitors act as leaders. Counterintuitively, under the app sharing mode, both parties can not only benefit the most when they act as leaders but also benefit the most when their competitors act as leaders.

1 January 2026
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
YQYangyang Qin
Yangyang Qin
CKChen Kehong
Chen Kehong