Although the investment-oriented development model for economic growth adopted by Chinese governments has generated spectacular results, the risks of debt-financed urbanisation and economic development have recently become evident in mounting local debts that are undermining the financial system, triggering concerns with respect to local governments’ indebtedness, financial stability and sovereign risk in China. In this paper, we portray the uneven spatial and temporal dynamics of local government debt in China, and examine the ways in which it is intertwined with institutional, political and economic factors. Our analysis shows that while global and national economic conditions have resulted in a dramatic increase in local government debt, particularly in the late 2000s and the early 2010s, the spatial variation of local debt accumulation in China could be partly explained by two institutional factors: land finance and inter-jurisdictional competition. We argue that the behaviour of local governments may harm the long-term future of Chinese cities.

Literature on how cities get connected through networks of firms has been increasing in recent years. In particular, advanced producer service (APS) firms are being widely used to build intra-firm linkages to establish urban networks. In contrast to studies applying intra-firm networks, this study proposes an alternative strategy to build urban networks based on inter-firm service provision relationships during the process of initial public offering (IPO) in which APS firms – including securities, law firms and accounting firms – provide professional services for firms aiming to be publicly listed. Based on service provision connections between APS firms and their clients, this study provides fresh insights on urban networks in China. The results show that Beijing, Shenzhen and Shanghai strategically hold dominant positions within Chinese urban networks and they are the lead command and financial centres within the country. Particularly, Beijing has overwhelmingly more influence over other cities. The urban networks are embedded in China’s unique institutional context where market and state power together have shaped these networks. Since the urban network is built up based on real economic linkages, the findings might have further implications for policy-making and could contribute to ongoing debates regarding financial centres in China. It implies that connections between firms based on real economic activities can be an effective way to construct urban networks in future research.

Although the literature on the financialization of housing pays most attention to mortgaged and securitized homeownership and the penetration of capital into subsidized rental housing, forms of financialization are varied. In China, housing commodification and privatization has underpinned a growth in homeownership. One of the outcomes of financialization of housing is the transformation of owner-occupied housing into a financial asset for households’ wealth. Despite a relatively low level of residential mortgage lending in China, both the absolute volume of mortgages and the proportion of gross domestic product they represent are now rising. Housing value appreciation has driven a significant increase in the financing of housing consumption through multiple channels. This article examines these channels and suggests that the financialization of housing in China is a critical part of the country’s overall development model. It is further argued that the root of housing financialization in China is not mortgage securitization but the creation of owner-occupied housing as a financialized asset to propel the wider financialization of the Chinese economy in the context of state-controlled financial environment.

China is witnessing a growing trend towards financialization by the state. Drawing on the concept of state-led financialization, this study is the first to explore how the government-guided investment fund (GGIF) has evolved and spread throughout the country. The promotion policies and practices of the central government have laid the key foundation for the development of GGIFs, while local governments have quickly adopted this new financial tool, resulting in its widespread take up. State-owned enterprises are heavily involved in the operation of GGIFs, indicating that this market-oriented tool has largely failed to attract capital from the private sector. This study shows that state-led financialization in China has strengthened rather than weakened the influence of the state in the economy, which is not the case in most Western economies. However, the limitations and risks of the GGIF are also related to the dominant role of the state in GGIF operations.

Economic transition has posed a serious challenge to environmental protection efforts in China. This study explores the environmental effects of the triple transition process of marketisation, globalisation and decentralisation using data on industrial SO₂and soot emissions at the prefecture-city level. Panel data regression results find that marketisation and decentralisation have been harmful to the urban environment while economic globalisation has been beneficial to urban air quality. As is to be expected, state-owned enterprises have contributed to China’s environmental degradation. However, the environmental impacts of the triple processes of economic transition only occur in the coastal and central cities. The results imply that the institutional perspective provides an important angle to understand the issue of environmental deterioration in China.