Multiple studies suggest that the risks of depression and suicide increase with increasing altitude of residence, but no studies have assessed whether changing altitude changes these risks. To address this gap, this study used data from the Intern Health Study, which follows students from the end of medical school through the first year of residency, recording depression via the 9-item Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9), anxiety via the 7-item Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire (GAD-7), and multiple risk factors for these symptoms. Data from 3764 medical students representing 46 schools and 282 residencies were available. Odds ratios (OR) representing the effects of altitude on psychiatric symptoms were estimated using generalized linear models. After excluding participants with missing altitude data, 3731 medical students were analyzed. High altitude residence (> 900 m) was significantly associated with PHQ-9 total score (OR = 1.32, 95% CI = 1.001–1.75, p < 0.05), and PHQ-9 suicidal ideation (OR = 1.79, 95% CI = 1.08–0.02, p = 0.02). Moving from low to high altitude was significantly associated with PHQ-9 total score (OR = 1.47, 95% CI = 1.087–1.98, p = 0.01), GAD-7 total score (OR = 1.40, 95% CI = 1.0040–1.95, p < 0.05), and PHQ-9 suicidal ideation (OR = 1.10, 95% CI = 1.01–1.19, p = 0.02). The data suggest that moving from low to high altitude is associated with increasing symptoms of depression, anxiety, and suicidal ideation.
Depressed mood, which can occur in the context of major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, and other conditions, represents a serious threat to public health and wellness. Conventional treatments are not effective for a significant proportion of patients and interventions that are often beneficial for treatment-refractory depression are not widely available. There is, therefore, an immense need to identify novel antidepressant strategies, particularly strategies that target physiological pathways that are distinct from those addressed by conventional treatments. There is growing evidence from human neuroimaging, genetics, epidemiology, and animal studies that disruptions in brain energy production, storage, and utilization are implicated in the development and maintenance of depression. Creatine, a widely available nutritional supplement, has the potential to improve these disruptions in some patients, and early clinical trials indicate that it may have efficacy as an antidepressant agent.
1 October 2016 in Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology and Biological Psychiatry
Involuntary psychiatric commitment for suicide prevention and physician aid-in-dying (PAD) in terminal illness combine to create a moral dilemma. If PAD in terminal illness is permissible, it should also be permissible for some who suffer from nonterminal psychiatric illness: suffering provides much of the justification for PAD, and the suffering in mental illness can be as severe as in physical illness. But involuntary psychiatric commitment to prevent suicide suggests that the suffering of persons with mental illness does not justify ending their own lives, ruling out PAD. Since both practices have compelling underlying justifications, the most reasonable accommodation might seem to be to allow PAD for persons with mental illness whose suffering is severe enough to justify self-killing, but prohibit PAD for persons whose suffering is less severe. This compromise, however, would require the articulation of standards by which persons’ mental as well as physical suffering could be evaluated. Doing so would present a serious philosophical challenge.
Background: Psychiatrists depend on their patients for clinical information and are obligated to regard them as trustworthy, except in special circumstances. Nevertheless, some critics of psychiatry have argued that psychiatrists frequently perpetrate epistemic injustice against patients. Epistemic injustice is a moral wrong that involves unfairly discriminating against a person with respect to their ability to know things because of personal characteristics like gender or psychiatric diagnosis.Methods: We review the concept of epistemic injustice and several claims that psychiatric practice is epistemically unjust.Results: While acknowledging the risk of epistemic injustice in psychiatry and other medical fields, we argue that most concerns that psychiatric practice is epistemically unjust are unfounded.Conclusions: The concept of epistemic injustice does not add significantly to existing standards of good clinical practice, and that it could produce changes in practice that would be deleterious. Psychiatrists should resist calls for changes to clinical practice based on this type of criticism.
"Suffering" is a central concept within bioethics and often a crucial consideration in medical decision making. As used in practice, however, the concept risks being uninformative, ambiguous, or even misleading. In this paper, we consider a series of cases in which "suffering" is invoked and analyze them in light of prominent theories of suffering. We then outline ethical hazards that arise as a result of imprecise usage of the concept and offer practical recommendations for avoiding them. Appeals to suffering are often getting at something ethically important. But this is where the work of ethics begins, not where it ends.