Health expenditure efficiency (HEE) is an important research area in health economics. As a large agricultural country, China is faced with the daunting challenge of maintaining equality and efficiency in health resource allocation and health services utilization in the context of rapid economic growth in rural areas. The reasonable allocation of limited rural health resources may be achieved by scientifically measuring the current rural HEE. This subject may help to formulate effective policy or provide incentives for the health sector. The combination of a super-slack-based measure (SBM) model with the Malmquist productivity index (MPI) is proposed to evaluate the static health expenditure efficiency (HEE) and dynamic health expenditure efficiency (DHEE) in rural China from 2007 to 2016. The results show that the HEE and DHEE values exhibit unstable trends over time. The HEE does not follow China’s economic development and presents an average of 0.598 (< 1); and the DHEE presents an average value of approximately 0.949 (< 1), indicating that the DHEE of most provinces is not moving in a desirable direction. The level of technological progress and scale optimization are the main factors hindering total factor productivity (TFP) growth. The Chinese government could improve the efficiency of rural health resources allocation by improving the rural health service system, optimizing the allocation of material resources and enhancing the level of health of financial resources allocation. The state should continue to moderate policy for different regions. Moreover, scientific and technological advancements should be introduced to improve the scale optimization levels.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the compensation amount as well as the mode through which compensations are paid on farmers’ satisfaction with the compensation received for farmland expropriation in China.Design/methodology/approach: Using rural household survey data collected among 450 households in three provinces, located in eastern, central and western China, this paper estimates the impacts of compensation payments, compensation modes, household characteristics and other control variables on farmers’ satisfaction applying an ordinal probit model.Findings: The major findings are: farmers’ satisfaction with the compensation depends not only on the size of the compensation but also on the gap between the compensation and the market value of the expropriated land; and the compensation amount positively affects farmers’ satisfaction when the social security compensation mode is used, but does not significantly affect farmers’ satisfaction when other modes are used.Originality/value: First, it contributes to the literature on farmland expropriation by providing empirical evidence of the direct impact of the compensation amount and other factors on the degree of farmers’ satisfaction with farmland compensations. Second, potential interactions between compensation amount and compensation mode are taken into account in estimating factors affecting farmers’ satisfaction.

As the third-largest crop in China, wheat production plays an essential role in China's agricultural production, food processing and consumption structure. Besides, China is the world’s largest wheat producer and consumer, where it produces 14.83% of the world's total wheat production in 2017. So it is necessary to analyze and evaluate the government policy for wheat production in China using PAM. This research depends on the data has issued by the National Development and Reform Commission/China statistics press 2018 (National farm production cost-benefit survey 2017). The outcomes of this paper showed that the coefficients measures confirm there is government support for wheat production, that indicates, farmers are getting prices higher than global prices by the continuation of the current policy. While there was no comparable advantage has shown for Chinese wheat product in social prices due to the government intervention in the prices of production outputs. Where this policy representation indexes show that the policy for wheat production 2017 supported the farmers on the consumer cost.

The Rural Collective Property Rights System Reform (RCPRSR) is a process of evolution along with the equilibrium point of the game theory. It is also an institutional change involving China’s primary economic system and rural basic management system. This paper used the stakeholder theory to determine the main stakeholders in the RCPRSR and then analyzed the behavior mechanism of the main stakeholders through the method of game theory. The results indicate that the main stakeholders are farmers, village organizations, and government. The Nash equilibrium solution is executing and joining respectively village organizations and farmers. Game theory also suggests that the RCPRSR is a gradual and repetitive dynamic process, not the result of one-time rational design. Based on the conclusions of the research, it indicates that should raise the enthusiasm of the village organization. This can increase the income of farmers and flourish the rural economy of China.