A limited inquiry into cooperative governance and performance suggests that best practices from corporate governance literature may not apply uniformly to cooperatives. The rarely addressed issue of endogeneity limits confidence in recommendations for corporations and cooperatives alike and inference of recommendations for cooperatives is complicated by availability of appropriate performance measures. By accounting for the most commonly recognized sources of endogeneity and measuring overall cooperative performance, expectations of better performance by larger cooperatives with smaller boards are confirmed, while limited evidence is obtained on the expected positive effects of seating outside experts on the board.

This study investigates factors influencing coordination of the California grape and wine supply chain. Results corroborate prior findings that quality considerations and needs to protect investments in specialized or durable assets significantly increase usage of more formal coordination mechanisms, such as formal contracts and vertical integration or ownership. Consistent with findings for other industries, such investments are associated with greater contract complexity and inclusion of enforcement provisions, while trade partners' prior experience working together decreases contract complexity. Furthermore, our results suggest that quality considerations extend to greater use of formal contracts further downstream. (JEL Classifications: L1, L2, Q13)