Much attention has been paid world-wide to the advancement of policy with regard to public–private partnerships (PPPs). Though PPPs continue to play a major role in the development of China’s national economy, capital projects and infrastructure upgrade, little work has been done to understand the evolution of Chinese governmental policy with regard to PPPs. This paper addresses this lack and sets out the trajectory of Chinese PPP policy maturation over the period of 1986 to 2018. Policy documents were retrieved from official government websites, such as the Ministry of Finance and National Development and Reform Commission, with some 205 policy statements deemed relevant to PPPs. These were then classified by type and submitted to regression analysis. Five major instruments in support of PPPs were identified, including fiscal, financial, taxation, land and operations support. Moreover, four historical policy phases can be identified in the Chinese PPP market, including ‘try’, ‘explore’, ‘expand’ and ‘consolidate’. While governmental policy may now be considered sophisticated, deficiencies remain, including insufficient policy coordination between departments, lack of financial incentives and poor transparency and disclosure supervision. These observations will inform policy makers as they look to continue advancement of PPP policy measures, and help practitioners in assessing the pitfalls of operating in the Chinese PPP market.

Purpose: The Public–Private Partnership (PPP) modality plays an important role in the procurement of global infrastructure projects. Regarding PPP's complex transaction structure, pricing of a PPP project is critical to both parties where the government pursues a high value for money (VFM) and the investor strives to maximize its financial gains. Despite the straightforward win–win principle, a formidable compromise is often the case to end up with a fairly acceptable price, subject to many determinants such as the risk profile, expected return, technological innovation and capacities of both parties. Among them, this study chooses to examine the “managing flexibility” (MF) capacity of investors in pricing of a PPP project, in light of the widely recognized importance of a real-option perspective toward the long term, complex and uncertain PPP arrangement. This study addresses two major questions: (1) how is MF in PPP projects to be valued and (2) how are PPP projects to be priced when considering a project's MF value.Design/methodology/approach: A binomial tree model is used to evaluate the MF value in PPP projects. Based on the developed MF pricing model, net present value (NPV) and adjusted VFM value are then calculated. Finally, a multi-objective decision-making method (MODM) was adopted to determine the optimal level of returns based on invested capital (ROIC), return on operation maintenance (ROOM) and concession period.Findings: The applicability and functionality of the proposed model is investigated using a real project case. For a given return, extended NPV and adjusted VFM value were calculated and analyzed using sensitivity analysis. Factor influence is shown by the model to be dependent on factor impact on cash flow. Subsequently, a multi-objective decision-making (MODM) model was adopted to determine the optimal level of returns, where the solution approximates the real-world bidding price. Results confirm that the pricing model provides a reliable and practical PPP proposal pricing tool.Originality/value: This study proposes an integrated framework for valuing MF in PPP projects and thus more accurately determine optimal pricing of PPP projects than revealed in extant research. The model offers a practical tool to aid in the valuation of PPP projects.

Purpose: Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) are crucial to the procurement of global infrastructure projects. Moreover, a price mode based on a cluster of core concessionary items is key to the delivery of value-for-money and successful project outcomes. However, existing research has yet to fully identify PPP concessionary items, nor yet described the range of practical price modes. This study provides taxonomy of core concessionary items impacting PPP projects, systematically classifies price modes, and assesses the applicability and risk impacts of those price modes on PPP projects.Design/methodology/approach: This study adopts a comparative case study method in analyzing core concessionary items and alternative price modes. China is taken as the context, as it is one of the world’s largest PPP markets. In ensuring research validity and reliability, diverse data sources are utilized, with a graphic content analysis tool developed to capture the structure of price modes.Findings: Eight PPP price modes are identified. These are: (1) UP (Unit Price) mode, (2) ALS (Annual Lump Sum) mode, (3) IRR (Internal Rate of Return) mode, (4) RP (Return for Investing Capital (RIC) - Profit Rate of O&M (PROM)) mode, (5) RFP (RIC - Financing Interest Rate (FR) - PROM) mode, (6) RFPL (RIC - FR - PROM - Lower Limit of User Charge (LLoUC)) mode, (7) RFL (RIC - FR - Lump Sum/Fixed Unit Price O&M Contract (LSOM/FUP)) mode, and (8) RFLL (RIC - FR - LSOM/FUP - LLoUC) mode. Other main findings are as follows: (1) Five risk allocation configurations can be achieved via these price modes. Yet while different price modes enable the allocation of specific risks, these do not always align with contracting parties’ original intentions. (2) IRR and RP modes may be less applicable in general because of their vulnerability in allocating critical risks and capacity for spurring opportunistic behavior.Originality/value: By depicting the paths by which concessionary items in price modes affect cash flow, a systematic analysis of price modes was conducted exposing structural characteristics, along with risk allocation choice implications. The study is unique in: (1) Providing a systematic classification of PPP price modes used in PPP projects, (2) Presenting a comprehensive identification and streamlining of concessionary items in PPP practice, and (3) Analyzing the risk effects of different price modes. Together, these outcomes offer a hitherto unavailable perspective on PPP project risk management. The value of the study lies in the following: (1) Existing studies employ diverse concessionary items, but their applicability varies. This study offers an overarching framework facilitating decision-making in selecting appropriate PPP price modes and in determining concessionary items. (2) This study adds to the understanding of PPP price modes in significant ways that will aid local governments and potential sponsors in crafting and administrating more workable contract designs.