Environmental governance is an important component of the national governance system. China’s current environmental problems are particularly complex. How to let the government, enterprises, and the public participate in environmental governance is the key to enhance the ability of environmental governance. Based on the evolutionary game theory, the interaction and influencing factors among enterprise pollution control, government supervision, and public participation are analyzed, and the empirical analysis is carried out based on China’s 30 provincial panel data from 2009 to 2018. The research results show that government supervision has a positive effect on the environmental governance and can urge enterprises to actively perform pollution control. The effect of government supervision is constrained by the income and cost of enterprises, and the penalties for passive pollution control should be raised. At the same time, improving the government’s reputation loss can effectively stimulate the government’s environmental supervision behavior. Public participation significantly promotes the governance effect of three industrial wastes, and the enthusiasm of public participation is closely related to participation cost and psychological benefits. Public participation can replace government supervision to a certain extent. The interaction between government and public has a positive effect on environmental governance. The research results will help to build an effective environmental governance system and improve environmental governance performance and public satisfaction.

The uncertainty and complexity of natural hazards put forward new requirements for emergency management systems. In order to deal with natural hazards effectively, it is important to build a cooperative network between government organizations and social organizations. The social network analysis method is adopted, the April 2013 Ya’an China earthquake is taken as a case study, the institutionalized emergency organization network before the disaster and the actual response organization network after the disaster are analyzed, and centrality, between centrality, closeness centrality and core-periphery are calculated. Through qualitative and quantitative research, the functions of social organization in the process of natural hazards emergency relief are revealed, the role orientation of social organization in the emergency management network is analyzed, and the influence factors of the social organization participation in the natural hazards relief is pointed out. Research results will help to promote the cooperation between social organization and government, and improve the efficiency of natural hazards emergency relief.

At present, in light of new situations and the new task of natural hazard response, effective public participation in emergency relief has become an urgent task that can reduce economic losses and casualties. The purpose of this paper is to construct a natural hazard emergency relief alliance and analyze the mechanisms and dynamics of public participation. In this study, methods based on a multi-agent system were adopted, and we used different participants as heterogeneous agents with different attitudes and resources. Using four different processes, namely participation proposals, negotiation interval, negotiation decision-making function, and participation strategy, we comprehensively construct an emergency relief alliance for natural hazards. In addition, the dynamic public interaction process is analyzed and a construction algorithm is given. The experimental results show that the proposed method has better performance in alliance formation efficiency, negotiation efficiency, and agent utility. The research results illustrate that the public’s attitudes and resources influence the construction of emergency relief alliances; a greater degree of public participation contributes to a more efficient alliance formation. The findings of this study contribute to the promotion of public cooperation and improvement in the efficiency of natural hazard emergency relief.