Emin Karagozoglu

Dr. Emin Karagozoglu

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 November 2015 in Management Science
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Journal Article
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EKEmin Karagozoglu
Emin Karagozoglu
ARArno Riedl
Arno Riedl
We experimentally explore the effect of performance information and production uncertainties on (i) subjective entitlements derived from the production process and (ii) bargaining over the jointly produced surplus. We hypothesize that performance information and details of the production process affect entitlements, which in turn influence bargaining behavior. We find that, without performance information, subjective entitlements are mostly mutually consistent, and bargaining mainly ends with an equal split. In stark contrast, negotiators derive strong, mutually inconsistent, subjective entitlements when there is performance information. These subjective entitlements affect opening proposals, concessions, and bargaining duration and lead to asymmetric agreements. Moreover, given performance information, endogenous variations in entitlements influence bargaining, suggesting an independent role of subjective entitlements. Production uncertainties influence bargaining, especially when performance information is present, but do not substantially mitigate the effect of entitlements. Theoretical bargaining models allowing for reference points or fairness principles can partly account for the empirical results. Yet, important aspects are left unexplained and our results suggest ways for extending these models.Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2012 .This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.

1 September 2016 in Games and Economic Behavior
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GBGary E. Bolton
Gary E. Bolton
EKEmin Karagozoglu
Emin Karagozoglu

15 June 2018 in Experimental Economics
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Journal Article
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EKEmin Karagozoglu
Emin Karagozoglu
MKMartin G. Kocher
Martin G. Kocher
We experimentally investigate the effect of time pressure from deadlines in a rich-context bargaining game with an induced reference point at the 2/3-1/3 distribution. Our results show that first proposals, concessions, and settlements are very similar for different time-pressure levels. Nevertheless, time pressure systematically influences the type of agreements reached: the likelihood of bargainers reaching agreements on the equal split is lower under time pressure. Furthermore, disagreements and last-moment-agreements (conditional on reaching an agreement) are more frequently observed under time pressure, though the effect on last-moment agreements disappears when disagreements are included in the analysis. Finally, the effect of time-pressure on the frequency of disagreements is stronger for those pairs with higher tension in first proposals.

9 June 2016 in Group Decision and Negotiation
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EKEmin Karagozoglu
Emin Karagozoglu
ÜUÜmit Barış Urhan
Ümit Barış Urhan

1 May 2012 in Mathematical Social Sciences
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Journal Article
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IAItai Ashlagi
Itai Ashlagi
EKEmin Karagozoglu
Emin Karagozoglu
BKBettina Klaus
Bettina Klaus
We consider estate division problems and show that for any claim game based on a (estate division) rule satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and order preservation of awards, all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria induce equal division. Next, we consider (estate division) rules satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and claims monotonicity. Then, for claim games with at most three agents, again all Nash equilibria induce equal division. Surprisingly, this result does not extend to claim games with more than three agents. However, if nonbossiness is added, then equal division is restored. Highlights ► We consider estate division problems, a generalization of bankruptcy problems, in which a positive-valued estate has to be divided among a set of agents. ► We show that for any claim game based on a (estate division) rule satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and order preservation of awards, all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria induce equal division. ► All our results point towards the same intuitive message: if it is impossible or difficult to test the legitimacy of claims, the conflict will escalate to the highest possible level and equal division is the “non-discriminating” outcome in Nash equilibrium

16 November 2019
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EKEmin Karagozoglu
Emin Karagozoglu