Russell Golman

Prof. Russell Golman

Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 September 2022 in Management Science
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Journal Article
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RGRussell Golman
Russell Golman
GLGeorge Loewenstein
George Loewenstein
AMAndras Molnar
Andras Molnar
SSSilvia Saccardo
Silvia Saccardo
Management scientists recognize that decision making depends on the information people have but lack a unified behavioral theory of the demand for (and avoidance of) information. Drawing on an existing theoretical framework in which utility depends on beliefs and the attention paid to them, we develop and test a theory of the demand for information encompassing instrumental considerations, curiosity, and desire to direct attention to beliefs one feels good about. We decompose an individual’s demand for information into the desire to refine beliefs, holding attention constant, and the desire to focus attention on anticipated beliefs, holding these beliefs constant. Because the utility of resolving uncertainty (i.e., refining beliefs) depends on the attention paid to it and more important or salient questions capture more attention, demand for information depends on the importance and salience of the question(s) it addresses. In addition, because getting new information focuses attention on one’s beliefs and people want to savor good news and ignore bad news, the desire to obtain or avoid information depends on the valence (i.e., goodness or badness) of anticipated beliefs. Five experiments (n = 2,361) test and find support for these hypotheses, looking at neutrally valenced as well as ego-relevant information. People are indeed more inclined to acquire information (a) when it feels more important, even if it cannot aid decision making (Experiments 1A and 2A); (b) when a question is more salient, manipulated through time lag (Experiments 1B and 2B); and (c) when anticipated beliefs have higher valence (Experiment 2C). This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.

1 January 2021 in Psychological Review
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RGRussell Golman
Russell Golman
NGNikolos Gurney
Nikolos Gurney
GLGeorge Loewenstein
George Loewenstein
We apply a model of preferences about the presence and absence of information to the domain of decision making under risk and ambiguity. An uncertain prospect exposes an individual to 1 or more information gaps, specific unanswered questions that capture attention. Gambling makes these questions more important, attracting more attention to them. To the extent that the uncertainty (or other circumstances) makes these information gaps unpleasant to think about, an individual tends to be averse to risk and ambiguity. Yet in circumstances in which thinking about an information gap is pleasant, an individual may exhibit risk- and ambiguity-seeking. The model provides explanations for source preference regarding uncertainty, the comparative ignorance effect under conditions of ambiguity, aversion to compound risk, and a variety of other phenomena. We present 2 empirical tests of one of the model's novel predictions, which is that people will wager more about events that they enjoy (rather than dislike) thinking about. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

1 July 2020 in Psychological Review
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RGRussell Golman
Russell Golman
SBSudeep Bhatia
Sudeep Bhatia
PKPatrick Bodilly Kane
Patrick Bodilly Kane
What are the mental operations involved in game theoretic decision making? How do players deliberate (intelligently, but perhaps imperfectly) about strategic interdependencies and ultimately decide on a strategy? We address these questions using an evidence accumulation model, with bidirectional connections between preferences for the strategies available to the decision maker and beliefs regarding the opponent's choices. Our dual accumulator model accounts for a variety of behavioral patterns, including limited iterated reasoning, payoff sensitivity, consideration of risk-reward tradeoffs, and salient label effects, and it provides a good quantitative fit to existing behavioral data. In a comparison with other popular behavioral game theoretic models fit at the individual subject level to choices across a set of games, the dual accumulator model makes the most accurate out-of-sample predictions. Additionally, as a cognitive-process model, it can also be used to make predictions about response time patterns, time pressure effects, and attention during deliberation. Stochastic sampling and dynamic accumulation, cognitive mechanisms foundational to decision making, play a critical role in explaining well-known behavioral patterns as well as in generating novel predictions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

22 April 2016 in The RAND Journal of Economics
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Journal Article
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RGRussell Golman
Russell Golman
SKSteven Klepper
Steven Klepper

1 January 2015 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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RGRussell Golman
Russell Golman
DHDavid Hagmann
David Hagmann
GLGeorge Loewenstein
George Loewenstein
We commonly think of information as a means to an end. However, a growing theoretical and experimental literature suggests that information may directly enter the agent’s utility function. This can create an incentive to avoid information, even when it is useful, free, and independent of strategic considerations. We review research documenting the occurrence of information avoidance as well as theoretical and empirical research on reasons for why people avoid information, drawing from economics, psychology, and other disciplines. The review concludes with a discussion of some of the diverse (and often costly) individual and societal consequences of information avoidance.

24 May 2015 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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RGRussell Golman
Russell Golman
GLGeorge F. Loewenstein
George F. Loewenstein
NGNikolos Gurney
Nikolos Gurney
We apply a model of preferences for information to the domain of decision making under risk and ambiguity. An uncertain prospect exposes an individual to an information gap. Gambling makes the missing information more important, attracting more attention to the information gap. To the extent that the uncertainty (or other circumstances) makes the information gap unpleasant to think about, an individual tends to be averse to risk and ambiguity. Yet in circumstances in which thinking about an information gap is pleasant, an individual may exhibit risk- and ambiguity-seeking. The model provides explanations for source preference regarding uncertainty, the comparative ignorance effect under conditions of ambiguity, aversion to compound risk, and a variety of other phenomena. We present an empirical test of one of the model’s novel predictions.