Background: Emotional eating, the tendency to overeat in response to negative emotions, has been linked to weight gain. However, scant evidence exists examining the prevalence and correlates of emotional eating among large samples of adults in the United States (U.S.). Hence, we examine the relationship among individual and socioeconomic factors, health behaviors, and self-regulation with emotional eating patterns among U.S. adults. Methods: Cross-sectional analysis of 5863 Family Health Habits Survey participants. Multivariable, ordered, logistic regression was employed to examine the relationship between the frequency of the desire to eat when emotionally upset (never, rarely, sometimes, often, and very often) and the independent variables. Results: Analysis reveals that 20.5% of the sample tended to emotionally eat often or very often. Being female, non-Hispanic White, and of younger age were all related to a higher likelihood of emotional eating. Additionally, inability to delay gratification (impatience) was related to an 18% increased likelihood (95% confidence interval (CI) 1.05–1.33) for emotional eating. Finally, emotional eating was significantly related to more frequent fast-food consumption. Conclusions: Program planners might need to develop targeted interventions aimed at enhancing emotional regulation skills while addressing these less healthful behaviors (e.g., fast-food intake) with the goal of obesity and chronic disease prevention.

The objective of this study was to quantify changes in the affordability of sugar-sweetened beverages, a product implicated as a contributor to rising rates of obesity worldwide, as a function of product price and personal income. We used international survey data in a retrospective analysis of 40 high-income and 42 low-income and middle-income countries from 1990 to 2016. Prices of sugar-sweetened beverages were from the Economist Intelligence Unit's World Cost of Living Survey. Income and inflation data were from the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook Database. The measure of affordability was the average annual percentage change in the relative-income price of sugar-sweetened beverages, which is the annual rate of change in the proportion of per capita gross domestic product needed to purchase 100 L of Coca-Cola in each country in each year of the study. In 79 of 82 countries, the proportion of income needed to purchase sugar-sweetened beverages declined on average (using annual measures) during the study period. This pattern, described as an increase in the affordability of sugar-sweetened beverages, indicated that sugar-sweetened beverages became more affordable more rapidly in low-income and middle-income countries than in high-income countries, a fact largely attributable to the higher rate of income growth in those countries than to a decline in the real price of sugar-sweetened beverages. Without deliberate policy action to raise prices, sugar-sweetened beverages are likely to become more affordable and more widely consumed around the world.

The issue of whether or not money influences policymaking has been widely debated in American politics. While a direct link between money and policy outcomes has proven difficult to make, bureaucratic decisions on trade protection provide an opportunity to link politically active firms and industries to policy outcomes. The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) and the U.S. Department of Commerce both play a major role in making trade policy by administering several important trade laws, including the U.S. antidumping law. Firms can petition the ITC and Commerce for protection from foreign firms that are alleged to engage in the unfair practice of dumping their goods on the U.S. market. Evidence suggests, however, that firms use this law as a means of seeking protection from foreign competition, even when that competition is fair. As the stakes are high for both domestic and foreign firms, there is the potential for political influence. Focusing on lobbying activities and campaign contributions, we analyze the influence of domestic and foreign monies on bureaucratic decisionmaking on trade policy.