Rainer Michael Rilke

Dr. Rainer Michael Rilke

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 February 2013 in Journal of Economic Psychology
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Journal Article
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JCJulian Conrads
Julian Conrads
BIBernd Irlenbusch
Bernd Irlenbusch
RRRainer Michael Rilke
Rainer Michael Rilke
GWGari Walkowitz
Gari Walkowitz

1 April 2014 in Economics Letters
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Journal Article
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JCJulian Conrads
Julian Conrads
BIBernd Irlenbusch
Bernd Irlenbusch
RRRainer Michael Rilke
Rainer Michael Rilke
ASAnne Schielke
Anne Schielke
GWGari Walkowitz
Gari Walkowitz

17 August 2017 in International Journal of Game Theory
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Journal Article
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HHHeike Hennig-Schmidt
Heike Hennig-Schmidt
BIBernd Irlenbusch
Bernd Irlenbusch
RRRainer Michael Rilke
Rainer Michael Rilke
GWGari Walkowitz
Gari Walkowitz

6 June 2018 in Experimental Economics
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Journal Article
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BIBernd Irlenbusch
Bernd Irlenbusch
RRRainer Michael Rilke
Rainer Michael Rilke
GWGari Walkowitz
Gari Walkowitz
We analyze the effects of limited feedback on beliefs and contributions in a repeated public goods game setting. In a first experiment, we test whether exogenously determined feedback about a good example (i.e., the maximum contribution in a period) in contrast to a bad example (i.e., the minimum contribution in a period) induces higher contributions. We find that when the type of feedback is not transparent to the group members, good examples boost cooperation while bad examples hamper it. There is no difference when the type of feedback is transparent. In a second experiment, feedback is endogenously chosen by a group leader. The results show that a large majority of the group leaders count on the positive effect of providing a good example. This is true regardless whether they choose the feedback type to be transparent or non-transparent. Half of the group leaders make the type of feedback transparent. With endogenously chosen feedback about good examples no difference in contributions can be observed among transparent and non-transparent feedback selection. In both experiments feedback shapes subjects’ beliefs. With exogenously chosen feedback, transparent feedback tends to reduce beliefs when good examples are provided as feedback and tends to increase beliefs in when bad examples are provided as feedback compared to the respective non-transparent cases. Our results shed new light on the design of feedback provision in public goods settings.

1 September 2023 in Experimental Economics
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MFMira Fischer
Mira Fischer
RRRainer Michael Rilke
Rainer Michael Rilke
BYB. Burcin Yurtoglu
B. Burcin Yurtoglu
We investigate the effect of team formation and task characteristics on performance in high-stakes team tasks. In two field experiments, randomly assigned teams performed significantly better than self-selected teams in a task that allowed for an unequal work distribution. The effect was reversed if the task required the two team members to contribute more equally. Investigating mechanisms, we observe that teams become more similar in ability and report to cooperate better when team members can choose each other. We show how different levels of skill complementarity across tasks may explain our results: If team performance largely depends on the abilities of one team member, random team assignment may be preferred because it leads to a more equal distribution of skills across teams. However, if both team members’ abilities play a significant role in team production, the advantage of random assignment is reduced, and the value of team cooperation increases.

1 July 2015 in Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
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JLJan-Erik Lönnqvist
Jan-Erik Lönnqvist
RRRainer Michael Rilke
Rainer Michael Rilke
GWGari Walkowitz
Gari Walkowitz