We extend the Fama-French (1992) model by considering growth option (as well as distress/leverage) variables in explaining the cross section of stock returns. We find that growth option variables, namely growth in capital investment and yet-unexercised growth options (GO), are significantly and negatively related to stock returns. Investors may be willing to accept lower average returns from growth stocks in exchange for a more favorable (positively skewed) risk-return profile. Book-to-market (BM) ratio seems to proxy for omitted distress/leverage variables. When these are explicitly accounted for, BM is not that significant. Our growth options variables have added explanatory power.
17 May 2015 in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
We provide new evidence on the economic role of growth options behind the profitability, distress, lotteryness, and volatility anomalies. We use idiosyncratic skewness to measure growth options and estimate expected idiosyncratic skewness capturing investors’ expectations about the firm’s mix of growth options versus assets-in-place. We find that investors require a positive premium to hold stocks of inflexible firms with low growth options and negative expected skewness and that a newly proposed skewness factor based on growth options explains the aforementioned anomalies. Thus, the new measure of expected idiosyncratic skewness may serve to reduce the number of anomalies in the literature.
This paper examines whether oil price shocks of different origin affect the price of carbon emission allowance traded under the European Union's Emissions Trading System; leading to changes in aggregate and sector-specific European equity returns. The results show that an unexpected oil-supply disruption has an imminent but weak positive effect on carbon emission price, while a positive aggregate demand shock has a strong positive effect on carbon emission price. By contrast, a positive oil-specific (precautionary) demand shock has a negative but weak effect on carbon emission price. These findings are economically important as positive shocks on the emission allowance price trigger a decrease on the aggregate stock return of the European equity market, albeit they trigger a large and persistent increase on European equity returns of oil-related industries with the exception of the Energy sector.
17 September 2017 in European Financial Management
Using order flow imbalance as a measure of sentiment we show that positive and negative shocks to sentiment lead to lower co‐movement between portfolio and market returns in the post‐shock period. Furthermore, an asymmetry is present as positive shocks to sentiment have less impact on co‐movement changes than negative shocks. Moreover, shocks to retail sentiment and the sentiment of two types of institutional investors lead to a reduction in co‐movement. Positive shocks to institutional order flow imbalance lead to smaller reductions in co‐movement than associated with retail shocks. These effects exist even after controlling for firm‐specific and market‐wide news.
27 August 2023 in Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments
In 2013, the European Union's Emission Trading Scheme (EU‐ETS) entered Phase III. The majority of emission permits in Phase III are auctioned instead of being allocated for free as in Phases I and II. Using a difference‐in‐differences method, we show that this change has led to an increase in the financial distress risk of the EU‐ETS‐regulated firms when compared to unregulated firms, suggesting that the EU‐ETS imposes a significant financial burden on regulated firms. This result is robust to an array of validation tests, alleviating concerns that it is driven by unobserved factors. In additional analyses we show that the increase in distress risk of regulated firms during Phase III can be explained by, (i) an additional climate regulation cost to purchase pollution permits and (ii) a low average environmental score that possibly (via high sustainability risk) lowers investors expectations regarding firms’ performance. Our findings also show that the distress risk increase is higher for regulated firms operating within countries with lower control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and voice accountability before the EU‐ETS implementation.